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I. INTRODUCTION
I need to start this piece with two confessions. First, when I called the
SMU Law Review inquiring about the possibility of an "in
memoriam" issue for the Honorable Harold Barefoot Sanders, I
knew the idea was not unique to me. That mine might have been the first
phone call and that I would be the "guest editor" for the volume simply
reflects my good luck and the confluence of unique circumstances; I am
the only Judge Sanders law clerk on the faculty at the Dedman School of
Law. I must also confess my first reaction to my own idea was extreme
reluctance, not because I did not think Judge Sanders' career-his politi-
cal career, but more importantly his judicial career-was unworthy of ex-
amination or could not offer intriguing insights into the art and craft of
judging. But because I knew he would think I had better things to do
with my time. From my first meeting with Judge Sanders during my
clerkship interview in chambers in my third year of law school through
my last meeting with him at an impromptu luncheon in the midst of the
recent presidential primary, what stands out in my mind was his arresting
directness, his willingness to get to the point, his balanced personal ap-
proach, which demanded that all who came into his chambers and his
court be treated with respect, and his humility. Not a false "awe shucks"
style which often conceals bravado and arrogance, but a sense of his own
humanity, rooted in personal integrity and awareness of the responsibili-
ties he assumed over the years; simply stated-his modest sense of his
own role in history. I can hear Judge Sanders teasing me, "Now Mo,
don't make this into a big deal." That wonderful drawl and impish grin
peeking out from under a shock of hair, daring his law clerks to take
themselves too seriously while demanding they take their jobs very seri-
ously. If Judge Sanders wanted to be remembered for anything it would
be for doing his job well. And I am sure, as far as Judge Sanders is con-
cerned, I could stop right there. With all due respect Your Honor, I think
there are important lessons to be learned from you as a federal district
trial court judge that go beyond simply acknowledging your judicial ca-
reer and thanking you from the bottom of my heart for teaching, goading,
teasing, mentoring, challenging, laughing with, and encouraging all your
law clerks for almost thirty years.
I did not set out in this piece to explain Judge Harold Barefoot Sand-
ers' judicial philosophy or his theory of judging; I can imagine the look on
his face had I ever had the temerity to ask such questions. This is a much
more modest undertaking, but one I think of which Judge Sanders would
approve. Taking this moment to honor and reflect on a judicial career
that spans thirty years provides all of us-lawyers, jurists, academics, and
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lay people alike-a unique perspective on the federal courts, especially
federal trial courts, as the messy, human institutions they are and the im-
portant role these institutions play in our constitutional democracy. The
"judicial enterprise" is "complex, uncertain, and sometimes inconsis-
tent."1 Fortunately we have moved past the point where we think of a
trial court's actions as involving the narrow application of law to facts, a
highly deterministic paradigm of adjudication, to a point where we recog-
nize the inherent scope of discretion accorded judges, who must meet and
manage the litigation filed in the federal courts.2 The "rule of law" as a
normative ideal guides all jurists, but as a positive theory, it is an overly
simplistic description of what happens in a trial court and belies the com-
plexity of the decisions judges routinely render.3 How do they do this?
Rule 1 of the federal rules tells trial judges they should exercise their
power and authority, which includes a large dose of managerial and adju-
dicative discretion, to achieve the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determi-
nation" of the case. 4 In this piece, and in this issue, Judge Sanders' law
clerks reflect on their experiences in chambers, working with Judge Sand-
ers, attempting to do just that.
A. TRUTH AND MEMORY
In a recent study of the federal courts as constitutional laboratories, I
discuss the potential and limitation inherent in writing from the perspec-
tive of a "participant-observer." '5 I find myself in a similar situation writ-
ing about Judge Sanders. I am here in large part because I was one of his
law clerks, and I agreed to solicit contributions for this issue from Judge
Sanders' clerks, lawyers who appeared before him, fellow jurists, and le-
gal scholars. In my prior study of the federal courts, I focused on a single
case as it made its way through the federal courts;6 in this Article, I focus
on a single judge. But I cannot claim the insights provided here as solely
my own. Judge Sanders' clerks responded to questionnaires, took time to
write their own reminiscences, and generally supported this project. In
1. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY:
THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, at ix (2002).
2. See, e.g., Maureen Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions and the Co-
nundrum of the Close Case, 50 SMU L. REV. 493, 507-24 (1997) (discussing the indetermi-
nacy debate that captured the legal academy and its resolution, which acknowledges the
legitimate scope of a trial judge's judicial discretion in both the managerial and adjudica-
tive arena) [hereinafter Armour, Rethinking]; Maureen N. Armour, Practice Makes Perfect:
Judicial Discretion and the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11, 24 HoFSTRA L. REV. 677, 705-18
(1996) (discussing the paradigm of judicial discretion as a skill developed through the reso-
lution of numerous individual cases, especially in the managerial and procedural arena)
[hereinafter Armour, Practice].
3. RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 143 (2008) (presenting a thoughtful
and thorough analysis of judging that offers insight into the difference between appellate
and trial judges by focusing, as he points out, not on normative mandates but positive
descriptions).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
5. Maureen N. Armour, Federal Courts as Constitutional Laboratories: The Rat's
Point of View, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 135, 139-45 (2008).
6. See generally id.
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addition, two of the primary attorneys involved in the Tasby Litigation 7
agreed to write about their experiences, and Mr. Sam Tasby, at the age of
eighty-seven, agreed to be interviewed for this issue.
In supporting this project, all the individuals who contributed reflected
on their own experiences in order to answer the questions: What made
the Honorable Judge Harold Barefoot Sanders an outstanding jurist?
What makes a great trial judge? Unlike the growing body of empirical
work on courts found in the academic literature,8 this "study" is grounded
in data mined from personal histories and the objectivity accorded us as
humans when we are willing to step back and reflect critically on our own
experiences. Contributors' memories of Judge Harold Barefoot Sanders
can always be questioned; the passage of time, personal predilections, and
intervening events inevitably shape our memories. But the collection of
stories and reminiscences provided by contributors to this project reflect
commonalities, similar experiences, and a common vision of time spent in
the daily workings of Judge Sanders' court. While each of us has his or
her personal story to tell, it is striking how the stories collected here share
the ring of truth that is the ultimate test of history.
In 1991, James Atlas wrote an article entitled Stranger Than Fiction,9 in
which he explored the idea that historians and journalists-and I would
argue, lawyers and judges-can get the facts right but miss the historical
"truth." As we embark on the task of writing a small piece of judicial
history, we are confronted with the inevitable gap between the "lived
event" and "its subsequent narration" even if we are the ones who lived
the event and are providing its subsequent narration. 10 If facts are slip-
pery, then interpreting facts, giving them color and intentionality, depth
and purpose, context, a past, and a future, is even more problematic. In
undertaking to be the guest editor for this special issue of the SMU Law
7. See infra note 116; see also Edward Cloutman, Reflections on Judge Barefoot Sand-
ers, 62 SMU L. REV. 1691 (2009); Robert Thomas, Longest and Largest-Judge Sanders
and the Tasby Case, 62 SMU L. REV. 1737 (2009). Mr. Edward Cloutman and Mr. Robert
Thomas, key attorneys in the Tasby Litigation, have graciously offered their reminiscences
of the case.
8. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS: BEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF AMERI-
CAN APPELLATE COURTS (Sheldon Goldman & Charles M. Lamb eds., 2008); Theodore
Eisenberg et al, Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 743 (2002); Monique C. Lillard & Ruth Colker, Empirical Studies: How Do Discrimi-
nation Cases Fare in Court?, 7 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL'Y J. 533 (2003); James Edward
Maule, Instant Replay, Weak Teams, and Disputed Calls: An Empirical Study of Alleged
Tax Court Judge Bias, 66 TENN. L. REV. 351 (1999); Sean M. McEldowney, New Insights on
the "Death" of Obviousness: An Empirical Study of District Court Obviousness Opinions,
2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4; Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Em-
pirical Study of Continuation Bias in Small-Business Bankruptcies, 50 J. L. & ECON. 381
(2007); Robert Newman et al., A Methodological Critique of the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Question: An Empirical and Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money on the
Judicial Function, 69 LA. L. REV. 307 (2009); Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study
of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism,
27 REV. LITIG. 669 (2008).
9. James Atlas, Stranger Than Fiction, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 23, 1991, at 40-42.




Review, I did not set out to write a definitive history of Judge Sanders'
judicial career; all of us involved in this project modestly claim to do little
more than offer our memories and perspective on the "lived events of
Judge Sanders' career" as we experienced them and as we now reflect
upon them. Others who shared these events with us might disagree with
our presentation, but I doubt that they deny we are telling the "truth"
about Judge Sanders as a practicing jurist.
II. THE POWERFUL ROLE OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
Federal courts are institutions that play a critical role in legitimating
the political order by shaping the array of constitutional, and civil and
criminal federal laws that mediate the relationship between government
and individuals. In addition, they play a significant role in the enforce-
ment of private law through their diversity jurisdiction. In these roles
they are often the court of first and last resort, a foundational democratic
institution.'1 But it is a rare trial judge who sees himself from this lofty
perspective. If there is a single truth shared by federal trial court judges it
is this: their daily decisions, no matter how discrete or discretionary, af-
fect the lives of individuals. It is the trial judge who hears the litigant's
voice in the courtroom, who watches a witness being cross-examined, and
who must objectively weigh the arguments of advocates whose ethical
duty is allegiance to their client.12 It is the trial judge who empanels the
jury and who must watch the criminal defendant's face when the jury
verdict is returned. It is the trial judge who must ultimately set the
docket, face the lawyers in the courtroom, and work to ensure that their
case moves apace. These judges understand that their first and most im-
portant obligation is to uphold the Constitution, administer their court-
room in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Local Rules, and render even the most difficult of decisions in accordance
with applicable law. In their world, "justice" and the "rule of law" is as
much a matter of effective docket management as it is a function of ren-
dering transparent judicial opinions.
The fact that within the institution of the federal courts, trial courts are
"the first, best, and likely only practical opportunity to obtain justice for
11. Armour, supra note 5, at 226-27. It is true that the federal courts handle state law
matters through their diversity jurisdiction, but those matters redress private law issues, or
legal relationships between individuals. My primary focus here is the role of federal courts
and judges in implementing federal law, especially federal constitutional law.
12. The Rules of Professional Responsibility distinguish between the candor due a
client when the lawyer is counseling or advising him and the duty of advocacy due that
same client when the lawyer appears in front of a tribunal. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDucr R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2008). Limited by the mandate not to burden courts with frivolous
claims, for example, in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, lawyers' ethical
obligations when they appear in court require them to balance their duties as officers of
the court with their obligations as advocates, erring, I argue, on the side of advocacy. See,
e.g., Armour, Practice, supra note 2; Armour, Rethinking, supra note 2; Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347 (2005); David
N. Yellen, "Thinking Like a Lawyer" or Acting Like a Judge?: A Response to Professor
Simon, 27 HOFsTRA L. REV. 13 (1998).
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your client" is not lost on the judges.13 Yet this is not the justice envi-
sioned by most parties, the "clash of opposing positions in the search for
simple truth [that] is the hallmark of the adversarial system."'14
This justice, in reality, is not usually meted out at trial where a jury of
lay persons sits and listens to the evidence under the watchful eye of the
neutral jurist for the simple reason that only approximately two percent
of federal cases are ever tried before a jury.15 Assuming the other cases
are decided by pre-trial summary procedures or are simply abandoned,
very few of the cases closed by a district court trial judge are, in fact,
appealed. 16 Viewed from this perspective, the formal black letter law-
making may be taken care of by the federal appellate courts, but the com-
mon law-making-the interface between people's lives and the law that
shapes our constitutional democracy-occurs daily in the district courts.17
While some commentators attempt to problematize the role of federal
judges by questioning the legitimacy of courts within a constitutional de-
mocracy on grounds that judicial discretion allows these judges too much
13. Joan Humphrey Lefkow, What Persuades When the Judge Has Discretion?, 31 Li-




17. The proposition that trial courts play a significant role in democracies by offering a
place for individual voices to be heard, a place where minorities can challenge majorities,
and a place where powerful government actors can be challenged has been explored by a
variety of writers. From their perspective the adjudicative process protects and enhances
the core democratic values of discourse, discussion, dissonance, and debate, and while ad-
versarialism has been criticized as an inefficient process for dispute resolution, its advo-
cates point to its essential role in a democracy. See, e.g., Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking
Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 769 (1995)
(exploring the role of civil rights litigators in giving a voice to their clients' stories in order
to challenge the state's majoritarian discourse justifying its unilateral imposition of power);
Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984) (arguing that adjudication of
constitutional issues is an instrument "for using state power to bring a recalcitrant reality
closer to our chosen ideals"); Joan Humphrey Lefkow, Judicial Independence, Judicial Re-
sponsibility: A District Judge's Perspective, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 361, 374 (2008) ("The
courts are an incredibly democratic institution. .... [A]nyone can file a lawsuit and have
their individual situation considered. This is grass roots democracy."); Christopher J. Pe-
ters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 312 (1997) (examining adju-
dicative law making as a form of constructive representation of individual interests, which
imbues the courts, and their decisions, with democratic legitimacy); Christopher J. Peters,
Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L. REv. 705, 710-12 (2004) (ex-
amining adjudicative speech as expression protected by the First Amendment); Judith Res-
nick, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of Court-Based
Processes are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 521 (2006) (discussing the political impor-
tance of open adjudicatory processes and the importance in a democracy of public access
to this process); Robert Rubinson, The Polyphonic Courtroom: Expanding the Possibilities
of Judicial Discourse, 101 DICK. L. REV. 3, 3-6 (1996) (examining the potential for judicial
dialogue and discourse to move from a monologic model to one that is dialogic, if not
polyphonic, in order to move the court away from the model of a dispassionate thinking
machine to a model that explicitly values individuals and ideas in resolving disputes); Rob-
ert L. Tsai, Conceptualizing Constitutional Litigation as Anti-Government Expression: A
Speech-Centered Theory of Court Access, 51 Am. U. L. REv. 835, 837 (2002) (exploring the
fundamental right of access to the federal courts as an essential aspect of the democratic
process because it is a forum that allows the individual's voice to be heard by the "state" in
the guise of a federal judge).
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power in shaping the law, this "anti-majoritarian" critique ignores the sig-
nificant and legitimate role adjudication plays in our democratic prac-
tice.18 Whether handling a dispute with the Army Corps of Engineers,1 9
resolving federal antitrust claims, 20 working with state breach of contract
laws,21 or spending thirty years eradicating "root and branch" insidious
vestiges of racial discrimination in the local school district, 22 federal dis-
trict courts take the business of dispensing "justice" on a daily basis seri-
ously. And no one understood this better than the Honorable Judge
Harold Barefoot Sanders. When he stepped onto the bench in 1979,
Judge Sanders brought with him a wealth of experience. A native of Dal-
las, Texas, a graduate of the University of Texas School of Law, a father
and husband, and veteran of World War 1I, Judge Sanders had pursued an
array of professional careers in politics, private legal practice, and law
enforcement before he accepted the challenge of the federal judiciary.23
18. See sources cited supra note 17. Professor Suzanna Sherry challenges the "counter-
majoritarian critique" (the claim that unelected judicial actors should not be "making
law") on the grounds that it fails to accurately portray what judges actually do. FARBER &
SHERRY, supra note 1, at 144-51; Suzanna Sherry, Politics and Judgment, 70 Mo. L. REV.
973, 976-81 (2005) (criticizing jurists' and scholars' misuse of the countermajoritarian cri-
tique) [hereinafter Sherry, Politics]. Professor Sherry points out that most actions taken
within a case fall squarely within the scope of the paradigmatic common law, or pragmatic,
judge's legitimate, delegated power. See Sherry, Politics, supra, at 977. The "counterma-
joritarian critique" is not raised when judges enforce docket rules, evidentiary rules, or
other nonsubstantive rules. Id. It is puzzling in this context how an analytic principle that
initially focused on decisions of the Supreme Court that "made" constitutional law, deci-
sions that interpreted the Constitution's core text, or subsequent precedent and constitu-
tional doctrine, has become so generalized in its application. Professor Sherry points out
that judges who must interpret the constitution to discharge their adjudicative responsibili-
ties are constrained in these decisions by the appellate structure of the courts, by judicial
norms of restrained decision making, and by use of common law or pragmatic paradigms of
legal decision making. Within this context claiming federal judges routinely trespass upon
the jurisdiction of elected legislative officials misperceives the essential relationship be-
tween these two branches of government in a constitutional democracy. See id. at 980-81;
see also Samuel Estreicher, Platonic Guardians of Democracy: John Hart Ely's Role for the
Supreme Court in the Constitution's Open Texture, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 (1981) (elaborat-
ing on Ely's "countermajoritarian" arguments providing a series of insightful critiques);
Christopher J. Peters, Persuasion: A Model of Majoritarianism as Adjudication, 96 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1 (2001) (critically exploring the "majoritarian" difficulty, the idea that simple
numbers equate to the only legitimate power in a democracy, by examining dimensions of
democratic participation other than elections, such as adjudication which, the author ar-
gues, is "democratically legitimate" because its core mechanism is one of persuasion, a
process of argument that incorporates a variety of methodologies and transforms "free and
equal deliberation" into a "collective decision" by proceeding according to rules the "ma-
jority" has accepted).
19. See John Carlo, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of the U.S. Army, Fort Worth Div., 539 F.
Supp. 1075, 1077 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
20. See infra notes 89-99 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Sanders' handling
of a complex antitrust summary judgment).
21. See infra notes 101-13 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Sanders' handling
of a state law breach of contract claim).
22. See infra notes 116-269 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Sanders' handling
of the local school desegregation litigation).
23. See Scott Farwell, Harold Barefoot Sanders Jr.: 1925-2008, Judge Symbolized Civil
Rights, Knew 'Fairness Took Backbone', DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 22, 2008, at 1A;
Paula Lavigne, School Desegregation Giant Honored, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 17,
2006, at 1B; Douglas Martin, Barefoot Sanders Dies: Dallas Judge Was 83, N.Y. TIMES,
2009] 1553
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It is clear, looking back over his career as a jurist, that each and every one
of these experiences played a role in preparing him for the challenges he
was about to face.
A. WHY ARE DIsTRiCT COURTS So POWERFUL?
District court judges handling litigation find themselves working within
a dynamic environment in which the underlying adjudicative facts are in
constant evolution.24 Pre-trial termination of cases, conducting trials, in-
cluding trials to the bench, handling questions of legal characterization,
those pesky mixed questions of law and fact, and handling post-trial mo-
tions and issues ensures that the trial court's primary focus is on the facts!
Unlike the appellate courts, who have the luxury of working with an es-
tablished factual record, a jury verdict, or a trial court's "Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law," the trial court judge has the responsibility of
making sure the facts are adequately developed, the factual disputes are
fairly presented, and findings of fact-the first step to raising and resolv-
ing legal disputes through the application of "law to facts"-comport with
accepted legal norms.25 Even when a district court judge is faced with an
appeal, the federal appellate courts have created doctrinal structures that
are highly deferential to the trial judge on managerial, procedural, and
factual issues, allowing the appellate judges to defer to the trial court and
step in only to reverse a lower court's decision in these areas when the
decision can be fairly characterized as an abuse of discretion.26 This pol-
icy of institutional deference makes sense because it acknowledges that
these are decisions properly delegated to the trial courts' unique exper-
tise or context such as case management, trial management, and adjudica-
tive fact finding (the trial court sitting as the finder of fact). As Judge
Posner points out, within this institutional structure "a federal district
judge has more decisional freedom than judges in career judiciaries. '27
However, when questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact are at
issue, the highly deferential abuse of discretion appellate standards, or
similar standards requiring a showing of prejudice or otherwise raising a
serious question about the conduct of the case, are set aside and the ap-
pellate court steps into the shoes of the trial court, reviewing the issues de
novo.28 If it disagrees with the district court's judgment on these issues,
Sept. 24, 2008, at B5; Barefoot Sanders, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barefoot-Sanders (last
visited Sept. 10, 2009); Barefoot Sanders Awards and Recognitions (on file with the
author).
24. Trial lawyers will tell you the facts are not final until the case is tried, because there
are always surprises.
25. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text (discussing the special fact standards
in an antitrust summary judgment).
26. Armour, supra note 5, at 154-56; Lefkow, supra note 13, at 21.
27. POSNER, supra note 3, at 142.
28. Every case involves a range of "fact" based decisions. Elizabeth G. Thornburg,
The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits on Independent Research, 28 REv. LITIG. 131,
148-57 (2008) (examining the phenomenon of defining different categories of facts in terms
of the institutional actor best positioned to make the final determination). Some of these
decisions are effortless (it was daytime, babies cry, I was angry) and warrant little appellate
1554 [Vol. 62
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the circuit substitutes its judgment for that of the trial judge. But even in
these cases, cases that involve complex legal decisions, the application of
open, malleable legal standards to complex facts, the trial judge and the
three-judge circuit panel29 revert to predictable rhetorical and adjudica-
tive strategies in rendering their opinions: they focus on the facts, they
treat the law as a "black letter" given, and they engage in as little overt
"law-making" as feasible.30 To the extent possible in these types of opin-
ions, the courts adhere as closely as is analytically possible to the norma-
tive judicial ideal of a restrained jurist appearing to do nothing more than
"apply the law to the facts."'31 As a result, "this [institutional] system
generates and tolerates tremendous variability in case outcomes at both
the trial level and the initial appellate level, three-judge panels."'32
Within this system, the district courts are truly democracy's "laborato-
ries," with their emphasis on efficient, effective, and fair dispute resolu-
tion, largely driven by the unique facts and circumstances of the given
scrutiny or comment. Id. Others, what are often called disputed or adjudicative facts,
require the involvement of a fact finder, either a jury or a judge. Id. at 147-58. The third
type of fact is found in the mixed questions of law and fact-what are often referred to as
questions of legal characterization-in which the judge applies the law to a set of facts, but
the facts are not subjected to the same rigorous scrutiny through the adversarial process as
the adjudicative facts and these facts are never submitted to a jury. Id. at 174-82. The
question of qualified immunity in a constitutional excessive force case is an interesting
example of how "fact based decisions" are treated differently, depending on whether their
determination is delegated to the jury or judge as a fact finder or to the judge as a question
of law (the legal characterization case or the "mixed question" case). Id. at 174-82; see
Vikrant P. Reddy, Not Qualified to Decide: The Fifth Circuit's Pattern Jury Instructions
Allow Juries to Decide Qualified Immunity. That's Wrong-But Who Will Change It?
(Spring 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Mr. Reddy points out that, as
of 2006, six of the federal circuit courts had reserved the question of qualified immunity to
the court as a mixed question of fact and law, while the other five circuits submitted the
question to the jury as a "pure" issue of disputed fact. Id. at 2. In both instances, the same
substantive legal standard applies, but on appeal, if the decision is considered properly
delegated to a "fact finder," the circuit court will apply a more deferential appellate stan-
dard. If the judge is fact finder, the standard of review on appeal is abuse of discretion;
however, if the decision is considered properly delegated to the court as a question of
"law" and not submitted to the judge as fact finder, the standard of review on appeal is de
novo, a standard that allows the circuit court essentially to substitute their judgment for the
trial court's.
29. The role of circuit courts within the federal system has been thoroughly explored
over the years, especially with respect to the relationship between the three judge panels
and the full circuit court rendering en banc decisions. When cases are appealed within the
federal system, most are decided by three judge panels, and the circuits make it clear they
do not want parties seeking en banc review unless there is a very good reason. See FED. R.
APP. P. 35, available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/clerk/docs/frap2007.pdf; see also
DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM (1988); WOODFORD How-
ARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SEC-
OND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS (1981); DONALD R. SONGER ET AL,
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (2000) (discuss-
ing the fact that statistical finality at the circuit level lies with the three judge panels);
Indraneel Sur, How Far Do Voices Carry: Dissents from Denial of Rehearing En Banc, 2006
WIs. L. REV. 1315 (2006).
30. Armour, supra note 5, at 155.
31. Id. at 198.
32. Id. at 225.
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case and the judicial discretion inherent in the adjudicative process. But
what ultimately guides the highly discretionary decisions of district court
judges: legal rules, institutional norms, judicial temperament, or political
context? Where does accountability lie for a district court judge: with
peers, litigants, lawyers, the public, or appellate jurists? 33 If institutional
legitimacy is grounded in the courts' perceived and actual adherence to
the normative ideal, or some might say myth, of the "rule of law," how do
we reconcile that with the discretionary power of the district courts?
Let's start with the question of "decisional freedom," or discretion. 34
How do district court judges handle this power? Particularly, how did
Judge Sanders approach this dimension of his judicial decision making?
The problem of judicial discretion is one that has challenged legal think-
ers over the decades. 35 How do we reconcile this discretion with the
"rule of law," a lofty principle deemed essential to the operation of our
constitutional democracy, especially when the lower federal courts' out-
put is so variable? If law were determinate and if the "application of law
to facts" were as simple as it sounds wouldn't the trial courts' output meet
narrower standards of predictability, wouldn't the black letter law be
more determinative of case results? Stated in more overtly political
terms, what does it mean to give "fallible" decision makers so much
power when they are not accountable to the electorate and rarely ac-
countable to other judges through appeal? One response to this conun-
drum-if discretionary decision makers who are fallible are fatal to a
legitimate system of adjudication-is to only "empower final enforcers
who are infallible: both perfectly disinterested and perfectly wise in inter-
preting a complete and principled legal order. '36 Since that is not possi-
33. POSNER, supra note 3, at 142-47 (analyzing the relative discretion, and therefore
power, of district courts and circuit courts by looking at the district judges' "decisional
freedom" relative to that of the circuit judges). In comparing the two courts, Judge Posner
examines what he finds to be key distinctions between them: (1) personal factors play more
of a role at the trial level because of the courts' "decisional freedom"; (2) federal trial
judges are constrained by the dual pressures of case backlogs and reversal on appeal; (3)
federal trial judges work alone, without the pressure to be "cooperative" that an appellate
judge must address when working with a panel or the full court; (4) federal trial judges
have less opportunity, and therefore less incentive, to "influence the law" since they focus
primarily on "factual or procedural issues specific to the particular case"; (5) federal trial
judges have less incentive to "influence the direction" in which law will evolve since their
risk of reversal is higher, reducing "rewards" for creative legal thinking; (6) "professional
criticism of judicial decisions" places a "sharper check on extravagant exercises of judicial
discretion at the appellate level than at the trial level"; (7) the appellate courts are subject
to a system of peer or professional accountability due to the public nature of their product,
published judicial opinions; and (8) quantitative output measures may play a more impor-
tant role at the trial court level than the appellate level. Id.
34. See id. at 142.
35. See Armour, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 504-24 (examining the debate over judi-
cial discretion, its legal infrastructure, and its institutional context); Armour, Practice,
supra note 2, at 705-61 (examining two paradigmatic approaches to judicial discretion, one
which defines it as skill, the favored definition within much of the federal trial courts'
managerial and procedural practice, versus principled decision making, which tends to rely
upon its own normative expression as the favored limitation on the courts' discretion).
36. Richard Stith, Securing the Rule of Law Through Interpretive Pluralism: An Argu-
ment from Comparative Law, 35 HASTIUN0s CONST. L.Q. 401, 401-02. While describing the
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ble, how do the federal trial courts work while remaining a legitimate arm
of a constitutional government? The answer is judicial pragmatism:
Pragmatism, as both a descriptive and normative theory of formal
adjudication, emphasizes the impact of context and the position of
the decision maker upon their decision .... Pragmatism has enriched
our understanding of adjudication by looking at the judicial norms
and values developed to fill in the interstices of the substantive
law .... 37
Ten years before those comments were even written, on June 1, 1986,
Judge Barefoot Sanders was described as "The Forthright Pragmatist. '38
And in 2008, Judge Richard A. Posner tells us that "[t]he word that best
describes the average American judge at all levels of our judicial hierar-
chies and yields the greatest insight into his behavior is 'pragmatist'
[or] more precisely, . . . 'constrained pragmatists'. ' ' 39 I could not agree
more.40 Federal district court judges are "sensible pragmatists" who rely
normative functions of the "rule of law," and especially its ideological and legitimating
functions in democratic societies, Professor Stith argues for interpretive pluralism, with-
drawing the interpretive hegemony of any single court within a distinct polity, such as the
United States Supreme Court. Id. at 402. As is seen in this Article and commentary cited
herein, the variability of output from the federal district courts and the circuit courts' three
judge panels suggests that we do not have a unitary interpretive structure in the United
States, since so few cases ever make it to the Supreme Court. As a practical matter, rather
than relying on the interpretive hegemony of a single court to legitimate the adjudicative
process, the day-to-day interpretation of the Constitution, federal law, and much state law
is rendered in the context of rich and fact based rulings of these lower federal courts and a
different legitimating paradigm. See Armour, supra note 5, at 154-56; Lefkow, supra note
13, at 21.
37. Armour, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 526 (exploring the development of positive
theories of judicial, managerial, and procedural pragmatism in response to the legal inde-
terminacy debate, which questioned the courts' legitimacy in the face of judicial
discretion).
38. See Bryan Woolley, Barefoot Sanders: The Forthright Pragmatist, DALLAS TIMES
HERALD'S DALLAS CITY MAG., June 1, 1986, at 10.
39. POSNER, supra note 3, at 230 (citations omitted). The legal academy has been
fascinated with the idea of pragmatism as a normative legal theory that could redress the
"problem of judicial discretion" or "doctrinal indeterminacy." See P. S. Atiyah, From Prin-
ciples to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and the Law, 65 IOWA
L. REV. 1249, 1250-51 (1980) (discussing the tension between pragmatism in the dimen-
sions of the judicial function, defined primarily as dispute resolution, and the resistance to
pragmatism, defined as the decline of principles in the judicial function, focusing primarily
on formal adjudication); Michael S. Moore, The Need for a Theory of Legal Theories: As-
sessing Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 988, 988 (1984); Edward L. Rubin,
Scholars, Judges and Phenomenology: Comments on Tamanaha's Realistic Socio-Legal
Theory, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 241, 242-46 (2000) (critiquing Brian Tamanaha's work on prag-
matism); Brian Z. Tamanaha, How an Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of Law,
56 DEPAUL L. REV. 469, 470 (2007), quoted in POSNER, supra note 3, at 203.
40. See also FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 1, at 3. Professors Farber and Sherry
critique the idea of a grand normative theory of constitutional interpretation on the
grounds that "none offers a solution to the problem of judicial discretion." Id. at 155.
According to the authors, "constitutional law is an uneasy compromise between the consti-
tutional law we expect ... and the constitutional methods we expect ... [the Court] to use.
This vision of constitutional law as an evolving compromise is often described as a 'prag-
matic' approach." Id. at 3. Pragmatists, according to the authors, use all available judicial
or common law methodologies. Id. From this perspective, law is conceptualized as a
human product, where doctrine is often messy, and case law evolves slowly. See, e.g.,
Sherry, Politics, supra note 18, at 980 (discussing common law judging and its internalized
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on a mixed strategy of pragmatism, legalism, and managerialism to move
their dockets.41 Without becoming caught up in the whys and wherefores
of the debate over the legitimacy of "pragmatic" versus "principled" deci-
sion making, these judges found a "sensible resolution" to the conun-
drum, which pushed them "to look beyond the bickering of the lawyers to
the concrete interests at stake. ' 42 But judicial pragmatism is not a sim-
plistic, result-oriented approach to adjudicating cases; rather, it is an ap-
proach that rejects narrow, scientific legalism as blinders that, rather than
ensuring fairness, shut out the real world of disputes and the reality that
district court judges' decisions directly affect litigants' lives in ways appel-
late courts may never see or realize. It is also an approach to resolving
legal disputes that does not become bogged down in the uncertainty or
malleability of the law, but accepts it as a natural part of the legal process.
In this respect, Judge Sanders bears a striking resemblance to the descrip-
tion of Judge Friendly as the essential pragmatist outlined by Judge Pos-
ner.4 3 Both shared a background of real world problems and both went
out of their way to ground their decisions in the reality of the case. For
both judges, their initial response to a case was "often an intuitive re-
sponse to [the diverse] pressures" that a case exerts on a judge-pressure
"to conform to precedent, to do justice, to achieve a socially useful re-
sult."'44 The academic debates about the legitimacy of "pragmatism" do
not interest these individuals. They, like many of their brethren, proba-
bly could not trace the philosophical dimensions of "pragmatism" and its
seeming conflict with the "rule of law." Nor would they likely consider
such an endeavor a useful exercise. As noted above, for most individu-
als-lay and professional alike-pragmatism connotes the artful blend of
law and reality in the trial court. It is a compliment, and not a philosophi-
cal critique.
judicial constraints of "fidelity to the rule of law and a preference for incremental rather
than radical change"); Linda Greenhouse, The Evolution of a Justice, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Apr. 10, 2005 (discussing, among other things, the slow evolution of Justice Blackmun's
opinions on crucial constitutional issues).
41. POSNER, supra note 3, at 238.
42. Id. at 248. This pragmatic perspective is found throughout the academic and legal
literature. Especially compelling evidence of this phenomenon are instances when judges
write about judging or when good judges are remembered. See, e.g., Joan Humphrey Lef-
kow, Judicial Independence, Judicial Responsibility: A District Judge's Perspective, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 361, 375 (2008) ("As for me, I decide cases. I deal with human
beings."); Colleen McMahon, The Monastic Life of a Federal District Judge, 70 Mo. L.
REV. 989 (2005); Lee H. Rosenthal, A View Through Chambers, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 557
(2005); William R. Wilson, Jr., Little Big Man-United States District Judge Ronald N. Da-
vies, 30 U. ARK. LrrrTE ROCK L. REV. 303 (2008); Trang Q. Tran, Independent Thinker: An
Interview with Sim Lake, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, 39 Hous.
LAw., Winter 2001, at 43 (interviewed by Joe Ahmad and Debbie Pacholder).
43. POSNER, supra note 3, at 259.
44. Id. (quoting Michael Boudin, Judge Henry Friendly and the Mirror of Constitu-
tional Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 975, 995-96 (2007)).
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B. DEMOCRATIC JUDGING WITH A SMALL "d"
Perhaps what we are describing here is less a unique dimension of the
character or judicial temperament of Judge Sanders than the phenome-
non of an individual rising to meet the challenge of a job that cannot be
discharged by adherence to a narrow normative theory of adjudication,
especially when that theory ignores the institutional role of federal courts
and the nature of the disputes they resolve. The complexities of manag-
ing and resolving disputes in a federal trial court call upon the judge's
skill and expertise as a manager, a proceduralist, a realist, and a legalist
who must interpret and apply a range of substantive laws. It is not hard
to see how, given this environment, a federal judge develops a "respect
for precedent, a dose of legal realism, a pragmatic interest in outcomes, a
respect for legal process, an insistence on relative competence, a sense of
what is practical, and a concern with judicial overreaching. '45 Simply
stated, when Judge Sanders put on his judicial robes, there was no at-
tempt to pretend he was not the same mortal he had been just moments
before.46 The image of the judge removed from the fray, sitting behind a
wall of legal principles that dictate case outcomes, a mere "discerner" 47 of
correct legal results without the need to know the litigants or understand
the personal impact of his decisions, was unacceptable to Judge Sanders.
In this regard, he was not only a pragmatic jurist, but also the quintessen-
tial democratic jurist (democrat with a small "d").
Judge Lefkow describes the federal district courts as "grassroots de-
mocracy" in action.48 But democracies do not work unless the partici-
pants know their voice will be heard, and the oppressed or disadvantaged
participants in the adjudicative process must understand that they stand
before the judge as an equal-equal to the lawyers, powerful litigants,
and even equal to the judge.49 If there is one major theme that runs
45. Id. at 259-60 (quoting Boudin, supra note 44, at 995).
46. Id. at 260 (discussing Justice Jackson's ability to bridge the "distance between
judges and mortals" (quoting G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION:
PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 232 (expanded ed. 1988))).
47. Id. at 262.
48. Lefkow, supra note 17, at 374.
49. See sources cited supra note 17. The commentators cited here offer important in-
sights into the role of adjudication and federal trial courts in the democratic process. What
their scholarship makes clear is that the essence of democratic theory, its core legitimating
norm, is its adherence to ensuring that minority opinions and individual concerns are
heard. In their turn, electoral majoritarianism and legislative representation are essentially
nondemocratic when they exclude these issues from the public discourse by silencing or
ignoring electoral minorities or outsider perspectives. Speech, as self expression and politi-
cal expression, is rendered irrelevant when the state refuses to listen; the sine qua non of a
democracy is an individual's access to public forums, where what they say matters and is
listened to with great deference and interest. It is not a stretch of the imagination to appre-
ciate that federal trial courts provide a unique and essential public forum for these voices.
See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 7-73 (1958) (discussing the essential
political nature of public discourse and the importance of dialogue in democratic theory);
Marcel Detienne, Public Space and Political Autonomy in Early Greek Cities, in PUBLIC
SPACE AND DEMOCRACY 41, 42-52 (Marcel H6naff & Tracy B. Strong eds., 2001) (collect-
ing essays that explore the role of public space and political expression in democratic the-
ory); SHELDON S. WOLIN, TOCQUEVILLE BETWEEN Two WORLDS (2003) (exploring the
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throughout this memorial issue it is this: Judge Sanders treated litigants,
especially those less well-off or less powerful, with respect, and he ex-
pected everyone in his court to do the same. His own humility and his
unwillingness to cater to arrogance, title, or self-proclaimed rights of priv-
ilege in his courtroom, ensured all an equal voice in this very public fo-
rum. And he listened. Sitting on the bench, he would hunch over and
focus his attention on the parties, the witness, or the lawyer. When any-
one appeared and took their place in his court, they received his undi-
vided attention. All this was accomplished without resort to pomp or the
pretense of judicial infallibility. Again, this was the result, not of some
deep-seated philosophy of adjudication, or even a very conscious strat-
egy; his judicial style or approach to the litigants simply reflected his own
interest in and concern for people. Judge Sanders had no desire to "hide"
from people in his judicial role, and his natural gregariousness 50 came
across even on the bench. When I say Judge Sanders was a democrat
with a small "d," what I mean is he was able to take the very messy
human process of adjudication and imbue it with a sense of humanity and
fairness.51
C. THE PRAGMATIC JUDGE AS DOCKET MANAGER
The decades beginning with the 1970s saw the rise of the managerial
judge, the ascendance of procedural pragmatism as the accepted ideology
of the federal "rule makers," and a growing emphasis on non-adjudicative
processes to dispose of litigation.52 This was the institutional context in
roots, scope and essence of American democracy). Professor Wolin tells us that "Toc-
queville was the first political theorist to treat democracy as a theoretical subject in its own
right." Id. at 59. As a political theory the "potential explosiveness of democracy lay in a
conception of the political whose first principle was that no one should be excluded-that
is ... democracy lacked a principled justification for exclusion." Id. at 61.
50. When the court went out to lunch or other events, it would take Judge Sanders
three times as long to cross the room because he stopped to talk with, it seemed to us,
everyone he knew. The law clerks teased Judge Sanders about this, pointing out that he
was an Article III Judge with lifetime tenure; he did not run the risk of losing his job in an
election.
51. See infra Part III.A-C (discussing Judge Sanders' handling of the Tasby Litigation
and the interview with Mr. Tasby). It is an obvious point but one that should be made
here: Judge Sanders was also a Democrat with a large "D."
52. See Maureen N. Armour, Public Policy Making and the Courts: Procedural Prag-
matism in an Era of Reform (1984) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); see,
e.g., Judith Resnick, Whither and Whether, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1101, 1101-02 (2006) (examin-
ing the important role adjudication has played in society by offering a public forum where
individuals, treated as equals by the state, were given a voice in resolving their disputes,
and allowing the community to observe the legitimate exercise of state authority and par-
ticipate in norm development); Judith Resnick, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the
Triumph and the Death of Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 176-77 (2003) (examin-
ing a shift in perspective in the federal judiciary in which judges are no "longer heroic solo
actors but part of a corporate body that has begun to... be suspicious of adjudication and
to prefer negotiation"); Judith Resnick, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences
for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41
UCLA L. REv. 1471, 1472 (1994) (examining whether courts should favor decisions on the
merits or settlements and the impact judicial preferences for settlement have on the politi-
cal role of the federal courts); Judith Resnick, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837 (1984) (chal-
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which Judge Sanders found himself when he took the bench in 1979.
Looking back, it is easy to see how Judge Sanders' own peculiar blend of
managerial, procedural, and adjudicative pragmatism rendered him
uniquely qualified for this "job." Judge Posner hypothesizes that federal
trial court judges' unique problem, managing a growing docket and case
backlogs, creates pressure on the courts. According to Judge Posner, this
pressure, the pressure to move cases quickly and efficiently, is at odds
with the federal trial courts' aversion to reversal by the circuit court. 53
Others have suggested that a similar tension exists between the federal
trial courts' pragmatic managerialism and the adversarial process, the for-
mer committed to efficiency in dispute resolution while the latter is com-
mitted to a lengthy, often resource-demanding, trial and the resolution of
cases on the merits. 54 According to the commentators, an aversion to
reversal creates incentives which encourage trial judges to take more time
with a case. This desire to move more slowly and deliberately increases
backlog pressure, and increasing case backlogs call into play the courts'
managerial pragmatism. According to the hypothesis, this cycle gener-
ates substantial institutional and personal incentives for trial judges to
seek nonadjudicative means of terminating litigation and, the thesis is ar-
gued, rely on these techniques to avoid difficult (whether procedurally,
legally or factually), and therefore institutionally expensive, decisions on
the merits.
Federal trial judges have to deal with case backlogs, and Judge Sanders
was clearly aware of this reality; moving the docket and managing the
growing caseload in the Northern District became even more of a con-
cern when he was appointed Chief Judge of the Northern District of
Texas in January 1987.55 The administrative pressures and managerial
concerns of the federal judiciary are also reflected in their professional
activities off the bench.56 After collecting surveys from many of Judge
lenging the notion that procedure is value neutral by examining the value aspects of the
courts' procedures, including such procedural values as finality, economy, and consistency);
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute: Study on Paths to a "Better Way": Litigation,
Alternatives, and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824 (1989) (presenting a major study of
the "litigation problem," or the accepted perception at the time that litigation was out of
control and inundating the federal courts, questioning the alleged scope of "the problem,"
and offering insights into possible solutions, including procedural, managerial, and non-
adjudicative dispute resolution alternatives); Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the
Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 303-10 (1989) (discussing the dimen-
sions of a "fair adjudication" under the traditional adversarial paradigm, or party control
of the investigation and presentation of evidence and the arguments (ensuring that parties
have a voice in the litigation), a passive neutral decision maker who limits his decision to
the record presented by the parties, and decisions that are judged on their rationality (de-
fined largely in terms of their legal predictability, adherence to legal precedent and appli-
cable rules of decision making)).
53. POSNER, supra note 3, at 143.
54. See sources cited supra note 52.
55. The Northern District of Texas's own approach to managing litigation has evolved
over time, including its use of technology. A quick perusal of the Northern District's web-
site (http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/) reflects many of these changes.
56. The federal judiciary are not professionally isolated. The administrative arm of the
federal courts, the Federal Judicial Center, holds conferences, oversees committees, and
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Sanders' clerks describing their experiences while at the court, and a
couple of pointed questions on my part, the thesis that Judge Sanders
avoided decisions on the merits in order to avoid hard legal issues or
"reversal on appeal" is not born out by the evidence. Judge Sanders
rarely used formal mediation orders, although over time every district
court judge's routine "pre-trial order" included an "order" to engage in
settlement negotiations. The idea that counsel must report to the district
court if settlement negotiations were unsuccessful certainly placed the is-
sue squarely in front of the trial court judges. How they individually re-
acted when lawyers reported that a settlement was not feasible is an
interesting question. I think it is fair to say that Judge Sanders had a keen
eye for the case that should settle-not because it raised difficult legal
issues, but because the dispute was less legal and more human, driven by
litigants' or lawyers' personal investments in the case, which caused them
to lose sight of the "risk of going to trial." In these cases, cases which
could go either way in front of a jury, Judge Sanders might invite counsel
into chambers and suggest they discuss settlement seriously.57 This infor-
mal procedure ensured that the parties and their lawyers knew they
would receive a scrupulously fair trial and that neither party entered the
courtroom with any advantage.58 In recent decades, trial courts have
adopted a more aggressive stance and a greater focus on settlement; the
rationale offered is that settlements take care of both parties' interests
and provide a more flexible approach to dispute resolution than a jury
verdict and without expending expensive institutional resources. 59 Not
everyone agrees with this position, especially in cases like the Dallas In-
dependent School District (DISD) school desegregation litigation.60 In
cases where there are significant constitutional issues or "equality" man-
dates to be redressed, the full, fair litigation and resolution of the matter
in the public domain of the federal court enhances a jurisprudence of
power and equality, enforces the democratic ideal that powerful institu-
tional actors must adhere to the law, and encourages minority voices and
outsider narratives. 61
acts as the glue that holds the federal courts together as an organization. In addition, there
is the Judicial Division of the American Bar Association, which includes both federal and
state court judges. All of these organizations encourage open and helpful dialogue
amongst its members. It is equally obvious that the problem of managing litigation in the
federal courts is hardly an issue effectively addressed court by court; however, individual
judges' approaches to their own litigation docket play a significant role in generating the
overall mix of institutional strategies.
57. The "Collected Surveys" from the Law Clerks, currently on file with the author,
will become part of the University of Texas School of Law Archives.
58. Most trial judges who deal with this phenomenon can attest to the fact that a little
reality testing goes a long way in helping lawyers, and their clients, appreciate that trials
are risky and expensive ventures.
59. See, e.g., Thomas D. Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntary Settlements,
29 VILL. L. Rav. 1363 (1984).
60. See infra note 116-269.
61. See supra note 17.
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Perhaps because of his own administrative background and his experi-
ence answering to a United States President, President Lyndon B. John-
son, upon taking the bench Judge Sanders quickly implemented chambers
procedures that ensured the docket moved. Cases were decided in a
timely fashion, either through pretrial methods like settlement or sum-
mary judgment; if a trial was needed, it happened within a reasonable
time. My co-clerk, Ms. Karen Jones,62 and I were only the third set of
clerks in Judge Sanders' chambers, but by the time we arrived, Judge
Sanders was in control of the court's daunting managerial tasks, and I
quickly learned that one of my responsibilities was to track motions for
my cases to determine when they were ripe, meaning that all papers from
movants and respondents had been timely filed. Once the motion was
ripe, it was ready to be decided, and for many motions the window for a
decision in Judge Sanders' court was one or two weeks. All of Judge
Sanders' law clerks quickly learned that justice delayed is often justice
denied. After thirty years as a federal district judge, it is fair to say that
Judge Sanders was a consummate manager of his docket. Many of the
stories and remembrances collected in this issue reflect on how Judge
Sanders used an artful blend of humor, suggestion, and firm direction
with his clerks, court personnel, and lawyers to make sure litigants re-
ceived their day in court in a timely fashion.
I would be disingenuous if I ignored the other "judicial" techniques
available to Judge Sanders in managing his docket, including the occa-
sional growl of frustration, pointed question, and "removal of the glasses
coupled with the raised-eye-brow-stare," but it took a lot to push him to
these extremes. Any trial judge can become frustrated with the lawyers
in his court and most try very hard not to show it, but sometimes there is
a conflict between what the lawyer thinks is best for his client and what
the judge thinks is appropriate under the circumstances. I asked Judge
Sanders' clerks if he favored using Rule 11 or other formal sanctions rou-
tinely to "control" lawyers, and the answer was a unanimous "no." The
consummate manager, Judge Sanders understood that even in this role
talking and listening to people achieved the best results; his managerial
style leaned towards conferences in chambers to openly discuss and ad-
dress problems or issues with counsel and to make sure everyone in-
volved in the case got on with the business at hand.63 There was no
hiding behind the bench or the robes; Judge Sanders was willing meta-
phorically and literally to role up his shirt sleeves, sit down with counsel
and work on the case.64
62. Karen Jones is currently a partner at Riddell Williams P.S. of Seattle, Washington.
63. The fact that federal magistrate judges handle all discovery disputes in the North-
ern District of Texas helps to limit opportunities for judicial frustration. Some lawyers
wish they could bring their discovery conflicts to the judges on grounds that it helps edu-
cate the court, but in the long run, I think the current system works to the lawyers'
advantage.
64. This is not to say that in thirty years on the bench Judge Sanders never had a
problem that required a more direct or stern approach, or one that resulted in some form
of sanctions. But that was not his favored approach.
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D. THE FEAR OF REVERSAL
A thorough consideration of trial docket management requires discus-
sion of the seeming tension between "fear of reversal" and efficient man-
agement of a trial docket. Judge Sanders never sacrificed fairness for
efficiency, and despite the obvious time constraints he and his clerks
worked under, careful, judicious consideration of legal and factual issues
was always a priority.65 However, Judge Sanders made it clear to me and
my fellow clerks that there was limited utility associated with spending
undue amounts of time on any given case, such as searching for the defin-
itive (from the clerks' point of view) determinative precedent, in order to
avoid having to exercise any adjudicative discretion or legal judgment.
As clerks, we took our responsibilities very seriously, wondering, often
out loud, how recent law school graduates could help a federal judge
make such important decisions and render judicial opinions that would
withstand the searching scrutiny of fellow trial court judges, appellate
judges, litigants, the bar, and the community. What Judge Sanders sensed
intuitively and made explicit to us in our meetings about the docket was
that the system of adjudication sets its own limits. When the law was open
and malleable, when legal standards were less than clear, when a disputed
legal issue fell into a doctrinal gap, when precedent did not come to grips
with the facts of the case, or when the task fell to the court to develop the
facts and make "fact findings" in order to apply the law to those facts,
whether sitting as a fact finder or sitting as a judge deciding a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact-the court simply had to do its best and make a
decision. And it needed to act in a timely fashion! Trial courts do not
have unlimited time to ponder even the most challenging or perplexing of
legal questions, and Judge Sanders expected the lawyers, and his clerks,
to get to the point when difficult legal issues were honestly disputed. The
court's job was to render a decision or, as he once commented to me
when we were discussing-really arguing about-a complex legal issue
yet to be resolved by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, "Mo, we just
have to do our best. Maybe the Fifth Circuit won't agree with our deci-
sion, but that's their job. We need to do ours." The comments provided
by my fellow clerks emphasize this institutional reality.
Of course, Judge Sanders was not thrilled when he was reversed, but he
did not treat it as a "bad grade on a test" or a personal opinion about his
intellectual acumen or skills as a judge. Judge Sanders intuitively under-
stood the institutional allocation of responsibilities within the federal ju-
diciary and he understood that, at times, the trial judge has to use his best
judgment and skill to make a decision, knowing the appellate court might
disagree. It would undermine the checks and balances inherent in the
federal judicial system if district court judges saw their judicial role as
limited to second guessing the circuit courts. This would remove an im-
65. Collected Surveys, supra note 57. The clerks' responses to questionnaires on this
point outline in some detail the time and effort spent on dispositive motions and trials.
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portant element from the adjudicative process-the independent judg-
ment of the trial court with its access to the facts, the enriched, dynamic,
contextual facts that rarely appear in appellate opinions. Sometimes the
decision Judge Sanders had to make was a "close call" and disagreement
with the Fifth Circuit was foreseeable. For example, with a highly discre-
tionary decision, disagreement might be foreseeable based on the differ-
ent institutional perspectives of the judges involved. At other times,
district court judges might simply be of the opinion that the circuit court
got it wrong.66
E. PRODUCING OPINIONS AND THE ROLE AND LAW CLERKS
One strategy Judge Sanders used to address these seemingly conflicting
institutional goals-careful consideration of the legal and factual merits
raised by a litigant's moving papers and efficient management of a grow-
ing and complex trial docket-was his approach to writing opinions, issu-
ing orders, and ruling from the bench. When I started this project, I
asked Ms. Lynn Murray, one of Dedman School of Law's librarians, to
develop a citation list of Judge Sanders opinions. Ms. Murray secured for
me a list of 1,386 opinions listed by Lexis, which included both published
and unpublished opinions.67 Yet even this list, impressive as it is, does
66. At the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference, Justice Scalia presents an award, a duck
caller, when a district court judge makes a ruling which the Fifth Circuit reverses, but the
Supreme Court ultimately affirms on appeal. The award is the "E pur si muove" Award.
The title refers to the legend that, after being forced by the Pope to recant his theory that
the Earth revolves around the Sun, Galileo muttered (as translated) "but it still moves."
See WILLIAM S. WAKH, HANDY-BOOK OF LITERARY CURIOSITIEs 252 (1909). Judge Sand-
ers received this award at the 2006 Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference. In the opinion at
issue, Judge Sanders held that a negligence claim against an ERISA-based HMO plan was
preempted by ERISA. Calad v. Cigna Healthcare of Tex., Inc., No. CIV-300-CV-3693-H,
2001 WL 705776, at *5-6 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2001). The Fifth Circuit reversed Calad in
Rork v. Humana, 307 F.3d 298, 306 (5th Cir. 2002), but the Supreme Court later affirmed
Judge Sanders in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004). The "duck caller"
apparently references a case in which Justice Scalia was asked to recuse himself, which he
refused to do, because he had been duck hunting with then Vice-President Richard Che-
ney. Mr. Scott McElhaney, 1982-1983, Jackson, Walker, LLP, and Ms. Susan Maxwell,
2000-2001, Bickerstaff Heath Delgado Acosta, LLP, provided information on the award
used in this footnote.
67. The list of citations is on file with the author. In attempting to "acquire" a com-
plete list, we were concerned about "unpublished opinions." In this regard, it is important
to note that West's Federal Supplement is not an official publication of the federal district
courts. It is a selection of opinions made by West editors from a larger selection of cases
submitted by the federal trial judges themselves. In recent decades, federal trial courts
have handed down many more opinions than are published. In the days before digital
databases, the unpublished opinions would likely disappear. By the late nineties, however,
Lexis was placing over 40,000 district court opinions online per year, almost four times the
number printed in the Federal Supplement. With the passage of the E-government Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.), mandating the
release of all district court opinions to the public, that number has more than doubled.
Today an opinion designated "unreported" or "unpublished" is given that designation by
the judge with full knowledge that it will be available in this data base. District court
judges are producing work at a significant pace, but no one, neither Westlaw nor Lexis, has
every federal district court case ever decided or every opinion ever written. (This informa-
tion was collected in a series of e-mails from Lexis on file with the author.)
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not reflect the Court's output, because it is missing the routinely entered
short orders addressing more narrow procedural or evidentiary issues,
rulings from the bench (a system that was both efficient and allowed
Judge Sanders to look at the litigants as he ruled), and early orders and
opinions issued before digital publication became omnipresent. I also
asked Ms. Murray to develop a list of Judge Sanders' Federal Supplement
and Federal Reporter citations: 238, including two circuit opinions involv-
ing cases on which he sat by designation. 68 There is no difference in the
analytical quality or judicial judgment involved in the two lists. What is
different is the amount of time invested in a written opinion that would
be published in the Federal Supplement. Judge Sanders' published opin-
ions, in most instances, focused on cases which addressed important is-
sues of public concern, like the school desegregation case;69 cases that
could have a significant local legal or economic impact, like the Hunt liti-
gation;70 cases in which publication would ensure transparency, accounta-
bility, and utility of a decision that was of significant human interest;71 or
cases where publication had been requested by one of the litigants.72 But
in other instances, his direction was clear: working over opinions and
readying them for publication was time taken away from other cases.
What was routinely produced was outstanding legal product that pro-
vided the lawyers and litigants with a clear understanding of Judge Sand-
ers' ruling, its legal basis and the necessary record for appeal.73 That was,
after all, the trial court's real job, and Judge Sanders did that job excep-
tionally well.
Those who speculate about the role of law clerks as "ghostwriters ' 74
may not appreciate the odd role of the federal trial court clerk. As newly
minted law school graduates, we are potentially overwhelmed by what is
expected of us and, if we are not, there is something seriously wrong with
our grip on reality. Much can be learned about trial court judges by ex-
amining how they "use their law clerks," 75 but two recent writers on the
subject appear to be highly critical, or at the least overtly suspicious, of
what they perceive to be potentially improper delegation to clerks of such
68. Id.
69. See infra Part III.A-C.
70. See, e.g., Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 689 F. Supp. 666 (N.D. Tex. 1987); Hunt v.
Bankers Trust Co., 646 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
71. See Kurt Schwarz, My Favorite Year: What a Law Clerk Learned About Justice,
Judging, and Litigation From Working on One Case with Barefoot Sanders, 62 SMU L.
REV. 1657 (2009).
72. See, e.g., John Carlo, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of the U.S. Army, Fort Worth Div.,
539 F. Supp. 1075 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
73. Anyone interested in the role of trial court opinions, especially those involving
constitutional litigation, should examine the breadth and depth of the opinions written by
Judge Sanders in the Tasby Litigation. See infra Parts III.A-C.
74. POSNER, supra note 3, at 221.
75. See Todd C. Peppers et al., Inside Judicial Chambers: How Federal District Court
Judges Select and Use Their Law Clerks, 71 ALB. L. REV. 623, 623 (2008) (studying the role
and use of law clerks). "One duty that many judges and clerks acknowledge at all levels
has been some drafting of judicial opinions or final orders, though the level of clerk partici-
pation varies widely." Id. at 631.
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tasks as reviewing briefs, checking the law, and checking factual and evi-
dentiary records, with their greatest concern reserved for those judges
who use clerks to "draft" portions of substantive or dispositive opinions
or orders.76 As part of a different project involving the creation of an
archive of Judge Sanders' papers, including his judicial papers, at the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin, all of his law clerks were asked to fill out a
simple questionnaire commenting on significant experiences and cases
during their clerkship. While this catalog is not yet complete, copies sent
to me reveal a more dynamic process when the court was engaged in
generating a final opinion or order, dispositive or not-a process that
started when the first brief is opened and continued up to the issuance of
a final order or memorandum opinion signed by Judge Sanders-than the
term "ghostwriting" evokes.
I will use my experiences as an example of this process, because Judge
Sanders and I had a couple of noteworthy debates about cases to which I
had been assigned, but my experiences were not unique. The first "de-
bate" arose in conjunction with a sitting federal grand jury. Without go-
ing into the underlying facts, Judge Sanders and I were discussing the
problem presented to him by defense counsel who wanted access to the
grand jury's proceedings. It was clear, in my opinion, that Judge Sanders'
prior experience as U.S. Attorney was making it difficult for him to ap-
preciate what was at stake from the defense lawyers' point of view. I had
never dealt with a grand jury, but my own personal background, and
therefore biases, made me highly suspicious of the process, and I was
having a difficult time grasping Judge Sanders' position, since it seemed
to me that he was treating the grand jury as a very routine part of the
criminal process. And, for him, it was. As our discussion evolved, we
found ourselves in a face-off in the library, but our conflicting concerns
and perspectives quickly resolved themselves as I pulled books off of the
shelves and, with Judge Sanders, examined the legal authority cited by
defense counsel. The relief sought by the defense lawyers in their motion
was unique and available to the defendant under a very limited set of
facts and circumstances. Judge Sanders acknowledged that he was not
familiar with the procedure laid out in the caselaw. But at no time during
this rather heated discussion did Judge Sanders pull rank or otherwise
demean my contribution to the discussion or question my position by dis-
76. Judge Posner refers to this process as "ghostwriting," an uncomplimentary term
that implies that the opinion is really the clerk's and not the judge's. See POSNER, supra
note 3, at 221. The authors of Inside Judicial Chambers provide in their article a list of "job
duties" for law clerks, which includes reviewing motions and briefs, and drafting orders
and memoranda for dispositive and nondispositive motions. Peppers et al., supra note 75,
app. at 639-45. I do not know what the response would have been from the jurists surveyed
if a category of activity had been labeled "ghostwriting," but they might have been more




missing me as young77 and inexperienced. I, in turn, learned to appreci-
ate the importance of talking openly and critically about legal issues,
without assuming that mere "analytic" skills, or the ability to read the
law, would be the ultimate decider. The question the court was forced to
grapple with, as with so many that come before a trial court judge, re-
quired the application of an open and malleable legal standard to a less
than paradigmatic set of facts, and carried the admonition: "so that justice
might be done." While I do not recall in detail the final decision Judge
Sanders made in this particular instance, I do recall thinking that he had
been able to shed his experiential blinders as a U. S. attorney and weigh
the facts fairly, just as I had been forced to recognize how my own biases
could affect my legal judgment.
Another example of this dynamic process is Judge Sanders' opinion in
Transource International, Inc. v. Trinity Industries, Inc., a paradigmatic
summary judgment which illustrates the scope of pre-trial disposition is-
sues decided by federal district court judges.78 This case also illustrates
the decisional and rhetorical strategies used by federal trial and appellate
judges when they are dealing with cases that do not require a high degree
of deference by the appellate court to the trial court's fact expertise, but
that don't require either court to "make law" or "find law" in order to fill
in a "doctrinal" or "interpretive" gap. The cross-motions for summary
judgment raised a broad range of federal and state antitrust issues as well
as state law breach of contract issues, but it was as close as you can get to
a classic case of applying applicable "law to the facts." When I began my
clerkship, I had just completed a class on antitrust law and dove into the
summary judgment with great enthusiasm. 79 My enthusiasm soon waned.
After reading over the briefs, I met with Judge Sanders to discuss the
motion and the issues it raised. Some of his concerns, which accurately
reflect the "types of decisions" trial court judges are routinely asked to
make, were quite simple: What is it they want me to do? What are the
legal standards? Are the applicable doctrinal standards clear? What are
the applicable summary judgment standards? And finally, what are the
actual "decisions" the court must make: determining facts, deciding if
there is a factual dispute, or deciding a mixed question of fact and law (a
question of legal characterization)? Fortunately, this was not a case in
which the parties disputed the existence of a cause of action or the state
of the applicable substantive antitrust or contract law. But that did not
mean that it was a simple summary judgment either; the parties' motions
ranged across the breadth and depth of antitrust law, and not surprising,
77. For the record, it should be noted that I am oldest of Judge Sanders' law clerks
(October 9, 1948), although other clerks began their clerkships at a more advanced age
than 1 (33 years of age).
78. Judge Sanders' summary judgment opinion is not available other than by reading
the Fifth Circuit's account of the case on appeal. See Transource Int'l., Inc. v. Trinity In-
dus., Inc., 725 F.2d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1984).
79. I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Paul Rogers, Dedman School of Law, South-
ern Methodist University, my antitrust professor, for making sure I knew enough antitrust
law to work effectively on the summary judgment.
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the "undisputed" factual record was hotly contested as evidenced by the
individual movants' thick factual appendices. My job first involved
checking the briefing. The lawyers had done excellent work, but they
were advocates, and Judge Sanders wanted to make sure we had the most
recent Fifth Circuit cases on point, including those addressing the sub-
stantive issues and those addressing the standards for antitrust summary
judgments.
In the midst of working on this case, I was, of course, engaged in other
tasks within chambers: answering lawyers' phone calls, handling social se-
curity appeals, working on other motions, attending case conferences
with counsel, working to help Judge Sanders prepare for hearings, attend-
ing hearings, helping Judge Sanders handle the occasional Friday after-
noon "emergency" temporary injunction, sitting in on criminal trials,
attending sentencings, attending tax protester trials, helping prepare jury
charges in diversity and federal cases using materials provided by counsel
and the Fifth Circuit, providing an initial review of any appeals from the
magistrates' court, assisting Judge Sanders with trials (helping to organize
pre-trial materials, attending conferences and hearings on pre-trial mo-
tions, and attending the actual trial to facilitate the flow of information
between the courtroom and chambers during the trial, working with trial
counsel on issues that arose during the course of trial to ensure that Judge
Sanders addressed their concerns in a timely fashion, helping with pre-
trial and post-trial motions, and doing anything else Judge Sanders
needed assistance with while he was sitting on the bench in the courtroom
conducting the trial), and taking care of the myriad of other tasks that
inevitably arise in a busy trial court. After hearings or during trial re-
cesses, Judge Sanders would often ask us, "What do you think?" He took
seriously his role as a teacher, and he wanted us to observe and learn. We
were also free to ask questions: Why did he impose a certain sentence?
Was he being too hard on one of the lawyers? Why did he rule as he had
from the bench? The list of possible questions is endless, as any federal
district court law clerk will tell you.8 0
Given Judge Sanders' deadlines for "ripe" motions, as soon as the
Transource briefs came in, I began pulling together controlling legal stan-
dards and precedent, focusing especially on the test or standard that
would guide his specific decisions on the summary judgment issue. The
format of the Fifth Circuit's appellate decision reflects Judge Sanders' fi-
nal memorandum opinion granting Trinity's motion on the antitrust and
breach of contract claims. It should be noted that both the Fifth Circuit's
opinion and Judge Sanders' opinion, which is discussed in the published
Fifth Circuit opinion, reflect the narrow rhetorical strategies routinely
used by trial courts and three judge appellate panels: treat the doctrinal
law as black letter, focus on narrow factual issues, and avoid "making
law" or raising issues that could require en banc consideration on ap-




peal. 81 The Fifth Circuit affirmed Judge Sanders' rulings on the federal
and state antitrust claims but reversed and remanded the breach of con-
tract claims-but more about that later. As I read over the circuit's opin-
ion, the twenty-five years that have elapsed since the decision disappear,
and I can vividly recall sitting at my desk with both parties' motions and
appendices feeling overwhelmed, until Judge Sanders pointed out the ob-
vious. Summary judgments are part of the trial courts' normal business
and in that respect pretty straightforward affairs: identify the legal issues,
figure out the factual issues, disputed and undisputed, and line up the
applicable law. It is not necessary to recite the facts of the case in any
detail here-suffice it to say there were two contracts and a letter of
credit that formed the heart of the dispute. It is also worth stating the
obvious: the simple recitation of facts in the published appellate opinion
and in the memorandum opinion from the trial court reflects extensive
effort working with the pleadings and summary judgment evidence, and
learning about railroad gondola cars, including their manufacturing and
marketing.82
Transource's complaint alleged several violations of antitrust laws.
Transource claimed that the non-competition clause in the first contract
"constituted an unlawful restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act"; "Trinity conspired with its manufacturers and suppliers to
keep Transource out of the business of manufacturing and leasing gondo-
las" in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act; Trinity "had
refused to allow Transource to sell its right to purchase gondolas to an-
other railcar leasing company and that noncompetition clause" violated
Section 3 of the Clayton Act; the "June 15, 1979, Agreement violated
Texas antitrust laws"; and finally, "Trinity breached the Agreement itself
by failing to post the Valdunes letter of credit and by failing to advance"
$20,000 to Transource at closing.83 What comes next in the Fifth Circuit's
opinion is traditional summary judgment boilerplate language stating ba-
sic policy considerations and weighing the difficulty of granting such mo-
tions. The opinion states that the "court must draw all inferences in
favor" of the defending party, but points out that the "nonmoving litigant
cannot establish a genuine issue of material fact merely by introducing
conflicting testimony."84 The party opposing the motion is charged to
"produce significant evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine
fact issue." 85 The Fifth Circuit then points out that on appeal of a sum-
mary judgment where the trial court found "plaintiff failed to introduce
evidence which created a genuine factual dispute," the appellate court is
81. See Armour, supra note 5, at 213-25.
82. This is one of the problems that law students face when they leave law school-
their experience with appellate opinions has not prepared them for the reality of legal
practice, where facts are rarely so neatly organized at the inception of a case.
83. Transource, 725 F.2d at 278-79.




"bound by the same standards" as the trial court.86 Effectively there is no
deference or abuse of discretion standard on the table; the trial court's
exercise of its adjudicative discretion is to be examined on appeal under
the glaring light of de novo review. 87 This "boilerplate" language can be
viewed as a hortatory thumb on the decisional scales, offering a hint to
trial courts of which way they should lean if the decision falls into a grey
area, which it inevitably will in complex cases like Transource. To make
this process even more complex, this summary judgment motion required
the trial court, and in turn the appellate court, to decide a number of
"mixed questions," those challenging legal characterization questions that
require the trial court to look at a set of facts, often undisputed, but not
always, and apply a legal label. These issues are troubling because, while
they involve a certain amount of "fact expertise," they are not delegated
to the trial court's fact-finding function and are reviewed under a de novo
standard, which relies on the appellate court's limited "fact finding"
expertise. 88
The first characterization issue required both courts to determine if the
alleged restraint of trade included in the first contract was vertical or hor-
izontal. Since horizontal restraints "are conclusively presumed to be ille-
gal without elaborate [factual] inquiry," characterizing the restraint as
vertical shifted the burden to Transource to "prove an anticompetitive
effect."' 89 Transource objected to the trial court's characterization of the
restraint as vertical, and not horizontal, and claimed this "issue of charac-
terization" should be submitted to a jury as a disputed fact issue. 90 In
three lines, the Fifth Circuit takes care of this issue, stating that the record
is clear and affirming the district court's characterization of the alleged
restraint of trade.91
On the second point, whether Transource could be viewed as a poten-
tial competitor with Trinity (creating a per se illegal agreement), the ap-
pellate court again agrees with the district court's conclusion, pointing to
the facts in the record.92 The Fifth Circuit held that "there was adequate
support in the record for the district court to rule as a matter of law that
Paragraph 8 of the Agreement did not constitute a per se violation of
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Kevin Casey et al., Standards of Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit
Substance and Semantics, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 281-82 (2001) (examining the different
appellate standards of review, shading off from de novo review for legal error through the
highly deferential "abuse of discretion" standard); Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudica-
tive Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of
the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV.
993, 993-1005 (1986) (discussing the power of appellate courts to withdraw mixed law/fact
questions from the discretionary power of the trial court by classifying them as questions of
law reviewed de novo on appeal even when that review requires the appellate court to
weigh and "find" facts).
89. Transource, 725 F.2d at 279.





section 1 of the Sherman Act as a horizontal restraint. ' 93 Thus, the po-
tentially vexatious "disputed fact" issue had been transformed into a "le-
gal characterization" issue, which though still a highly fact-based decision,
is much more amenable to summary judgment.
The "rule of reason analysis" comes next, and here the Fifth Circuit
addresses the question of standing first. Of the three elements of anti-
trust standing at issue in this case, the district court determined that the
plaintiff had adequately pled and met the "target market" and damages
requirements. As for the third element of standing, alleging "a sufficient
causal relationship between the injury and the antitrust violation," the
Fifth Circuit points to the language in the complaint as failing to show
"that any injuries could have resulted" from the enforcement of the non-
compete clause and quotes the district court's memorandum opinion on
this point. 94 Once more the appellate court agreed with the district
court's application of law to the "facts" of the case.
The conspiracy, monopoly, Clayton Act, and state law antitrust claims
were similarly treated by the Fifth Circuit. On the conspiracy claim, the
district court had held that the "plaintiff had failed in its effort to rebut
defendant's motion" and the Fifth Circuit agreed.95 In looking over the
district court's ruling, the Fifth Circuit points out that the plaintiff had
failed to raise a fact issue (whether or not there is a disputed fact issue is
a question of legal characterization), and that Trinity had provided plausi-
ble business explanations for what had happened. 96 Again, the tenor of
the holding focuses on how the facts in evidence are to be weighed and
evaluated, with the Fifth Circuit supporting the district court's determina-
tion that something more than reciting "facts suggesting a parallel refusal
to deal" is needed where defendants "can fully explain" what happened
in terms of an independent business judgment.97 The monopolization
claim failed after the district court and the circuit court rejected Tran-
source's characterization of the relevant market and found it had failed to
explain how Trinity could be said to have a "dangerous probability" of
monopolization, given its low market shares in the gondola manufactur-
ing market.98 The Clayton Act claim similarly failed based on the district
court's and circuit court's legal characterization of the relevant
contracts. 99
As the opinion unfolds, we see time and time again that what is really
at issue is not the substantive legal standard under the antitrust statutes,
but rather the specialized standards for evaluating summary judgment ev-
idence in the antitrust context. While there were some "fact" based hold-
ings in which the district court and circuit court found "as a matter of
93. Id.




98. Id. at 282.
99. Id. at 285.
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law" that there was no disputed fact issue and a factual finding could be
made without a full trial, these determinations and the "characterization"
questions were all reviewed de novo without reference to any other ap-
pellate standard. Effectively the circuit court stood in the shoes of the
district court and either agreed or disagreed with the lower court's judg-
ments. I do not think that I thought about that when I was working on
the case, and I know Judge Sanders never asked me if I thought the cir-
cuit court would agree with us, except on the last issue. The final ques-
tion the district court had to address was a question of contract
construction, which question has two parts. The first is whether or not
the contract is unambiguous; if the answer is yes, the contract can be con-
strued by the district court as a matter of law. However if the trial court
finds the contract is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence of the parties intent
should be admitted and the question of the contract's construction sub-
mitted to a jury as a disputed fact based issue. The question whether a
contract is or is not ambiguous is a classic question of legal characteriza-
tion, the proverbial mixed question of law and fact and one trial courts
routinely address, albeit not always well. 100 When these contractual is-
sues arise, they do so in a predictable context; there is always extrinsic
evidence that contradicts one or the other party's claimed interpretation
of the contract, hence the dispute. The question is when should such ex-
trinsic evidence be considered by the trial court, as part of the context for
interpreting the contract or after the terms of the contract on its face have
been determined to be open to interpretation, in other words, ambiguous.
The district court found that the first contract was unambiguous "as a
matter of law" and based on its construction of the unambiguous con-
tract, further found that Trinity did not breach its agreement.101 The con-
tract appeared to require Trinity to post a letter of credit and advance
$20,000 working capital to Transource; 10 2 the core dispute was whether
Trinity was unconditionally obligated to post the letter of credit. 10 3 Tran-
source claimed that this was the case, and Trinity claimed the contract,
while it provided for the letter of credit, by its terms did not impose that
duty directly and unconditionally on Trinity. 10 4 Trinity further claimed
the letter of credit was a condition precedent to the obligation to fund the
capital and that, since this pre-condition failed, no further contractual du-
ties arose. The district court agreed and granted Trinity's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the contractual issues and the circuit court reversed,
but let's look closely at the circuit's analysis. Having set up the contract
issues as described, the Fifth Circuit states: "The basic problem in this
case is that both parties were fully cognizant of the fact that the letter of
credit had to be posted by someone on the very same day that they signed
100. See supra notes 28, 88 (discussing appellate review of mixed questions of fact and
law).
101. Transource, 725 F.2d at 286-87.





their own Agreement. '10 5 The failure to fund the letter of credit caused
the agreement to fail;10 6 the question posed by the Fifth Circuit is "which
party had the duty to post the letter of credit?"' 0 7 The Fifth Circuit re-
views the district court's rationale for determining that the contract was
unambiguous and the district court's construction of the terms of the
agreement and does not agree. The Fifth Circuit finds the contract is am-
biguous: "We have examined the Agreement, and we are unable to say as
a matter of law that without ambiguity the contract assigns the duty of
posting the letter of credit to a particular party."'1 8 Applying Texas' law
governing contract construction the Fifth Circuit went on to hold that, in
light of the surrounding circumstances, "both parties offered arguable in-
terpretations of the terms of the Agreement."'1 9 Having remanded the
issue and directed the district court to allow extrinsic evidence on the
issue of contract interpretation, the Fifth Circuit continues to outline the
applicable Texas law to be applied by the district; according to the circuit
the relevant state law standard provides, "[i]f there is any doubt as to the
meaning of a contract," extrinsic evidence is to be considered. 110 The
Fifth Circuit points to two pieces of deposition testimony, introduced as
part of the summary judgment evidence, and holds that "Lewis' admis-
sion [in the deposition] creates a factual dispute with respect to the mean-
ing of the Agreement. The deposition casts doubt upon Trinity's
contention that the parties did not agree Trinity was to post the letter of
credit.""' While its analysis is not pellucid on this point, the Fifth Circuit
apparently attempts to determine if the contract is subject to judicial in-
terpretation as a matter of law by considering both the written terms of
the agreement as well as some extrinsic evidence raising questions about
the parties' intent, but finds that the answer to this question is no, and
that a full trial of the contract construction issue is needed. With regard
to the defense of novation, the Fifth Circuit again characterized the two
contracts as not so clearly inconsistent as to support the legal inference
that the second contract was intended to replace the first, thereby finding
that there was no novation as a matter of law.112 According to the Fifth
Circuit, absent clear inconsistencies between the two contracts, contrac-
tual intent is a triable question of fact unless the evidentiary record sup-
porting the summary judgment is so clear that "reasonable minds" could
not differ about the disputed fact. 113
While twenty-five years have passed since I worked on the case, I do
recall finding the Texas case law on the question of contract construction
and novation challenging. But I also recall meticulously going over the
105. Id. at 287.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 287-88.
109. Id. at 288.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 289-90.
113. Id. at 290.
1574 [Vol. 62
Remembering Judge Sanders
"standards" with Judge Sanders and applying them to the contract terms,
viewed in their appropriate context. Obviously we were aware of the
conflicting extrinsic evidence-it was part of the summary judgment re-
cord, but we also were aware that such evidence was not to be considered
when making the threshold determination whether the contract was am-
biguous. As stated at the outset, questions of contract interpretation al-
ways arise when there is extrinsic evidence of ambiguity. So, was Judge
Sanders wrong? Did he err? The answer is no. He did not make a mis-
take in the law or misapply the law. The legal issue is a troublesome one
with a summary judgment standard that provides limited direction to the
trial court. After addressing the two contract issues, the district court was
confident that it had discharged its duty to apply the law to the facts as
directed. It was a judgment call, one the Fifth Circuit did not share.
Quite frankly, the issue had me stumped because, coming from law
school, I was unfamiliar with the practical issue of contract interpretation
and the adjudicative procedures for handling extrinsic evidence of con-
tractual intent in the context of a summary judgment. I do recall working
with Judge Sanders on this final issue after we had waded through all of
the complex antitrust issues. I also recall his approach to the problem:
"We can only do our best. If the Circuit doesn't agree with us, they will
let us know." Judge Sanders' final opinion was a judgment call, not an
error in judgment. The litigants first had a district judge look at their
summary judgment and then they had a three judge circuit panel review
that decision and the summary judgment record de novo; the Fifth Cir-
cuit's reversal of the district court on appeal was treated by Judge Sand-
ers as evidence that the system works. And that was Judge Sanders' basic
take on the relationship between the two courts. The circuit court's judg-
ment might differ from his, and if that was the case, their job was to pro-
vide further direction on remand. No judge likes being reversed, and
Judge Sanders was no exception. He may not have always agreed with
the circuit court, but he always did what they told him to do.114
With regard to the actual writing of opinions or memorandum orders, I
know that within this process, I would draft different parts of the analysis
114. The question of "error," of course, assumes that there is a single correct and know-
able answer to each legal decision, but commentators who have looked at this issue are less
than confident that a finding of error by an appellate court necessarily comports with this
narrow legalistic paradigm. For our purposes, especially when considering the Tasby Liti-
gation, where the dialogue between the district court and the circuit court was extensive
and provided an important institutional perspective and sounding board for the desegrega-
tion process, the question of error is more fruitfully viewed as the circuit court's attempt to
define the limits of a trial judge's discretion-the point at which selecting either of two
possible alternative answers is not acceptable-regardless of the particular legal nomencla-
ture used. See, e.g., Armour, Practice, supra note 2 (operationalizing judicial discretion as
the set of acceptable decisions even when the available alternative decisions conflict); Lea
Brilmayer, Wobble, Or the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 365-66 (1986) (discuss-
ing the play, or wobble, in all legal decisions); see also Anthony D'Amato, Can Any Legal
Theory Constrain Any Judicial Decision?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 513 (1989); Peter Tillers,
Evidence, Uncertainty, and the Rule of Law, 66 B.U. L. REV. 381, 381 (1986) (discussing the




after discussing matters with Judge Sanders, and he would work with
those materials. Judge Sanders demanded clarity-get to the point! His
drafting, editing, and rewriting ensured the final memorandum opinion
issued by the court spoke with restraint and economy; the court's opin-
ions had to say what needed to be said, nothing more and nothing less.
The final opinions issued by the court were always Judge Sanders' opin-
ions and represented as much intellectual rigor and honesty as could be
brought to bear. There was nothing lazy, sloppy, or disingenuous about
Judge Sanders' approach to writing the court's opinions, regardless of the
issue at stake. Did Judge Sanders and his law clerks always agree? They
usually ended up agreeing, and while disagreements certainly occurred
along the way, hopefully those disagreements helped ensure the court's
final opinion was transparent and fair.
Working with Judge Sanders on the grand jury issue described above,
as well as Transource's and Trinity's summary judgment motions, was not
only intellectually challenging, but it also required a certain amount of
courage, confidence, and self-awareness. First, regardless of how difficult
or complex the issues, the parties deserved a decision, regardless of which
way the court ruled. Three years of law school taught me how to argue
"both sides" of an issue, but it had not prepared me for the responsibility
of helping the court make profound decisions affecting people's lives.
Judge Sanders sensed my concerns and encouraged me in my work; he
clearly wanted me to learn how the adjudicative process worked. Even
though we had disagreed initially on how to resolve the grand jury ques-
tion, his openness about his own perspectives and experiences with grand
juries helped me understand the institutional context of the decision he
finally rendered. With regard to the private dispute involving Transource
and Trinity, Judge Sanders again was aware of both the legal and institu-
tional context in which we worked. In both instances, the parties de-
served an answer. And in both instances, what struck me was his
awareness of his institutional role as a trial judge and the scope of his
"discretion," or what Judge Posner has called "decisional freedom," when
making decisions. He took this responsibility very seriously and under-
stood that his ultimate accountability was not simply to the appellate
court, but more importantly to the individual litigants who had come into
his court. While it is not often explicitly discussed in his published opin-
ions, Judge Sanders often talked about his "discretion" with his law
clerks, the give and take in the numerous decisions he made on a daily
basis. In this context, Judge Sanders' law clerks were the perfect foil to
his judicial pragmatism. We had little "intuition" to fall back on and,
fresh from three years of law school, we were clear adherents to the "le-
gal paradigm" with perhaps a misplaced, but profound, faith in our ability
to get the "law" right. I think that one of the ways Judge Sanders en-
couraged his clerks to "speak" up if they did not agree with one of his
decisions was to make them privy to the often intellectually private
processes of judicial decision making. Reflecting on my experiences and
those of my court colleagues is useful, but the role of law clerks obviously
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varies from judge to judge. In Judge Sanders' court our role included
"standing up" and, professionally and competently, pointing out potential
problems or concerns. Egos and notions of infallibility had no place in
Judge Sanders' court, but neither did intellectual timidity. How does a
law clerk learn to have the kind of professional moxie Judge Sanders de-
manded of his clerks? 115 We learned from the Judge.
III. PRAGMATISM AND ACCOUNTABILITY: THE VIEW
FROM THE BENCH
A. THE DALLAS DESEGREGATION CASE PRIOR TO 1981
It is impossible to talk about Judge Sanders without discussing the
Tasby Litigation,116 the case challenging de jure racial segregation in the
Dallas Independent School District (DISD). Judge Sanders was the
fourth federal judge asked to oversee the desegregation controversy, fol-
lowing Judges Atwell, Davidson, and Taylor. "Hawley Atwell resigned
rather than help desegregate the schools. T. Whitfield Davidson person-
ally opposed desegregation but reluctantly presided over token measures
in the 1960's. '' 117 Without excusing it, the School Board's recalcitrance
and the early district courts' reluctance to aggressively enforce Brown Ii's
mandate (for "District Courts to take such proceedings and enter such
orders and decrees . . . as are necessary" to implement school desegrega-
tion "with all deliberate speed")1 18 was not uncommon.11 9 But by the
115. As I met each new set of clerks over the years, I was struck by their intelligence
and their strength of character, but then, Judge Sanders was a good judge of character.
116. For the purposes of this Article, I will refer simply to the Tasby Litigation to de-
scribe the lawsuit to desegregate DISD that Judge Sanders inherited from Judge William
M. Taylor. Without listing the entire procedural or appellate history, citations to particular
opinions or rulings will be provided as needed.
117. See generally GLENN M. LINDEN, DESEGREGATING SCHOOLS IN DALLAS: FOUR
DECADES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1995). Professor Linden chronicles forty years of
school desegregation litigation in the federal courts. Published in 1995, the book ends with
Judge Sanders' opinion declaring DISD unitary, a decision which, according to Linden,
"ended the twenty-three year old case." Id. at 213. Sadly, this was not true; it would take
an additional ten years, rather than the three originally anticipated, before the school dis-
trict would be released from court supervision.
118. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
119. The history of school desegregation litigation has been subject to extensive scru-
tiny over the years by legal scholars examining the phenomenon of recalcitrant school
boards confronting federal district court judges and the mixed results. Some scholars have
looked at particular judges or particular school districts in an attempt to gain insight into
this process, while others have focused more generally on the federal courts' extensive
equitable discretion to exercise a range of remedial powers and how they exercised this
power in order to desegregate schools. Regardless of their scholarly perspectives, individ-
ual scholars inevitably find themselves commenting on the political and institutional chal-
lenges facing the federal trial judges delegated the job of desegregating our country's
schools. See, e.g., Cheryl Feutz, Note, The Supreme Court's Reanalysis of School Desegre-
gation Remedial Decrees: Is the Majority Placing Subtle Limits on the Trial Court's Vast
Equitable Discretion?, 61 Mo. L. REV. 679, 679 (1996) (examining the narrowing of the
federal courts' remedial powers in school desegregation cases over time); Polly J. Price,
The Little Rock School Desegregation Cases in Richard Arnold's Court, 58 ARK. L. REV.
611, 611 (2005) (examining Judge Richard Arnold's role in the Little Rock school desegre-
gation cases); Doug Rendleman, Brown II's "All Deliberate Speed" at Fifty: A Golden An-
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1960s even the United States Supreme Court lost patience with the lack
of progress in racially segregated school districts and made it clear that in
the face of school boards' efforts to "evade and avoid their responsibili-
ties" under Brown 1I to proceed with all "deliberate speed,"'1 20 those
boards now had the affirmative obligation "to come forward with a plan
that promises realistically to work ... now."' 121 When new desegregation
litigation against the Dallas Independent School District was filed in
1970, it ended up in Judge William M. Taylor's court. DISD initially took
the position that it had complied with the district court's prior desegrega-
tion orders discharging its obligations under Brown to eradicate the "ves-
tiges" of segregation, 122 but Judge Taylor did not agree, and in 1971
concluded that, despite previous litigation and judicial efforts, Dallas
schools were still unconstitutionally segregated. 123 Judge Taylor then
spent the next ten years unsuccessfully attempting to desegregate DISD
under the watchful eye of the Fifth Circuit. In 1971 a new phase in Dal-
las' desegregation litigation began when the Fifth Circuit vacated Judge
Taylor's original order denying plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunc-
tion and "remanded with directions that the district court in an expedi-
tious manner, on this or a supplemented record, make full written
findings of fact and conclusions of law on the merits of the cause, in the
light of the principles . . . enunciated in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education.'124 Judge Taylor's subsequent memorandum opin-
ion reflects the federal judiciary's growing frustration with recalcitrant,
balky school districts even conservative jurists like Judge William "Mack"
Taylor: "It is difficult to believe in this day and time that anyone any-
where would be surprised, shocked or amazed at this case or at the pen-
dency of this law suit.' 25 In the face of growing pressure from the circuit
court and the minority community to take action, Judge Taylor made a
telling pronouncement. Addressing one of the major issues facing every
niversary or A Mid-Life Crisis for the Constitutional Injunction as a School Desegregation
Remedy?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1575, 1578, 1580 (2004) (examining the seemingly nega-
tive nature of the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown, arguing that the right at issue was not
a right to attend an integrated school, but rather a right to not be forced to attend a segre-
gated school); Carl Tobias, Charlotte and the American Dilemma, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 139,
144 (1999); Mark V. Tushnet, The Supreme Court and Race Discrimination, 1967-1991: The
View From the Marshall Papers, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 476 (1995); Jessica E. Wat-
son, Quest for Unitary Status: The East Baton Rouge Parish School Desegregation Case, 62
LA. L. REV. 953, 957-58 (2002) (discussing the Fifth Circuit's reluctance to "micromanage"
school cases and their deference to the extensive discretion of district court judges in man-
aging their desegregation litigation); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's
Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1128
(1996) (arguing that "federal trial courts have exercised a wide degree of discretion with
little check on their authority," and tracing the "doctrinal origins" of this discretion to the
school desegregation cases, when the "Supreme Court found it necessary to authorize the
exercise of this extraordinary power").
120. Tasby v. Estes, 342 F. Supp. 945, 947 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (Taylor, J.).
121. Id. (citing Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968)).
122. Id. at 947.
123. Id. at 947-48.
124. Tasby v. Estes, 444 F. 2d 124, 124 (5th Cir. 1971).
125. Tasby, 342 F. Supp. at 947.
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federal judge attempting to redress decades of racial segregation in their
local school district, the remedial use of busing to achieve racial integra-
tion,126 Judge Taylor stated, in very personal terms, that busing was not
his remedy of choice: "I am opposed to and do not believe in massive
cross-town bussing of students for the sole purpose of mixing bodies. I
doubt that there is a Federal Judge anywhere that would advocate that
type of integration as distinguished from desegregation."'1 27 At a time
when federal judicial nominees' positions on "constitutional issues" had
not yet infiltrated the confirmation process, 28 Judge Taylor's statement
on busing is intriguing. It appears designed to reassure the school district,
and parts of the local community, that if they will work with him, he will
not use the available remedy of district-wide busing aggressively. The
statement is worrisome because it is contextless. Judge Taylor does not
base his refusal to consider substantial busing as a remedy on his legal or
factual analysis of the specific case before him, nor does he argue that
busing is not an appropriate remedy in light of constitutional precedent
defining the remedial powers of the court. Many of the judges overseeing
desegregation cases were accused of "judicial activism" 129 when they or-
dered busing or used other sanctioned remedies, despite the fact that
their decisions were appropriately constrained by legitimate judicial
126. A random search of academic literature, legal and otherwise, from that time
reveals numerous articles on busing. Some argued that it was the only means of remediat-
ing segregation, others were more critical. See, e.g., R. Loy Waldrop, Jr., Comment, Busing
and Racial Imbalance: Judicial Sword and Social Dragon, 39 TENN. L. REv. 647, 659-61
(1972).
127. Tasby, 342 F. Supp. at 948.
128. The question whether it is appropriate to ask a judicial nominee or candidate his
position on issues that might come up in cases before him or whether judges should express
their positions on such potential legal issues is the subject of much current debate. See,
e.g., Alan B. Morrison, The Judge Has No Robes: Keeping the Electorate in the Dark About
What Judges Think About the Issues, 36 IND. L. REV. 719, 719 (2003).
129. Depending on the context, this term has two very distinct applications. To the
extent that it has infiltrated the national rhetoric as a rallying cry for those who claim
"judges should only apply the law, not make law," it represents a misunderstanding of what
judges are required to do in discharging their constitutional duties. See Ruth Bader Gins-
berg, Judicial Independence: The Situation of the U.S. Federal Judiciary, 85 NEB. L. REV. 1,
12 (2006). But the term may accurately describe those moments in judicial decision mak-
ing that reflect a sea change in courts' jurisprudential thinking. See Armour, supra note 5,
at 158-63 (discussing the role of the federal courts in prison reform). Those who study
judicial methods grapple with the challenge of how to draw a line between appropriate
judicial "law making" using the common law method of legal pragmatism and incremental-
ism and moments when the judge "goes too far." See, e.g., E. Nathaniel Gates, Justice
Stillborn: Lies, Lacunae, Incommensurability, and the Judicial Role, 19 CARDOZO L. REV.
971 (1997); Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Do Judges Deploy Policy?, 22 CARDOZO L. REV.
863 (2001). This dimension of "judicial activism" focuses on the courts' institutional exer-
cise of discretion and power that is perceived to exceed the bounds of acceptable legal
incrementalism in judicial lawmaking, and is distinct from quite different institutional con-
cerns that focus on the problem of individual bias or questionable conduct in discharging
the judicial function and rendering decisions. The former addresses the inherent human
factor in the institutional process of adjudication, while the latter addresses a form of
human error that threatens to undermine the legitimacy of that process. See Leslie W.
Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality "Might Rea-
sonably Be Questioned", 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 55, 55-56 (2000); James J. Brudney,
Recalibrating Federal Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 149 (2003).
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methodologies. 130 Judicial "activism" may be an appropriate label when
a judge does not adhere to precedent or explain why controlling prece-
dent does not apply on principled grounds, or when a judge fails to follow
the intent or prudential concerns embodied in that precedent, fails to ap-
ply proper standards in rendering fact based decisions,' 3' does not limit
herself to the issues raised by the parties, engages in "unnecessary dic-
tum," or fails to explain her decision "openly and rationally. ' 132 Judge
Taylor's statement about busing appears to fall outside of these con-
straints. Similarly, in 1955, District Judge William S. Atwell "ruled
against a plaintiff seeking to desegregate Dallas' schools, holding that the
United States Supreme Court had overstepped its authority in Brown.'1 33
Overruled by the Fifth Circuit, "he did the same [again] in 1957" when he
rejected a case by the NAACP representing two African-American chil-
dren who wanted to attend the DISD school closest to their home; the
school they attended was a predominantly African-American school, the
one closest to home was a predominantly Anglo school. 134 Judge Atwell
was again overruled by the Fifth Circuit. Was Judge Atwell's conduct
judicial activism? The term judicial activism is rarely a helpful or inform-
ative term, especially as used in the partisan political arena, but to the
extent it reflects a valid dimension of the national debate about judicial
judgment, it should at least be properly used to describe, not only judicial
actions, but also judicial inaction in the face of controlling precedent and
constitutional mandates. 135 Nowhere is this truer than in the arena of
130. See supra text accompanying note 33 (discussing judicial decision making and
judges' appropriate use of a range of judicial methodologies).
131. See supra text accompanying note 28 (exploring the range of "fact" based decisions
facing district court judges and the relative degree of discretion accorded these decisions
on appeal).
132. See Price, supra note 119, at 648 (discussing Judge David Tatel's 2004 Madison
Lecture at New York University on judicial methodologies, during which he proposed a
scale of "judicial activism" that could be used to analyze particular judicial decisions).
133. SMU Dedman School of Law, Desegregating Dallas Schools: The Litigation
Archives, http://library.law.smu.edu/DISD/background-info (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
The archives can be accessed through the SMU Dedman School of Law's website and
contain a wealth of useful material, including a summary timeline of the Tasby Litigation,
digital versions of key litigation documents, a selected bibliography, and litigation-related
documents dating back to 1971 from Judge Taylor, Judge Sanders, Mr. Edward Cloutman
(the plaintiffs' counsel), and Mr. Robert Thomas (DISD's counsel).
134. Id.
135. Judicial "activism," when used by lay critics of the judiciary, appears to express
concern that judges should only "apply law, not make law," and, as captured in these
rather simplistic aphorisms, represents one expression of the narrow ideological approach
to the "rule of law" and the role of the federal courts. When judges discharge their consti-
tutional responsibilities, as they attempted to do in the school cases by using their remedial
powers to fashion and implement plans for desegregating school districts, the approbation
of "activist" is misplaced. While critics might disagree with the judges' actions-and critics
of busing were always free to do so-and inactions, as long as these judges adhered to
acceptable common law modalities in applying the United States Supreme Court's man-
dates, they should not be criticized as "activists." My own experience tells me that lay
persons often do not understand what it means to say that "judges should just apply the
law," since even this seemingly narrow judicial act necessarily includes the inherently prob-
lematic process of "interpretation," which is especially true in the arena of constitutional
litigation. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REv. 1, 3-9
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constitutional litigation where transparency and accountability on the
part of governmental actors, including federal judges, is essential to the
democratic fabric of our society.
In hindsight, it is not surprising that Judge Taylor's 1971 order finding
an unconstitutional dual school system was affirmed by the Fifth Cir-
cuit,136 but his proposed desegregation plan failed to pass constitutional
muster.137 Following remand from the circuit, Judge Taylor entered two
significant orders that shaped the litigation in the years to come. In the
first order, he refused to include the neighboring Highland Park School
District and surrounding suburban school districts, all of which were
predominantly Anglo, in a consolidated desegregation plan with
DISD, 138 a remedial issue that had recently been addressed by the Su-
preme Court in Milliken v. Bradley.139 Early in the litigation, Judge Tay-
lor had allowed in an array of intervenors, including the newly targeted
defendant suburban school districts. When Judge Taylor held the hearing
on this matter there were a number of new "voices" clamoring for the
court's attention. 140 Judge Taylor's decision was extremely popular with
some segments of the community, especially the suburban schools, but
this time Judge Taylor explained his refusal to apply the available remedy
of an inter-district desegregation plan in terms of applicable Supreme
Court precedent, doctrine, and policy, as well as the facts of the DISD
case. 141 In 1976, in his second major order, Judge Taylor adopted a new
desegregation plan,1 42 which was appealed. The primary issues on appeal
were the NAACP's intervention, the court's order refusing to consolidate
the Highland Park School District and DISD into a single desegregation
plan, a school assignment plan dividing DISD into six sub-districts, in-
cluding one which was nearly all African-American, and the acquisition
of certain school properties. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit made the point
that "substantial changes have occurred in DISD" since 1971; a majority
Anglo system is now a predominantly minority one, although Dallas itself
(2004) (examining one aspect of constitutional interpretation: the generation of doctrinal
rules, tests, and standards needed to implement core constitutional text or holdings); Rich-
ard H. Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1274, 1331 (2006) (examining the "judicial role in crafting doctrinal tests to imple-
ment the Constitution"); Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., How Do Judges Decide? A Course for
Non-Lawyers, 106 DICK. L. REV. 773, 774, 783 (2002).
136. The Fifth Circuit played a notable role in desegregating southern schools. See gen-
erally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981). Unlikely Heroes pays particular attention to
judges Elbert P. Tuttle, John Minor Wisdom, John R. Brown, and Richard Taylor Rives; it
should be noted that Judge Wisdom was a member of the three-judge panel that rejected
Judge Taylor's desegregation plan for Dallas.
137. See generally Tasby v. Estes, 517 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1975).
138. Tasby v. Estes, 412 F. Supp. 1185, 1186 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
139. 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
140. The cast of intervenors changed over time and reflected a number of different
segments of the community. Whether Judge Taylor's decisions allowing such broad inter-
vention helped the litigation is hard to evaluate, but it certainly expanded the number of
"voices" heard by the court.
141. Tasby v. Estes, 412 F. Supp. 1185, 1187 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
142. Tasby v. Estes, 412 F. Supp. 1193, 1193 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
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remains majority Anglo. 143 The Fifth Circuit approached the plan ques-
tion by focusing on the district court's efforts in soliciting different pro-
posals, holding hearings, and developing a voluminous record on the
feasibility and effectiveness of the various desegregation proposals pend-
ing before the court. 144 While acknowledging the district court's efforts
in this regard, the circuit still remanded the student assignment portion of
the plan for "further consideration" and urged the district court to "re-
consider the other provisions of its plan in the light of the relief it ulti-
mately orders."145  The circuit's mandate ordering "further
consideration" tellingly included a suggestion that the district needed
"formal studies of the anticipated times and distances of likely bus
route' 46 before a final plan was adopted, a hint that further busing was a
remedy the court needed to seriously consider despite Judge Taylor's pre-
vious statements.
An appeal from this decision was taken to the United States Supreme
Court, which dismissed the writs of certiorari as improvidently granted
although Justices Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist vigorously dissented. 147
Justice Powell argued in his dissent that the DISD case presented "a long-
needed opportunity to re-examine the considerations relevant to framing
a remedy in a desegregation suit," especially the remedy of busing, and
disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's and the majority's opinion that the re-
cord was insufficient to do So. 14 8 According to Justice Powell, the Fifth
Circuit had failed to give "proper deference to the district court's consci-
entious execution" of the task of desegregation, and the court's personal
knowledge of the school district acquired through years of litigation, the
proverbial view from the bench that was used to justify delegating sub-
stantial remedial discretion to the district courts in desegregation cases. 149
Justice Powell also points to Judge Taylor's month-long trial, in which the
court considered various plans and testimony, including that of a court-
appointed expert, and the input provided from numerous community
groups concerned about the proposed integration plans as further evi-
dence that the appellate record was more than adequate for Supreme
Court review. Despite his earlier comments that he did not approve of
busing, Judge Taylor had in fact used busing as part of his remedial arse-
nal. The plan being scrutinized included the busing of approximately
20,000 students, but it also created a number of "one-race" student bod-
ies, which was problematic in the eyes of the Fifth Circuit, without more
143. Tasby v. Estes, 572 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1978).
144. Id. at 1013.
145. Id.
146. Estes v. Metro. Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 438 (1980) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (dismissing writs of certiorari). Estes was first argued October 29, 1979. 444.
U.S. 922. It was decided January 21, 1980, 444 U.S. at 437. Justice Marshall took no part in
the decision. Id.
147. Estes, 444 U.S. at 438 (Powell, J., dissenting).




fact-finding justifying the decision. 150
The tenor of Justice Powell's dissent is clear: a growing segment of the
Supreme Court was ready to reevaluate busing because they claimed the
"promise of Brown v. Board of Education cannot be fulfilled by contin-
ued imposition of self-defeating remedies."' 51 The busing ordered by
Judge Taylor fell on the low end of the busing plans proposed for Dallas,
with the School Board's plan busing approximately 14,000 students, while
the NAACP proposed busing close to 70,000 students. 52 Judge Taylor
was clearly reluctant to order additional busing, but the Fifth Circuit had
ruled the presence of so many proposed "one-race" schools required spe-
cific findings from the district court concerning the feasibility of various
"student assignment" techniques and clearly explaining the maintenance
of "any one-race schools" under the desegregation plan. Justice Powell
saw the issue differently from the Fifth Circuit, claiming that the remedial
goal is not integration, but desegregation, and the effectiveness of plans
in addressing prior constitutional violations must focus on this fact. Ex-
amining Tasby in this light, Justice Powell focuses on what he refers to as
the destabilizing impact of busing, an impact he inferred from the large
reduction in Anglo enrollment in the DISD since 1971 when Judge Taylor
first ordered minimal busing, as a factor that should be considered when
crafting desegregation plans. Whether Justice Powell was correct in con-
sidering "white flight" as a relevant factor when evaluating the feasibility
of the equitable remedy of busing, or whether "white flight" had in fact
played a role in the racial transformation of DISD, was not discussed by
the majority of the Supreme Court. The case was finally remanded to
Judge Taylor in 1980 pursuant to the Fifth Circuit's original order di-
recting the district court to make additional findings justifying any "one-
race" schools under the proposed desegregation plan, i.e., to revisit the
busing issue.
Meanwhile, the litigation had acquired a significant new voice, The
Black Coalition to Maximize Education, a group of black community
leaders whose position on some of the proposed remedial measures, espe-
cially busing of black students, differed from the Plaintiffs' or the
NAACP's.153 Efforts on the part of the parties to settle the case during
the lengthy appeals process, i.e., agree on a desegregation plan, ceased
when the case was remanded, and upon remand the NAACP asked Judge
Taylor to recuse himself "because of his ties to the city's business commu-
nity. 1 54 After waiting five years for the circuit court and the Supreme
Court to review his prior order, Judge Taylor removed himself from the
150. Id. at 442.
151. Id. at 439 (citation omitted).
152. Id. at 442 n.7.
153. For a more detailed discussion of the events occurring "outside" the courtroom at
this time, see LINDEN, supra note 117, at 142-51.
154. Id. at 145. While the NAACP felt that Judge Taylor could preside over a "negoti-
ated remedy," they questioned whether he could be an impartial trial judge in tight of his
ties to the business community, his prior membership in DISD's defense firm, and his use
of that firm to draw up his wife's will.
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Tasby Litigation on March 21,1981, without taking any judicial action on
the desegregation plan in order to avoid any further delays, and the "risk
that another Dallas desegregation plan might be overturned on appeal"
because of questions about his impartiality.1 55 When Tasby was reas-
signed to Judge Sanders, he took the case with all of the numerous legal,
prudential and pragmatic challenges it presented.
B. JUDGE SANDERS is ASSIGNED TASBY
Judge Sanders was appointed to the federal trial bench by President
Jimmy Carter in 1979. His varied career included service in the Texas
House of Representatives, a stint as the United States Attorney for the
Northern District of Texas, service in the administration of President Lyn-
don B. Johnson, a failed nomination to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia, private law practice, and an
unsuccessful run for United States senator.156 Even though he was more
liberal than the three previous federal judges who had handled the Dallas
desegregation cases, his appointment caused comment, some fearing he
was too liberal, with others concerned about past statements he had made
regarding the use of busing as a desegregation remedy.1 57 The NAACP,
already instrumental in the recusal of one federal judge from the case,
asked Judge Sanders if he thought he could preside over the case given
that busing was the core remedial issue addressed in the Fifth Circuit's
opinion on remand. 158 There were also concerns expressed that the time
and distance studies ordered by the Fifth Circuit were inadequate and not
produced in a timely fashion.159 Responding to these concerns, Judge
Sanders announced on April 11, 1981, that any past statements he may
have made that were critical of busing would not disqualify him. As far
as Judge Sanders was concerned the case had been assigned randomly,
and he was obligated to handle it fairly under his oath of office. 160
Assigned the case in March, Judge Sanders immediately set to work
addressing the Fifth Circuit's concerns and scheduled a hearing in April
on the formulation of a new student assignment plan. In the meantime,
Judge Sanders began learning the case, including going on the road to get
a feel for the school district, its length and breadth, its social makeup, and
the time and distance involved in traveling from one community to an-
other, all aspects of the case relevant to the question of busing. Getting
up to speed on the case was no mean feat as the Tasby Archives can
attest; ten years of desegregation litigation in Judge Taylor's court had
generated a substantial number of files, including a variety of desegrega-
tion plan proposals.161 While the archives are still being processed, a
155. Id.
156. Barefoot Sanders, supra note 23.




161. Desegregating Dallas Schools: The Litigation Archives, supra note 103.
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quick perusal of the "Scope and Content" of Judge Sanders' papers is a
better measure of the demands desegregation litigation makes upon a dis-
trict court than simply looking at their written opinions.a62 The Tasby
Archives tell a compelling story, starting with the district court's opinion
of August 3, 1981, in which Judge Sanders held that while "vestiges of
state-imposed racial segregation remain in the Dallas Independent
School District, 1 63 "additional systemwide transportation is not a feasi-
ble remedy for the existing constitutional violation.' 64 The story contin-
ues with the day-to-day involvement of Judge Sanders, and the
indispensible Special Masters appointed by the court, in the process of
desegregation (reports, meetings, hearings, motions and the ever present
"publicity"), through Judge Sanders' decision to grant DISD unitary sta-
tus on July 26, 1994,165 the additional nine years of court supervision fol-
lowing this order, finally culminating in Judge Sanders' decision to
dismiss the litigation and release DISD from judicial supervision in
2003.166
What is clear from this voluminous and detailed record, is that school
desegregation litigation does not occur within the neat boundaries of the
traditional adversarial paradigm. The impedimenta that appear in the
court's opinions, judicial record, case filings, and papers cannot begin to
capture the "Sturm und Drang" of the Tasby Litigation within its larger
context in Dallas, Texas. What happened in open court or in the parties'
meetings in chambers was merely the tip of the desegregation litigation
iceberg, as different players in the larger arena positioned and reposi-
tioned themselves on the issue of "proper remedies," especially busing,
and when and how DISD was to be desegregated. 167 How these matters,
which effectively occurred outside of the courtroom's public view and
often off the record, affected Judge Sanders can only be known through
his rulings, but it is impossible to claim these events did not impact the
litigation. School district desegregation litigation, especially in the south,
was a cauldron into which poured decades of distrust, racial bias, and
hate, as well as a loss of faith, a growing sense of urgency, and a renewed
hope that the federal courts could fashion a remedy using their extensive
equitable remedial powers to achieve educational equality and equity.
Sadly racial discrimination, whether overt and intentional, as it was in
DISD, or a process of more covert social or institutional forces, is an issue
the federal judiciary continues to address. 168
162. Id.
163. Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 686 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
164. Id.
165. Tasby v. Woolery, 869 F. Supp. 454, 477 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
166. See generally Tasby v. Moses, 265 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
167. LINDEN, supra note 117, at 150-217.
168. See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, Comment, Colorblind Segregation: Equal
Protection as a Bar to Neighborhood Integration, 92 CALIF. L. Rav. 841 (2004) (examining
racial segregation in the housing arena in Dallas, Texas, beginning in the 1950s, and the
civil rights litigation challenging the Dallas Housing Authority's and the City's policies of
racial isolation and exclusion, the Walker litigation, from 1987 to 1999).
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There is no doubt in my mind that if a conference were held to evaluate
Judge Sanders' "handling" of the Tasby Litigation that included all of the
lawyers, parties, school officials and community representatives who were
involved in the case over the years, there would be a range of opinions,
hopefully some complimentary, but I am sure there would be an equal
number of critical voices raised as well. The question is not whether eve-
ryone agreed with Judge Sanders' handling of the Tasby Litigation, but
whether he in fact accomplished what he set out to do, which is to fulfill
his oath of office and provide the Tasby litigants access to an independent
district court judge committed to hearing their case and fashioning an
effective equitable remedy that would ensure all children in DISD at-
tended desegregated schools. While not an elegant formulation, I like
Justice Rehnquist's definition of an independent jurist, and I think it is an
especially apt formulation to describe a federal judge's role in a school
desegregation case: In school desegregation cases the judge is like "a ref-
eree in a basketball game who is obliged to call a foul against a member
of the home team at a critical moment in the game: he will be soundly
booed, but he is nonetheless obliged to call it as he saw it, not as the
home crowd wants him to call it."' 169 Judge Sanders fit the bill: the factual
record in Tasby was well developed, his opinions were thorough, he
openly engaged with controlling precedent, he noted when precedent was
less than pellucid or provided clear guidance, and he mined the work of
other federal judges engaged in similar cases, examining the factual re-
cord and judicial actions in desegregation cases from across the country
as he set about crafting a plan for DISD. Judge Sanders grappled hon-
estly with the prudential concerns inherent in the Supreme Court's dic-
tates on the use of equitable remedies, and he was honest about his
unwillingness to be a "pioneer" on a few of the "new" legal issues raised
by Tasby. He did not display the same reluctance as his predecessors to
169. Ginsberg, supra note 129, at 1 (citing William H. Rehnquist, Act Well Your Part:
Therein All Honor Lies, 7 PEPP. L. REV. 227, 229-30 (1980)). In her article, Justice Gins-
berg points to United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), as an exemplar of judicial inde-
pendence. Id. at 3-4. This case was precipitated by United States District Judge John
Sirica issuing a subpoena to then-President Nixon, directing him to produce tape record-
ings and documents that had captured President Nixon's conversations with advisors about
an alleged cover-up of illegal activities. Id. at 4. Justice Ginsberg notes that the Supreme
Court at that time included four Nixon appointees, all of whom acted in concert to affirm
Judge Sirica. Id. What Justice Ginsberg does not discuss was the country's response, a
sense of relief that the judicial branch still functioned as a check and balance on the execu-
tive branch. Other examples of judicial independence cited by Justice Ginsberg include
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). Id. at 5.
In both of these cases, district court judges, one in the Eastern District of Virginia and the
other in the District of Columbia, faced difficult questions of constitutional significance,
which asked them to restrict the constitutional powers of the President. Id. at 5-7. The
issue was ultimately decided by the United States Supreme Court in favor of the petition-
ers. Id. The question of judicial independence and the problem of political pressure is one
that engages jurists across the country as they work to maintain an appropriate institu-
tional balance often in the face of extremely harsh criticism and political pressure. See,
e.g., STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,




hold the school district's proverbial "feet to the fire" in order to achieve
desegregation, but he was equally frank about his desire to find creative
and new solutions that would fit the unique circumstances of the case.
Finally, he expected the litigants and their lawyers to proceed in good
faith as advocates for their clients' constitutional concerns and not at-
tempt to hijack the court or the litigation for their own political gain. 170
C. JUDGE SANDERS' DESEGREGATION OPINIONS
When district court judges explain their decisions, especially constitu-
tional rulings, with written opinions, the court's transparency and ac-
countability are enhanced, not just for purposes of appeal but also for
purposes of explaining and legitimating the court's actions to the litigants
and the larger community. This is especially true for highly discretionary
decisions with far reaching social impact, such as those involved in fash-
ioning desegregation plans for a school district like DISD.17 1 The institu-
tional and individual context in which judges like Judge Sanders found
themselves demanded that their commitment to the adjudicative princi-
ples of consistency, predictability, fairness and uniformity in the applica-
tion of highly malleable constitutional principles to socially complex,
historically dynamic facts, the paradigm of the "rule of law" in the deseg-
regation cases, required these judges to fully explain their actions, how
they viewed the facts, the actors, the social context, the educational goals
and the applicable law. 172 Invoking "the rule of law" as a guiding princi-
170. See supra note 135 (discussing "judicial activism") and note 129 (discussing "judi-
cial independence").
171. There is always a question of balance when discussing judicial independence. How
does a judge walk the line between appropriate judicial restraint and the need to decide
difficult cases that call into question the constitutional structure or the unconstitutional
conduct of a state actor? Many have effectively argued that the federal judiciary, including
the Supreme Court, was too restrained in its handling of the early cases challenging de jure
racial segregation, while others claim they moved too precipitously or exceeded their re-
medial powers. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 119 (chronicling the history of desegre-
gation cases in the South and the role of the federal courts). Today reflecting on this
history perhaps the single most important lesson to be learned is the importance of the
federal district courts as an open, public forum in which citizens challenging the constitu-
tionality of state action and state actors defending their actions can proceed, knowing the
ensuing challenge will be conducted under a set of rules in a public forum designed to
ensure their voices will be heard and the disputed facts addressed with as much trans-
parency as can be mustered in the courtroom.
172. The role of judicial opinions and the importance of opinion writing, especially in
the constitutional arena, is explored by numerous authors. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsberg,
Remarks on Writing Separately, 66 WASH. L. REV. 133 (1990) (discussing the nature and
function of opinions in different legal systems); David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman &
Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L.R. 681
(2007) (discussing the circumstances that generate different types of judicial opinions at the
trial court level); Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1,
18-19 (1984) (defining principled decision making, the sine quo non of judicial self-re-
straint, as an opinion in which the ground of a decision is stated openly as distinct from the
judicial activist who adopts a highly formalist style in an effort "to conceal the degree to
which they are asserting judicial power"); Jonathan D. Varat, Review Essay, Economic
Ideology and the Federal Judicial Task: The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform; by Richard
A. Posner, 74 CAL. L. REV. 649 (1996) (critiquing Judge Posner's claims for judicial re-
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pie does not mean there will be strict uniformity in these trial courts'
desegregation decisions, quite the opposite. The variability in outcomes
deemed acceptable at the trial court level in the routine run of cases is
exponentially enhanced in desegregation cases because of the unique
context for each case: urban versus rural settings, the length and nature of
the segregation, the racial makeup of the community, the size and struc-
ture of the school district, and the ability of the parties to work together
and work with the district court judge to develop a desegregation plan.
Realistically, in the school desegregation cases, whether or not to write
extensive opinions at significant junctures in the cases was not an option;
the district courts exercised highly discretionary equitable powers in de-
signing a desegregation remedy, and the trial court's full explanation of
why it had adopted or rejected any given school desegregation plan was
essential. The district courts knew that their audience extended beyond
the individuals formally designated as parties in the litigation. They also
knew that the likelihood the courts' actions would result in actual institu-
tional "change" required the courts to consider the larger context of the
litigation; their opinions would help shape and set the ground rules for
important local debates about educational policy, educational equity and
equality, the quality of individual student's educational experience
throughout the district, the legitimacy of parental concerns, and other is-
sues inevitability raised when polities address the goal of "equality of
equal opportunity." In addition if the circuit courts were going to evalu-
ate the constitutionality and remedial effectiveness of a proposed deseg-
regation plan, extensive fact findings and analysis were needed; the
appellate courts had to rely upon the district courts to provide the
uniquely personal "view from the bench" that could capture and express
the human dimensions of this type of litigation. Quite early on in the
desegregation cases, the dialogue between the circuit courts and the dis-
trict courts relied upon extensive trial court opinions to shape the legal,
factual and remedial issues on appeal and allow the appellate courts to
offer clearer direction. Unlike other litigation, where a decision dele-
gated to the trial court's discretion meant less appellate supervision, 173
appellate deference was not the norm in the school desegregation cases,
even when the standard of review of certain aspects of the trial court's
decisions was the limited "abuse of discretion" standard. 174
Judge Sanders' first major opinion in the Tasby Litigation is notable for
its length, attention to detail and extensive analysis of the facts of the case
in light of controlling judicial principles, this would be the theme through-
straint by noting that activist judges can be quite candid and that overemphasizing judicial
restraint can lead to inaction).
173. See supra notes 28, 88 (discussing federal appellate deference to a range of district
court functions).
174. See supra notes 120-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit's rejec-
tion of Judge Taylor's opinion outlining the original proposed desegregation plan for DISD
in 1971); infra notes 235-46 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit's review of
Judge Sanders' desegregation plan).
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out the litigation. After hearing testimony for four weeks, including the
time and distance studies ordered by the Fifth Circuit in its remand of
Judge Taylor's original order, Judge Sanders finished taking evidence.
After the hearing it appeared that additional busing might be a feasible
option, but it was also clear that the split in the African-American com-
munity over busing troubled him. 175 As stated earlier, Judge Sanders ul-
timately found that "vestiges" of the prior unconstitutional segregation
remained in the district, but that "additional system wide transportation"
was not a feasible remedy.176 At the close of the hearing he ordered the
parties to "prepare and file desegregation plans for the Court's
consideration."1 77
In setting out the prior history of the case in his first opinion, Judge
Sanders points out that "DISD was no stranger to desegregation litiga-
tion when this action was initiated. ' 178 In recounting the history of the
case prior to the 1970 litigation, Judge Sanders speaks not only of the
district's prior inaction, but of the federal judiciary's complicity:
The courts did not direct DISD (and DISD did not volunteer) to
take affirmative action to eradicate the vestiges of the former statu-
tory segregated system. So, while it can fairly be said that DISD, like
many another school district, moved with maximum deliberation and
minimum speed to carry out the 1955 desegregation mandate of the
U.S. Supreme Court, it should also be said that the federal court
moved at the same pace; DISD did what the Court ordered no more,
no less.1 79
Judge Sanders then recounts the history of the litigation under Judge Tay-
lor, including a range of issues deemed raised and resolved (the prior
court's finding a constitutional violation evidenced by segregated schools
remaining in the district and the prior court's refusal to apply interdistrict
remedies).1 80 He describes the essential features of the desegregation
plan adopted by Judge Taylor and notes the unsuccessful attempt by the
parties to agree on a desegregation plan after the case was remanded by
the Fifth Circuit following the Supreme Court refusal to grant certiori.181
Judge Sanders lays out the history Tasby leading up to the assignment of
the case to him, including the NAACP's motion requesting "Judge Taylor
to recuse himself;" and, as the opinion states, "Judge Taylor did so."'182
The Fifth Circuit's concerns on remand were clear to Judge Sanders: the
circuit was concerned about the number of one-race schools that re-
mained under the 1976 plan proposed by Judge Taylor; the circuit wanted
the magnet school concept further evaluated; and the circuit wanted the
175. Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 690 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
176. Id. at 686.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 687.
179. Id.
180. Id.




district court "to consider assigning Anglo students to the (Nolan Estes
Educational Plaza) complex. ' 183 Judge Sanders also considered it essen-
tial to describe the parties to the litigation since its inception, noting how
many have come and gone. Of those remaining, eight participated in the
hearing, including the Black Coalition to Maximize Education ("Black
Coalition"), a "newcomer among the intervenors, representing a class of
black parents with children in DISD whose interests and positions on the
issues in this case ... differ from those of the other parties."'184 The court
continues by acknowledging the amicus curiae in the case, The Educa-
tional Task Force of the Dallas Alliance, and notes their "effort to lend
further assistance to the [c]ourt."'1 85 Describing the litigation's current
legal geography the opinion provides a short summary of each party's
position in the case, with one group seeking to maintain the 1976 desegre-
gation plan and the other group, led by the plaintiffs, seeking to prove the
plan constitutionally inadequate to remedy past discrimination or achieve
the constitutionally mandated "greatest possible degree of actual school
desegregation." 186
Though the Black Coalition was the newest party to the litigation, it
turned out to be one of the most significant. Described as a "broad-based
minority community group," Judge Sanders' opinion names its constitu-
ent members and notes the series of meetings it conducted in the black
community, seeking members' input on the issues before the court. 18 7
The testimony offered by the Black Coalition at that early hearing "con-
vinced the Court that there is considerable difference of opinion among
sizeable segments of the minority citizenry of Dallas over the type of re-
lief that should be ordered in this case."'188 Without deciding which party
"speaks for the greater number of Dallas blacks," the court states with
confidence that "no one party to this suit can lay claim" to representing
the entire black community; 189 this finding shaped the scope of relief, es-
pecially busing, that Judge Sanders would finally order. Judge Sanders
discusses other cases in his opinion in which disagreements in the black
community over remedial measures occurred, making the point that its
occurrence in the Dallas case is not unique, but also finding that Tasby
was the only case "where intervenor status has been taken for the pur-
pose of advancing the divergent positions on the record." 190 According
183. Id.
1 84. Id. at 689 (citing CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 1, 6 (London 1904) (1853)




188. Id. at 690.
189. Id.
190. Id. Judge Sanders finds additional support for this position, giving formal recogni-
tion to this division in the black community, in the legal scholarship. Id. (citing Derrick
Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 507-08 (1976)); see generally Bernie D. Jones, Critical Race
Theory: New Strategies for Civil Rights in the New Millennium?, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER
L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing Derrick Bell's career).
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to the court, "basic principles of equity require courts to develop greater
sensitivity to the growing disagreement in black communities over the
nature of school relief."191 The admission of the Black Coalition as an
intervenor in the Tasby Litigation may have been one of the most signifi-
cant events in the case. In a time during which the U.S. Supreme Court
and other courts were beginning to express concern over busing, 192 DISD
was experiencing declining Anglo enrollments as an absolute measure,
and trends in population and enrollment predicted future increases in mi-
nority enrollment and decreases in Anglo enrollment as a proportion of
the overall enrollment in the district. 193 Situated in an urban area that
was spread out and had relatively low population density as a whole,
DISD had already been divided into subdistricts which mirrored the ra-
cial makeup of the district, and which provided "parents and students a
sense of community participation and local control over their schools. '194
In this context the voice of the Black Coalition objecting to busing black
students and offering a range of other remedial strategies was bound to
be heard loudly and clearly by the court.
Summarizing the demographic and geographic landscape at length in
the opinion, Judge Sanders notes that the "single most compelling charac-
teristic of the DISD for purposes of designing an effective desegregation
plan" is the reality that the district is a majority-minority school dis-
trict.1 95 Despite this observation the court goes out of its way to make
the point that it will not consider theories of "white flight" in formulating
its remedy.196 Judge Sanders is clear about his reasons for taking this
position, citing for support Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit authority and
the facts introduced at the hearing, which established numerous other
reasons for the out-migration of Anglos from DISD. 197 However, putting
aside "white flight" as a factor to be explicitly considered in fashioning a
new desegregation plan does not mean the court cannot consider popula-
tion trends and projections in its final analysis.198 Judge Sanders turns
next to the social geography of Dallas-in particular its housing pat-
terns-noting that these patterns reflect "great physical separation of the
races."'199 The opinion goes into great detail describing the difference be-
tween Dallas and other urban school districts with more of a donut
shaped population distribution, with black residents in the city's core, the
center of the donut, and white residents, the suburban school districts,
forming a ring around the outside, a formation which lent itself to
191. Tasby, 520 F. Supp. at 690 (quoting Bell, supra note 190, at 507-08).
192. See supra text accompanying note 147 (noting Justice Powell's desire to revisit bus-
ing as the favored equitable remedy in school desegregation cases).
193. Tasby, 520 F. Supp. at 695.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 699.
196. Id.






redrawing school attendance zones as pie-shaped wedges.200 The physical
racial segregation in DISD did not lend itself to such a simple geographic
fix; Judge Sanders found that this racial geography was "doubtless due to
complex socioeconomic factors, which are beyond the writ of this or any
other court."' 201 There is no doubt that a high correlation exists between
de jure school segregation patterns and racially segregated housing pat-
terns; for example, the Fifth Circuit in 1979 ordered the Lubbock School
District to make additional findings of fact to determine whether the
Board of Education's past intentional acts of discrimination may have
had an "incremental segregative effect" on the residential patterns of the
school population. 20 2 But this was unusual; on the whole, federal courts
were much more willing to focus on academic achievement and equal
access to quality educational resources and programs in fashioning deseg-
regation decrees, while racialized housing patterns always seemed to fall
just beyond their remedial reach.20 3
Judge Sanders' recitation of relevant cases and principles in the opinion
is thorough, focusing on key Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent,
and paying particular attention to other district court decisions, with their
carefully developed facts and analysis of similar problems. 20 4 The opin-
ion certainly meets any standard of transparency in terms of clearly stat-
ing the principles Judge Sanders planned to use in exercising his equitable
remedial discretion to fashion a new desegregation plan. What warrants
comment is that Judge Sanders, in citing relevant cases, pays particular
attention to the cases' "facts" and describes their individual judicial reme-
dies and the appellate courts' review of these remedies in great detail.205
200. Id. at 701 (the food metaphors are intriguing).
201. Id. at n.41.
202. United States v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 600 F.2d 518, 527-28 (5th Cir. 1979), cited in
Tasby, 520 F. Supp. at 714.
203. This is not to say that racial discrimination in housing and in Dallas in the building
of public housing that replicated the old racial divides has not been addressed by the fed-
eral courts, but this has happened only when a clear racial motive could be established.
The insidious impact of de jure segregation and other forms of racial discrimination, while
recognized, have largely been put beyond the reach of the federal courts' constitutional
remedial powers. See Adam Liptak, The Same Words but Differing Views, N.Y. TiMES,
June 29, 2007, at A24. The article discusses the Supreme Court's opinion in the most re-
cent school case addressing the use of racial integration to remedy past racial discrimina-
tion and segregation, in which both sides in the litigation as well as the majority and
dissenting Supreme Court justices cited Brown v. Board of Education and its briefs. Id. In
interviews following this recent decision, lawyers who represented the black schoolchildren
in Brown said "that several justices in the majority had misinterpreted the positions ...
taken in the [Brown] litigation" and "misunderstood the true meaning of Brown." Id.; see
also, e.g., infra note 279; see generally Jonathan Fischbach, Will Rhee & Robert Cacace,
Race at the Pivot Point: The Future of Race-Based Policies to Remedy De Jure Segregation
After Parents Involved in Community Schools, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 491 (2008)
(discussing the United States Supreme Court's recent opinion in the companion cases of
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and Meredith v.
Jefferson County Board of Education, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), and its potential impact on race-
based, race-conscious, and race-neutral policies adopted by school districts to achieve the
goal of integration).




What we see is a pragmatic jurist looking for guidance and insight from
his brethren on the unique problems he faced. Judge Sanders cites and
quotes an array of holdings, presumptions, and general principles that he
intended to follow and that he found particularly relevant to the remedial
problem he faced of "single-race" schools in majority-minority school dis-
tricts.20 6 Whether the continued existence of one-race schools in DISD
was an unlawful vestige of past discrimination was the pivotal question
for court? In this context what did the Fifth Circuit's mandate of "maxi-
mum desegregation practically achievable" 207 mean? The court noted
that racial quotas and busing are not required by law, but when would
anything less be deemed the maximum desegregation practicable ordered
by the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit? At the end of his review of
this precedent, Judge Sanders outlines the nine legal principles that would
govern the case, each one addressing some aspect of the court's desegre-
gation challenges. 20 8 Rather than attempt a neat, coherent synthesis of
applicable constitutional law-an impossible task given the state of the
jurisprudence-Judge Sanders simply sets forth the principles in num-
bered order from one to nine. 20 9 What becomes clear upon reading these
principles and associated precedent is that there has been a shift in the
federal courts' perspective on school desegregation over the two decades
from 1960 to 1980.
As time and distance grew between the original acts of de jure segrega-
tion and judicial attempts to remedy the insidious impact of those acts,
including irradicating all "vestiges" of prior discrimination, the courts
found themselves increasingly willing to set aside earlier legal and factual
presumptions, which had allowed them to find discrimination based pri-
marily on the fact of segregated schools, and focus instead on the difficul-
ties they perceived in desegregating majority-minority districts, and
question the remedial efficacy of certain remedies, especially busing.210
This does not mean the general principles governing the equitable rem-
edy of a desegregation plan were altered; rather it means that the difficul-
ties inherent in achieving racial integration school-by-school within
predominately minority urban school districts gained recognition in the
judicial discourse. A shift in the dialogue between the circuit courts and
district courts followed this trend.2 11 In difficult or challenging cases, the
district courts' remedial decisions predictably became increasingly fact-
sensitive and grounded in the district courts' unique or pragmatic
problems; the appellate courts' response in these highly context driven
types of cases is to defer to the trial courts' primary institutional exper-
tise, fact finding, its on the ground perspective, 2 12 which, in the case of
206. Id.
207. Id. at 702.
208. Id. at 704-05.
209. Id.
210. See sources cited supra note 119.




school desegregation, included a panoply of individual, contextual, and
systemic facts to be considered in designing a remedial plan.213
The trial court's equitable remedial powers may only be exercised
where a constitutional violation has occurred, and the next section of
Judge Sanders' opinion attempts to locate the original scope of the consti-
tutional violation. 214 Judge Sanders grounds his remedial authority in
Judge Taylor's 1971 finding that "vestiges of the segregated system re-
mained in DISD" and a "similar finding of system wide vestiges of segre-
gation" by Judge Taylor that was the basis for his 1976 desegregation
order.215 Finding this to be the law of the case, Judge Sanders holds that
these findings will not be revisited.216 The court makes the further find-
ing that DISD has acted in good faith since these original rulings, but this
second finding is not dispositive of the question2 17 whether DISD has
eliminated all vestiges of the former unconstitutional system. In order to
resolve this question Judge Sanders holds the Keyes presumption to be
determinative, meaning that currently segregated schools are considered
a vestige of prior segregation policies, even though there has been no
intentional racial discrimination since 1971.218 DISD vigorously opposed
this finding, introducing evidence and arguing that the predominately mi-
nority schools remaining in the district could be explained by increases in
minority student population and residential housing patterns and were
not "vestiges" of prior de jure segregation.219
Citing Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court authority, Judge Sanders
opines that racialized housing patterns cannot be treated as the legal
cause for racial imbalance in schools until "all vestiges of the de jure sys-
tem are eradicated," and that the evidence needed to prove otherwise is
likely unobtainable. 220 While the relationship between the predominantly
Anglo schools and many of the predominantly minority schools indicates
that the relationship between past acts and present segregation has "be-
come so attenuated" it would not support a finding of de jure segregation,
"it is neither practical or possible to" determine on a school by school
basis which schools are "vestiges" and which are not.22 1 Significantly, the
court points out that it lacks guiding principles from the higher courts
regarding how to measure this attenuation over time, that it has no desire
to "pioneer in the field," that it must take into account the practicalities
of the situation, and that under prevailing precedent it must treat the
school system as a whole. 22 2 These limiting legal principles, principles
appealing to any pragmatic jurist, allowed the court to find that "vestiges
213. See supra note 132 and accompanying text; infra note 224 and accompanying text.
214. Tasby, 520 F. Supp. at 705-07.





220. Id. at n.45.
221. Id. at 706-07.
222. Id. at 707.
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of past discrimination continue to exist in DISD, evidenced by some of
the predominantly minority schools ... and further evidenced... by the
lower achievement of minority students as compared to Anglo stu-
dents. ' 22 3 The fact that, as a practical matter, Judge Sanders could not
identify the specific one-race schools or measure the achievement gaps
that were attributable to prior de jure segregation was not fatal to his
holding.224 In this opinion we can observe how Judge Sanders' unique
blending of legal formalism with its reliance on precedent, legal stan-
dards, and fact findings-with legal pragmatism-which examines legal
problems in a context-enriched setting, looking at legal practicalities, and
evaluating results in terms of their overall feasibility and impact came
into play.
In evaluating the constitutional adequacy of Judge Taylor's proposed
plan, Judge Sanders went through each and every provision in the plan
and outlined his concerns, which reflected in large part the Fifth Circuit's
expressed concerns. 225 What stands out in this portion of the opinion is
the court's incredible attention to detail in terms of student enrollment
data, programmatic information, the court's overall comprehension of the
educational system, and the potential impact of the proposed plan.22 6
Judge Sanders revisits another recurring theme of the case, the lack of
bright-line precedent establishing clear benchmarks to determine when a
school district is integrated, the reluctance of the appellate courts, includ-
ing the Supreme Court, to establish specific numerical standards as legal
standards by which to measure desegregation, and the resulting institu-
tional pressure on the district courts to use their unique perspective and
expertise in determining what will be their acceptable minimum defini-
tion of an integrated district considering "the practicalities of the situa-
tion. ' 227 Again, Judge Sanders calls upon his colleagues in other federal
courts who are faced with or have faced similar difficult situations, but
overall the message is clear; the district court judge is truly the court of
first and possibly last resort for the litigants, and more importantly, for
the children in DISD.
In order to move forward at this juncture in the litigation, Judge Sand-
ers must resolve the question of single-race schools: What will be the nu-
merical cut-off in defining a minority or single-race school? DISD urges
use the of a ninety percent standard, claiming that this is the best measure
of a one-race school.228 Plaintiffs urge the use of a forty percent rule,
claiming that any school with a present Anglo enrollment of more than
forty percent is out of balance with the system.22 9 Announcing that he
found both proposals unacceptable, Judge Sanders opted for the twenty-
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 707-39.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 710.




five percent to seventy-five percent standard as an initial starting point in
defining a desegregated school.230 What stands out in this debate is the
rather obvious middle, or practical course, adopted by the court. It is
easy to appreciate the parties' positions when viewed from the perspec-
tive of the adversarial paradigm, but, as will be seen, the adversarial pro-
cess clearly has its limitations when it comes to generating a feasible
constitutional plan that can effectively desegregate a large, urban major-
ity-minority school district. The opinion is replete with similar discus-
sions, as Judge Sanders examined different aspects of the 1976 plan in
light of the Fifth Circuit's concern over single-race schools. The tenor of
the opinion is extremely pragmatic, and fairly reflects the critiques and
concerns raised by the parties during four weeks of hearings.231 Whether
the Court was completely successful, Judge Sanders attempted to give a
voice to all of the litigants, Judge Lefkow's grass roots democracy in ac-
tion, as the Tasby Litigation moved down the home stretch.
In the end, Judge Sanders ordered the litigants to file separate "deseg-
regation plans prepared in conformity with this Opinion," which were to
address the key issues set forth therein.232 Essentially, the court asked
the parties to evaluate, point-by-point, the feasibility of programs and re-
alistically assess the cost and timetable for programmatic remedies; to
propose methods for increasing enrollment in the present magnets, espe-
cially Anglo enrollment; to address the practicability of attendance zone
changes; and finally, to "evaluate the feasibility and appropriateness of
adjusting the current 4-8 transportation plan to further desegregate the
predominately minority 4-8 schools. '233 Judge Sanders ends his opinion
by returning to the most troubling aspect of the litigation, the "substantial
body of minority parents" who seek an end to busing.234
The Fifth Circuit's opinion on appeal reviewing Judge Sanders' deseg-
regation plan describes the process that unfolded following the issuance
of his original analysis of the case and his request for the parties' input.
As described by the Fifth Circuit, "the case has come a long way" and "it
has now reached the point where the major portion of the district court's
judgment is the result of the parties' own agreement. 2 35 It is not difficult
to imagine this result, considering the litigants' and their lawyers' experi-
ence with the case, as well as Judge Sanders' clarity in outlining what he
considered to be the crucial issues that needed to be resolved before a
final desegregation order or, as described by the Fifth Circuit, "a sensi-
tive, thorough opinion could be entered. ' 236 The experiment in democ-
racy with a small "d" worked; because an "impressive level of agreement"
230. Id.
231. Id. at 707-49.
232. Id. at 749-50.
233. Id. at 750.
234. Id.




was reached amongst the parties there were limited issues on appeal.2 37
A negotiated desegregation plan at this remedial stage, especially after
the court has held an extensive hearing and made detailed fact findings,
makes sense in a school desegregation case. After ten years of litigation
(1971-1981), the parties and their counsel had developed extensive
knowledge and expertise regarding feasible, available desegregation rem-
edies. And they, like the district court, faced the challenge of creating a
feasible, practical plan that would eradicate the "vestiges" of prior dis-
crimination and move the district forward. In reaching this agreement,
the plaintiffs and the NAACP gave up their request for increased busing;
Judge Sanders' conclusion that increased mandatory busing was not feasi-
ble, because of substantial time and distance problems and because of the
low number of Anglo students to be distributed throughout the district,
was not appealed.238 More importantly, none of the parties appealed the
adequacy of the district court's desegregation plan as a remedy for past
constitutional violations.2 39 Additionally, since the parties' stipulations
addressing four other areas of judicial concern were approved by the dis-
trict court and entered as part of its final order the appeal was quite nar-
rowly focused. 240
DISD continued to argue that the district court erred when it refused
to declare DISD unitary instead finding that "vestiges" of past discrimi-
nation remained.2 41 The Fifth Circuit makes the telling point that in its
prior decisions finding a determination of unitary status in school districts
similar to DISD was not clearly erroneous does not translate into a hold-
ing that a district court refusing to bestow unitary status on a seemingly
similarly situated school district is in error. The Fifth Circuit's analysis of
this issue and its refusal to create a paradigmatic fact based legal "uni-
tary" standard further highlights the circuit courts' willingness to keep
deferring to the trial courts on this point. The circuit's unwillingness to
take upon itself the fact sensitive analysis needed to rule on this issue
made the point that the school district still had the burden of proof on
this issue and it had failed to meet that burden by proving that a "current
condition of racial segregation is not a vestige of the [district's] past [dis-
crimination]. ' 242 Reviewing the district court's opinion as a whole, the
Fifth Circuit is satisfied that the issue of whether DISD had produced
sufficient evidence to rebut the finding by Judge Taylor in 1976, that ves-
tiges of prior discrimination remained, was not erroneously decided by
Judge Sanders.2 43 According to the Fifth Circuit, Judge Sanders did not
make an independent determination on the issue of unitary status nor
237. Id. at 93.
238. Id. at 92-93.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 92.
241. Id. at 93.
242. Id. at 93-94.
243. Id. at 95.
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was he required to do so. 244 But the Fifth Circuit notes that when the
question of unitary status is properly raised, it should be considered by
the district court free of any inference that the district court's judgment
below, or the Fifth Circuit's affirmance in this appeal, "constitutes a law
of the case" holding that DISD was not unitary in 1981.245 With regard to
the challenged remedies reviewed under the highly deferential abuse of
discretion standard, the Fifth Circuit affirmed Judge Sanders' rejection of
the Minority Neighborhood Option Plan and revision of minority hiring
goals, but reversed the district court's alteration of certain school attend-
ance zones. 246 This was the last major appeal in the Tasby Litigation.
During the ensuing period from 1981 to 1994, the year DISD was de-
clared unitary, Judge Sanders issued orders on a range of topics, including
busing, feasibility studies for new, enhanced learning centers, and recruit-
ing more minority faculty, as the court and the parties worked on the
daily decisions needed to implement the detailed desegregation plan.2 47
In 1994, DISD formally moved for a declaration of unitary status,2 48 a
hearing was held, and Judge Sanders issued another lengthy opinion
granting the district unitary status but retaining judicial oversight of the
case for a three-year monitoring period to allow DISD to correct certain
compliance deficiencies raised during the hearing.2 49 There are obvious
institutional incentives on the part of the school district to pursue "uni-
tary status": to "get rid" of the case; to relieve the district of the time and
effort involved in overseeing implementation of a desegregation plan, in-
cluding reports, hearings and meetings with litigants and the community;
attorneys' fees; the existence of extremely malleable legal standards; and
244. Id. at 96.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 98-99 (noting that, on appeal, neither side objected to the use of the 70% to
75% figure in defining racially identified schools).
247. See SMU Dedman School of Law, supra note 133 (Summary Timeline of the Tasby
Litigation)
248. See, e.g., Susan Poser, Termination of Desegregation Decrees and the Elusive Mean-
ing of Unitary Status, 81 NEB. L. REV. 283 (2002) (discussing the federal courts' growing
reluctance over time to engage in institutional reform litigation, because of concerns about
the scope of judicial discretion in the remedial process, and the lack of narrow judicial
principles in school desegregation cases to guide that discretion); Watson, supra note 119,
at 962 (arguing "[t]here has been an increasing tendency in the federal appellate courts to
affirm district court rulings of unitary status in order to uphold the goal set out by the
Supreme Court of returning school systems to the control of local and state authorities").
249. Tasby v. Woolery, 869 F. Supp. 454, 477 (N.D. Tex. 1994). The question of unitary
status came up once before, in 1989. See Tasby v. Edwards, No. 3-4211-H, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16823 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 1989) (mem. op.). DISD filed a one-page, two-para-
graph motion seeking unitary status, to which was appended a document signed by the
African-American Board members opposing the motion. Id. at *1. The district court or-
dered DISD to file a reply to the plaintiffs' response, but instead of complying with this
directive, the Board sent the district court a letter stating that the Board could not agree on
a reply. Id. at *2. Treating the letter as a statement to the district court that the Board
refused to comply with the its prior order, Judge Sanders issued a stern rebuke: "Defend-
ants may not intend their non compliance with the Court's Order to be contumacious,
warranting contempt proceedings, but Defendants are subject to sanctions for such non
compliance." Id. The district court verbally sanctioned DISD and ordered that no motion
for unitary status could be filed before January 15, 1990. Id. at *2-3.
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the reality that the district court in order to do its job has had to be privy
to the innermost workings of the school district on a daily basis. In re-
sponse to DISD's motion a hearing was held and, again, Judge Sanders
prepared a lengthy, thorough, detailed opinion, covering applicable legal
precedent and the status of the desegregation plan in his effort to deter-
mine whether DISD had acted in good faith and had complied with the
court's desegregation decree "for a reasonable period of time.1250 The
primary question before the district court was whether the vestiges of
past discrimination have been eliminated to the "extent practicable.
251
In reviewing DISD's compliance with the district court's prior decree, the
opinion breaks down the desegregation plan element by element, noting
where DISD has done well, where deficiencies exist, and where the Plain-
tiffs offered criticisms and suggestions. 252
After granting DISD unitary status, Judge Sanders reflects upon the
understandable "skepticism of the Black School Board trustees and some
in the Black community" regarding the Board's true commitment to de-
segregation2 53 and states his belief that "such intransigence no longer ex-
ists" and the shortcomings in compliance noted in the opinion are "due
primarily, and perhaps solely, to failures by a few district personnel to
follow through. '2 54 In a very human moment, Judge Sanders admits that
"[f]rom time to time the [clourt has expressed its impatience at the appar-
ent lack of motivation and good management responsible for these
problems," 255 but he is confident these problems will be quickly resolved.
The ruling was not appealed, perhaps in deference to the fact the court
"got it right" or, more likely, because there had been substantial compli-
ance with the plan and Judge Sanders, true to his pragmatic nature, was
going to keep an eye on the district for a while. By putting in place
"court supervision," Judge Sanders circumvented the issue of dismissing
the lawsuit and created an opportunity for any of the parties to come
back to the court if problems arose, a solution that was practical, fair,
efficient, effective, and ensured the minority community could air their
concerns in front of Judge Sanders in open court.
The opinion granting unitary status provided for a three-year monitor-
ing period with regular reports to the auditor, but this turned out to be an
unduly optimistic timeline. Finally, on June 5, 2003, almost ten years af-
ter declaring DISD unitary, Judge Sanders dismissed the Tasby Litigation
with another thorough opinion setting out the history of the Litigation,
DISD's progress desegregating the district, and the current racial/ethnic
250. Tasby, 869 F. Supp. at 461-62.
251. Id. at 460.
252. Plaintiffs and intervenors argued that the racial tension on the DISD Board evi-
denced vestiges of past discrimination were not eradicated. Id. at 475. The district court
noted its concern "about the contentious nature of Board deliberations," but pointed out
that this is not a measure addressed in the judgment or a measure of desegregation ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court. Id.





composition of DISD's student body.2 56 In this opinion the court ex-
plores DISD's years of legal and political toil, the hiring of Superinten-
dent Mike Moses, the passage of a significant bond issue, the growth of
minority personnel in DISD, and the more collegial operation of the
Board of Trustees.2 57 At the hearing on unitary status, one of the major
points raised in opposition to DISD's motion requesting the court dismiss
the litigation was the minority community's frank skepticism that the
Board of Trustees would follow the mandates of the court's desegregation
order and commit itself to maintaining a desegregated school district af-
ter the court's supervision ended. In anticipation of this concern being
raised in front of Judge Sanders, DISD's Board of Trustees had adopted a
"Declaration of Commitments and Covenants Upon Release from Court
Supervision (Covenants). '258 In addition to the general principle stated
in the Covenants that the District was committed to equal educational
opportunity, the Covenants also express the District's commitment to
maintaining the programmatic remedies initiated during the litigation. 259
Judge Sanders states in his opinion that he is relying on the Covenants as
a gesture of good faith on the part of the Board and that the "[c]ourt
would be gravely concerned if there were any material departures from
the Covenants during the three year term which begins upon the dismis-
sal of this case."'260
In setting the stage for his final opinion in the Tasby Litigation, Judge
Sanders' review of applicable precedent focuses on a significant shift in
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the question of unitary status. The
Supreme Court, in a trio of cases from the early 1990s, now stressed the
importance of local control, the inherently "transitory nature of judicial
supervision," and the importance of returning districts to that local con-
trol as soon as practicable. 261 The Supreme Court's juridical "thumb on
the scales of justice" now encouraged district courts to withdraw from the
arena of school politics and policy. As he has done throughout the litiga-
tion, Judge Sanders clearly sets forth the legal principles that will guide
his final decision in the Tasby Litigation and then walks through in detail
his application of this law to the unique facts of the case he had overseen
for over twenty years.262 It is not surprising at this stage in the litigation
that there were a number of stipulated and non-contested matters, includ-
ing the Board's ability to function effectively and its ongoing commitment
to desegregation;2 63 the court compliments and commends the Board on
its achievements in these areas.2 64 The contested issues were thoroughly
considered and the court's findings were supported by evidence from
256. See generally Tasby v. Moses, 265 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 761-62.
259. Id. at 761.
260. Id. at 762.
261. Id. at 763.
262. Id. at 765-80.




DISD, the Plaintiffs, and the independent auditor, Ms. Sandra Malone. 265
Even at this late stage, Judge Sanders took the time to develop a full
record, which included acknowledging the legitimacy of the Plaintiffs'
concerns; and while the end was clearly in sight, there was nothing sum-
mary or rushed about the proceedings or the court's final decision.
In concluding the written opinion, Judge Sanders leaves his indelible
imprimatur on the case by complimenting Superintendent Moses, the
School Board, and the lawyers for both the Plaintiffs and the Defend-
ants.266 Judge Sanders states that "[t]he [c]ourt is particularly grateful for
the careful and constructive work of the External Auditor, Ms. Sandra
Malone[,] and her predecessor, Dr. Donald Hood. '267 Perhaps most im-
portantly, Judge Sanders acknowledges the "courageous" Sam Tasby, the
original plaintiff in the case.2 68 Thirty-three years had passed since the
Tasby Litigation was filed, with numerous hearings held, orders issued,
and hours spent reviewing evidence with a single goal: to eradicate the
vestiges of de jure segregation and move DISD toward unitary status.269
It is telling that Judge Sanders ends his final opinion in the Tasby Litiga-
tion on a personal note by acknowledging the man whose soft-spoken
voice was finally heard in open court and who sat by his lawyer's side
through endless, perhaps often incomprehensible, hearings because he
believed, as did Judge Sanders, that the federal district court would be his
court of first and last resort.
D. REFLECrING ON TASBY
Those reflecting on the Tasby Litigation from today's vantage point, or
reflecting on the school desegregation cases from the vantage point of
history, should not second guess district court judges who undertook the
challenging task of redressing state-sanctioned segregation in our public
schools.270 The Tasby Litigation, as it evolved, followed patterns similar
to those seen in other cases involving large urban school districts. Ini-
tially, there was a period of institutional reluctance on the part of the
court and the local community to begin aggressively implementing the
Supreme Court's Brown mandate, and demands for change were met
265. Id. at 767-80.
266. Id. at 780-81.
267. Id. at 781.
268. Id. at 780.
269. Id.
270. State-sanctioned segregation in the South was not limited to the public schools, but
schools so embody democratic ideals, including the ideal of equality of equal opportunity,
the debate over integration in the school cases shaped the larger political discourse as well.
However, equality cannot be measured simply by reference to the more limited goal of
eradicating segregation and its vestiges set forth in the federal courts' desegregation orders
from this era. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
823-32 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (objecting to the narrow definition of desegregation
put forth by the majority and citing numerous cases for the proposition that equality, as
mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment, is measured by more than narrow remedial at-
tempts to redress de jure segregation.); see also Hutchinson, infra note 331 (discussing the
continuing need for a racial discourse addressing substantive equality).
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with a political discourse dominated by the majoritarian communities ar-
guments in favor of a "go slow" strategy. This was followed by a period
of educational reform directed at restructuring the schools programmati-
cally, reallocating resources using both targeting and equity funding para-
digms, and restructuring school assignment plans by moving boundaries
or implementing busing programs. As the federal judges developed ex-
pertise in the arena of desegregation, the cases reflect an increasingly en-
gaged dialogue developing between the district courts and the local
school districts, in which educational programs and policies were openly
scrutinized in the public forum of the courts. The four remedial issues
that played such a significant role in shaping the Tasby Litigation shaped
desegregation litigation across the country: whether and how district
courts would use interdistrict desegregation plans to achieve racial inte-
gration; whether and how district courts would address segregated hous-
ing in their desegregation plans; whether and how busing would be used
to achieve integration; and whether and how the courts would address the
seemingly intransigent achievement score gaps. The courts responded to
the larger integrationist concerns with primarily incremental strategies,
reflecting a more pragmatic problem-solving approach, an approach
which relied in large part on fostering agreement, and therefore compro-
mise, amongst the litigants as an important institutional strategy. This
strategy contrasted sharply with the more far-reaching integrationist vi-
sion espoused by early civil rights advocates, including Thurgood Mar-
shall both as a civil rights lawyer and later as a Supreme Court Justice,
and their desire for a more aggressive judicial role in restructuring the
country's racial landscape.271 In this respect the evolution of the Tasby
Litigation paralleled desegregation litigation across the country.
First, there was the question of incorporating suburban, or predomi-
nantly Anglo, school districts in the desegregation order in order to
achieve racial integration on a school by school basis. The district court
in Tasby, like its peers throughout the country, did not pursue this strat-
egy,272 although Booker T. Washington High School for the Performing
and Visual Arts, DISD's arts magnet high school, has successfully re-
cruited and admitted students from outside the district since early on in
its inception.2 73 It is difficult to measure the impact this policy has on the
school's racial makeup today, but in 2006 the school reported a racial and
ethnic composition of approximately one-third Anglo, one-third African-
American, and one-third Latino, at a time when the school district itself
271. See infra text accompanying notes 279-94.
272. See id.
273. In recruiting out-of-district students, the school includes all applicants to the
school in the initial round of auditions and assessments; the school's stated policy is to
apply the same artistic eligibility criteria to any and all applicants. According to district
policy, out-of-district students are only admitted if the school cannot fill a given class or
cluster (dance, music, theater and visual arts) with "qualified" students from within the
district. See Dallas ISD-TASB Policy On Line, http://www.tasb.orglpolicy/pol/private/057
905/pol.cfm?DisplayPage=FDA (LEGAL).pdf&QueryText=TRANSFER (Interdistrict
Transfers policy); DISD, Response to an Open Records Request (on file with the author).
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was six percent Anglo, sixty-three percent Latino, and thirty percent Af-
rican-American. 274 As has already been seen, the question of how to ad-
dress highly segregated housing patterns challenged Judge Sanders.
Ultimately Judge Sanders' pragmatic approach took its inspiration from a
range of remedial measures, developed locally or adopted from other
school cases, whose primary focus was to eradicate the institutional and
programmatic vestiges of segregation by focusing on funding new schools
and programs, and providing limited targeted busing in those instances
where racial integration could be achieved. Finally, all of the district
courts involved in desegregation had to address the continued gap in
achievement scores between Anglo students and their African-American
and Latino peers. And they, like Judge Sanders, had to decide whether
the achievement score gaps were vestiges of prior de jure segregation, the
result of more nuanced institutional racial biases, or attributable to other
factors, including the economic segregation that had followed "white
flight," which fell outside their remedial reach. These same district courts
faced the challenge of evaluating the effectiveness of their desegregation
programs in closing this achievement score gap;275 educators touted and
district courts implemented a variety of programs, but a substantial racial
gap in test scores persists today. In this context, what does success mean?
Did the courts define their goal as equality in educational opportunity or
were the district courts increasingly focused on meeting the more nar-
rowly defined remedial mandates of the Supreme Court?
While it is fair to criticize the federal district courts' initial institutional
reluctance to take an active role in the school desegregation cases, 276 it is
harder to answer the question of whether the federal trial judges should
have done more, or whether they withdrew from the fray too early.277
274. See TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY, ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE INDICATOR SYSTEM:
BOOKER T. WASHINGTON CAMPUS REPORT 8 (2006-2007), available at http://ritter.tea.
state.tx.us/cgi/sas/broker; TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY, ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE INDICA-
TOR SYSTEM: BOOKER T. WASHINGTON CAMPUS REPORT 8 (2007-2008), available at http://
ritter.tea.state.tx.us/cgi/sas/broker. A substantial number of the out-of-district students ad-
mitted to Booker T. Washington High School for the Performing and Visual Arts are An-
glo. When asked about the continuing policy of admitting out of district students, various
individuals, including members of the Booker T. Washington Advisory Board, commented
that it was difficult to find qualified students from within the district, given the school's
high artistic standards. This would appear to be especially true in those "arts," such as
dance and instrumental, where the family resources needed to pay for private lessons and
to support years of training correlate more highly with the income distributions in the
surrounding predominately Anglo school districts.
275. See sources cited supra notes 116, 118, 125 (referencing more general scholarship
that analyzes the school desegregation cases); supra note 202 (arguing that one way to
redress this gap in achievement scores is through economic integration within the individ-
ual schools).
276. The United States Supreme Court's own policy of gradualism has been well docu-
mented. See, e.g., Norman I. Silber, Brown and Shades of Gray: Ex Parte Communication
in the Litigation Over Racial Justice, 31 LmG. 6 (2004) (discussing the Court's behind-the-
scenes maneuvers leading up to the adoption of "with all deliberate speed" in Brown II,
349 U.S. 294 (1955)).
277. See supra notes 117, 119, 126, 136; see, e.g., William H. Clune, Courts and Legisla-
ture as Arbitrators of Social Change, Educational Policy Making and the Courts: An Em-
pirical Study of Judicial Activism, 93 YALE L.J. 763 (1984) (reviewing MICHAEL A.
2009] 1603
SMU LAW REVIEW
Just as the federal trial judges began to design more effective desegrega-
tion plans, plans that undertook a broader range of remedies than the
plans from the 1960s-1970s, the Supreme Court began to retreat from its
policy paradigm of an active, engaged federal judiciary overseeing school
desegregation cases. As a result, the federal trial judges who were trying
to address the real world problems of neighborhood segregation, gaps in
test scores, objections to busing in the Anglo community, growing objec-
tions to busing in the African-American community, and the challenge of
increasing school budgets through taxes or bond issues felt the founda-
tional constitutional jurisprudence shift beneath them. When the Su-
preme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari and remanded the Tasby
case in 1975, Justice Powell's dissent was but one example of the Supreme
Court beginning to look for opportunities to revisit the district courts'
role in the desegregation cases by limiting the scope of their equitable
powers and remedies. 278
The Supreme Court's doctrinal shift was designed to have a direct im-
pact on district courts' handling of desegregation cases.279 Without enter-
ing the debate over what Brown v. Board of Education meant to its
lawyers, the litigants, the Supreme Court in 1954, or the Supreme Court
in 2008, it suffices to point out that Justice Thurgood Marshall, who
helped litigate Brown, voiced disagreement over time with many of his
REBELL, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (1982)) (examining the role of courts as accessible democratic forums
for minorities who are underrepresented in state legislatures and the role of the trial
courts' fact finding function as a substitute for more normal legislative processes, and chal-
lenging allegations of judicial activism, pointing out the important role of constitutional
adjudication and the problem of conservative judges who fail to fulfill that role by actively
waging a subtle campaign of opposition through their control over the adjudicative pro-
cess); Book Note, Grand Illusion, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1135 (1992) (reviewing GERALD R.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991))
(critiquing the efficacy of the federal courts in addressing segregation).
278. See discussion supra Part III.A. In Tasby, the question whether "one-race" schools
could be allowed to exist was extremely divisive. It is not hard to appreciate the district
court's and litigants' arguments: If eradicating de jure segregation is the primary goal, is
not the primary measure of successful integration defined as the eradication of "one-race"
schools? How is this goal of integration to be defined in a predominantly minority school
district? However, if integration is reduced to the status of a "remedy," and not the consti-
tutional measure of equality, the debate shifts. This was the case in Tasby. If eradicating
the vestiges of de jure segregation is viewed through the lens of "history" and the "attenu-
ated" link between de facto segregation and "single-race" schools, concerns about the
practicable feasibility of busing to achieve integration capture the jurisprudential debate.
Whether busing was the appropriate remedy was openly debated both within and outside
of the litigation. The question was how the issue should be resolved: by looking at the
"majority of the community" to be bused and ascertaining their wishes or by stepping back
and looking only at the remedial impact sought? It is telling that Judge Sanders cites Pro-
fessor Derrick Bell's article Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 507-08 (1976), introducing into the debate over busing the
voice of a well known African-American civil rights advocate. See also Tasby v. Wright,
520 F. Supp. 683, 690 n.ll (N.D. Tex. 1981); see Jones, supra note 190, at 33-88 (2002)
(discussing Professor Bell's career from "legal liberal to critical race theory trailblazer").
279. Sheryll D. Cashin, American Public Schools Fifty Years After Brown: A Separate
and Unequal Reality, 47 How. L.J. 341, 350 (2004) (addressing many of the arguments
made by Professor Cashin in her book, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND
CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004)).
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colleagues on the Court about what it meant to achieve an integrated
school system, the goal of the Brown litigation. 280 Professor Cashin's es-
say exploring the Supreme Court's retreat from Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation intertwines analysis of the Court's precedent with conversations
she had with Justice Marshall when she was his clerk.281 Reading Justice
Marshall's dissents in case after case, coupled with this more personal
view of the Justice as decision after decision beat the retreat from Brown,
we are made privy to the demise of Justice Marshall's integrationist vi-
sion.282 As will be seen below, this "history" closely tracks what hap-
pened in the Tasby Litigation with one exception: Judge Sanders did not
release the school district from judicial supervision as quickly as many of
his judicial peers.
The Supreme Court's decision, Milliken v. Bradley, which in 1974 re-
fused to include the increasingly white suburban school districts in De-
troit's desegregation plan, is considered the death knell for integration in
large urban school districts. 283 Milliken "essentially insulated predomi-
nately white suburban school districts from the constitutional imperatives
of Brown" and gave "citizens more incentive to create their own separate
school districts" offering white parents in urban districts a place to
"flee." 284 Judge Taylor's 1975 decision refusing to include the Highland
Park School District in the DISD desegregation plan embraced Milliken
and sparked considerable comment. 285 Milliken set the stage for the re-
medial challenges the increasingly majority-minority urban districts
across the country would face in the years ahead. In 1991, in Board of
Education v. Dowell, Justice Marshall, in his dissent, questioned whether
thirteen years of desegregation was sufficient to undo sixty-five years of
segregation in the Oklahoma City schools, and whether the school board
should be allowed to return any schools to their one-race status under the
rubric of local autonomy. 286 Justice Marshall's dissent reflected the deep
divide between civil rights advocates and the Supreme Court over the per
se "stigmatic injury" of racial segregation and whether "feasible meth-
280. Id.
281. See generally Cashin, supra note 279, at 346-49.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 347 (discussing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)).
284. Id.
285. Tasby v. Estes, 412 F. Supp. 1185, 1192 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (Taylor, J.) (dismissing
suburban school districts from the litigation by agreement but declining Plaintiffs' request
to include the Highland Park Independent School District in the DISD desegregation
plan), affd by Tasby v. Estes, 572 F. 2d 1010, 1015 (5th Cir. 1978). Discussions with a
variety of individuals who were involved in the litigation directly or indirectly at this time,
reflect similar perspectives; next to busing, this was an extremely divisive issue within the
Dallas community and one of the most discussed and critiqued decisions in the Tasby Liti-
gation. With this decision, Judge Taylor effectively put the goal of racial integration beyond
the reach of the court. LINDEN, supra note 116, at 76, 96. See, e.g., John M. Jackson,
Remedy for Inner City Segregation in the Public Schools: The Necessary Inclusion of Subur-
bia, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 415 (1994) (discussing the impact of Milliken v. Bradley on the school
desegregation cases).
286. Cashin, supra note 279, at 347-48 (discussing Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,
251-52 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
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ods" remained to create an integrated school system.287 Justice Marshall
rejected the idea that then-existing segregated housing patterns justified
allowing "one-race" schools on three grounds: (1) the idea that private
decision making shapes such housing patterns ignores the historical data
documenting the relationship between the school districts' segregationist
policies and segregated housing patterns, (2) empirical evidence contin-
ued to show that predominately African-American schools were not
"equal in fact," and (3) single-race schools, even when within predomi-
nately African-American neighborhoods, perpetuated the stigma of seg-
regation. 288 These same issues shaped the Tasby Litigation, with the
court expressing similar concerns over segregated housing patterns, local
control and resistance to busing among portions of the African-American
community, the continued existence of single-race schools, the develop-
ment of special programs to address the racial gap in achievement scores,
and the independent auditor's access to, and examination of, DISD data
to ensure equality in funding and programming across all schools.
Dowell is doubly significant because it also reversed an important pre-
sumption that had guided the district courts' exercise of their adjudicative
discretion up to that point. Prior to Dowell, any actions by a school board
reversing integration were considered presumptively unconstitutional
under the Supreme Court's 1968 opinion in Green v. County School
Board.289 After Dowell, this presumption no longer existed. Rather than
presume unlawful segregation from the continued existence of single race
schools, a school district's "good-faith" efforts in attempting to comply
with the court-ordered plan increasingly became the determinative factor
when district courts were deciding whether a school district was constitu-
tionally desegregated. 290 Dowell was quickly followed by two more cases,
Freeman v. Pitt 291 and Missouri v. Jenkins,292 in which the Supreme
Court's directions to the district courts were clear. The district court's
new priority was to return control of the schools to the school district as
soon as possible; their task was to remedy desegregation only to the "ex-
tent practicable," even if that meant giving up the goal of integration. In
assessing whether the goal of a desegregated-or unitary-school system
had been achieved, the district courts were now directed to redetermine
as a matter of fact and law whether "single-race" schools were a product
of the school district's prior discriminatory conduct. As single-race
schools persisted in the large urban school districts, tracing their causal
roots to institutionalized racism versus the seemingly benign explanation
offered by "demographic shifts in population" or "housing patterns" dic-
287. Id. at 348.
288. Id.
289. 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968). The Supreme Court in Green held that a freedom of
choice plan did not meet the requirement of a racially neutral, district wide school admis-
sions/assignment policy when it did not result in integration because the white students
refused to "choose to go" to predominately black schools.
290. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 237, 250.
291. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
292. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
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tated whether these schools would continue to be treated as unconstitu-
tionally segregated. The same principles applied to gaps in achievement
scores between Anglo and minority students. The burden had shifted and
if an explanation other than prior de jure segregation could be found, the
gaps were no longer a problem for the courts.293
Justice Marshall's dream of racially integrated public schools through-
out the country was no longer the stated goal of the United States Su-
preme Court. In response to this doctrinal shift by the early to mid-1990s
district courts faced an onslaught of litigation from the school districts
seeking release from judicial supervision. Judge Sanders was fully aware
of these cases, and they were important in guiding his decisions.294 The
federal trial bench now had to address such malleable standards as "good
faith efforts" on the part of the school districts in determining whether
the district was fully desegregated, a finding which depended more on the
courts' determination that there was nothing workable left in its remedial
grab-bag then it did on their determination that there was nothing left to
do. The link between single-race schools and achievement score gaps, the
standard bearers of the federal courts' early determinations that schools
in this country were unconstitutionally segregated, for some had "re-
ceded" into history as cases were in the courts for decades.
Needless to say, the "good faith" of DISD became a focal point of the
litigation, and was called into question whenever the district failed to
comply with the court-ordered plan, or whenever the board's rancorous
deliberations, which often left the board split along racial lines, were cov-
ered in the news. Judge Sanders had to revisit the issues of "single-race"
schools and "achievement score gaps" under this new constitutional juris-
prudence, issues which resonate in his opinions as personally troubling.
When Judge Sanders declared the district unitary, the standards set out
by the Supreme Court guided his decision, but this does not mean they
were outcome determinative in a narrow formalistic sense. Clearly troub-
led by what he, and many others, viewed as the "attenuated" link be-
tween "single race schools" and de jure school desegregation after twenty
years of litigation, Judge Sanders' decision is essentially pragmatic.
Pragmatically, it is impossible to maintain no causal relationship existed
between policies of racial segregation and oppression that permeated
Dallas, Texas (and which some might argue still do to some extent) and
racially segregated housing patterns in Dallas. Judge Sanders' adoption
of the term "attenuated" to describe the relationship between single-race
schools, Dallas' segregated housing patterns, and prior de jure segrega-
tion acknowledges a relationship, whereas the question raised by the Su-
preme Court, and not effectively answered, was how this relationship
should be defined and addressed constitutionally.
293. See, e.g., Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 120 n.2.
294. See supra Part III.C. In the three major opinions issued by Judge Sanders address-
ing (1) the desegregation plan, (2) the question of unitary status, and (3) the question of
dismissal, he was meticulous in setting out the applicable Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit
standards and principles, and the work of his fellow federal trial court judges.
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There is no inherent logic to the argument that the passage of time and
intervening events had so refashioned the social, cultural, political, and
demographic landscape of Dallas in 1994 that its racial contours no longer
reflected the prior insidious period of de jure racial segregation. It is a
little bit like looking through a telescope; depending upon which end you
look through and which lens you pick, what you are looking for can seem
to recede into the distance, or appear to be right under your nose. Noting
that there was no clear legal standard or developed jurisprudence that
narrowed or guided the courts' determination on this issue, Judge Sand-
ers followed the path of many of his colleagues on the bench in declaring
the district unitary after twenty years of active litigation. Judge Sanders
did not pursue Justice Marshall's integrationist vision, but, as reflected in
his opinion, he couldn't given controlling precedent.2 95 The ideal of pur-
suing desegregation to the extent practicable clearly resonated with this
pragmatic jurist, but he was not insensitive to the concerns expressed by
the minority communities that more needed to be done to truly remedi-
ate the impact of prior de jure segregation in Dallas. Judge Sanders' deci-
sion to declare the district unitary but retain judicial supervision, in spite
of the single-race schools and the test score gaps, hopefully addressed
these concerns. The solution Judge Sanders crafted for Tasby reflected
his belief that while federal courts cannot themselves bring about the in-
stitutional and educational changes sought through their desegregation
orders, they do play an important role. Whether it is a moral role, a for-
malistic legal role, or perhaps most importantly in a democracy the role
of a public forum in which to explore the issue of integration and social
change, in 1994 Judge Sanders knew it was not yet time to step out of the
picture. 296
District court judges involved in the desegregation cases found them-
selves enmeshed in the daily administration of the schools, supervising,
among other things, hiring, busing, curriculum, and special programs.
When they sat on the bench to consider motions to modify plans or mo-
tions to enforce plans, they considered a range of facts other than those
narrowly defined as evidentiary facts introduced on the record; they con-
sidered facts they had access to through the use of special masters, and
through their own interaction with the school boards, the litigants, and
the local communities. At times, the remedies available to the district
295. Supra notes 278-93 and accompanying text.
296. See Book Note, supra note 27. In the Book Note both the book reviewed and the
article itself reflect the legal discourse of the time and question the role that should or
could be played by the federal courts in effecting broad social change in the country's
public schools. Id. at 1135. The reviewer points to the moral force of the district courts'
equitable decrees as significant in shaping the social conscience while acknowledging the
remedial conundrum. Id. at 1140. If the courts are so seemingly ill equipped to redress
these issues perhaps they should cease attempting to do so. See, e.g., Wendy Parker, The
Supreme Court and the Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 475 (1999) (exploring the district courts' exercise of their extensive remedial powers
and the lack of a clear understanding of the "harm" caused by segregation or the remedies
necessary to fully remediate this harm).
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courts seemed wholly inadequate, especially when school districts
claimed they lacked the funds to implement necessary programs. When
the district courts were asked by the school districts to declare unitary
status, the courts were inevitably aware of the larger political dialogue
taking place outside their doors, and the jurisprudential dialogue taking
place amongst their colleagues across the country. The question Judge
Sanders had to answer in 2003, ten years after he had declared the district
unitary, was whether the goals and standards of both the Supreme Court
and the district court for the desegregation plan had been met. When
DISD sought an end to court supervision, divisions and disagreements
about whether all desegregation practicable had been achieved, and
whether vestiges of de jure segregation existed still permeated the litiga-
tion. Some things had changed in the years since Judge Sanders was as-
signed the Tasby Litigation: he was a much more experienced federal trial
judge and DISD had continued to lose Anglo enrollments. However
other aspects of the case had not altered substantially: housing patterns in
Dallas were still highly racialized and the gap in achievement scores be-
tween Anglo students and African-American students had not com-
pletely closed.
To the minority communities, almost as important as the desegregation
plan itself was the fact that the district court had proven an accessible
public forum where the plaintiffs, the intervenors, the NAACP, DISD,
and other members of the community could come together and express
their concerns directly to one another and to Judge Sanders. Judge Sand-
ers skillfully used the courtroom and the litigation as a way to bring dis-
parate voices and perspectives together to address problems and find
possible solutions. He did this by requiring the litigants to sit down, face-
to-face, and listen to one another. Judge Sanders had great faith in the
democratic process of an engaged dialogue, parties offering their posi-
tions and responding to their "opponents." In this context Judge Sanders
expected the parties to act in good faith and honestly determine what
could be agreed upon and what could not.2 97 At no time during the
Tasby Litigation did the court loom over the litigation or attempt to insert
itself as an expert on educational reform. During this last stage of the
litigation, losing this public forum concerned the minority parents in
DISD almost as much as anything else; their concerns were an important
factor as Judge Sanders weighed what was to be his final decision in the
case. Did the parties, and the district's parents, still need a neutral, public
297. It is impossible to recount the number of times parents and other concerned par-
ties approached the court about their concerns regarding a school or the district, perceiving
Judge Sanders and the independent auditors as more responsive to their individual con-
cerns than DISD. My own personal experiences as a parent with a child in DISD, along
with my discussions with Judge Sanders, demonstrate the openness of the court to a variety
of concerns, even if they were not formally brought to the attention of Judge Sanders by
the litigants. I was personally involved in one such instance. The Anglo parents at a major-
ity-minority school approached Judge Sanders expressing their concern that DISD was al-
lowing, even encouraging, Anglo parents within their school's attendance zone to transfer
to a nearby majority Anglo school on tenuous grounds.
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forum in which to discuss their concerns, and a federal judge overseeing
that forum to ensure an open and engaged dialogue about the problems
facing DISD? Or were the questions and concerns being brought to the
court now better handled by DISD without court supervision? Where
did the question of seemingly intractable gaps in achievement scores fall
within the range of issues addressed by a federal trial court judge consid-
ering the dismissal of a school desegregation case? Was this a problem
that required the court to fashion yet another remedy, or order additional
spending? Was this "gap" sufficient evidence the prior de jure segrega-
tion had not been eliminated "root and branch" to keep the case in court
for another year, or two, or three?
Which lens would the court look through to make its final decision? I
think Judge Sanders adopted the correct perspective: the gap in achieve-
ment scores and the single-race schools reflected the history of racial
apartheid in Dallas, but the available solutions were either not "practica-
bly feasible" for a court to undertake or fell within the special compe-
tency of DISD, and its Board of Trustees to fashion and administer.
There might be policies and programs available to them-for example,
economic integration-which simply exceeded the courts' equitable dis-
cretion, or judicial competence, as defined by the current Supreme
Court.298 Equally important to Judge Sanders was the observable change
in the electoral and board politics of DISD. He could see that challeng-
ing educational issues were being addressed more openly and systemati-
cally by the board; the minority communities had demanded and won the
right to sit at the decision makers' table and have their voices heard.
E. THE DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT POST TASBY
I recall asking Judge Sanders about his decision in 2003 to release
DISD from judicial supervision and dismiss the Tasby Litigation. Large
298. For example, what is the solution to the gap in achievement scores? Many com-
mentators point to the insidious impact of de facto segregation on academic achievement,
but this more nuanced form of institutionalized racism was set beyond the trial courts'
reach early on in the school desegregation cases. There was nothing to stop DISD on its
own from addressing the problem of economic homogeneity, within the district on a school
by school basis. If black students disproportionately attended schools located in economi-
cally disadvantaged neighborhoods and that had an adverse impact on students' academic
achievement, the district could redistribute student populations using factors other than
race to address this perceived problem. See Cashin, supra note 279, at 352-61. One poten-
tial solution, economic integration, has received positive reviews from those who claim it
redresses the cultural and social predictors of low economic performance. Id. at 355-61; see
also Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration
of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1334, 1337-53 (2004) (citing studies showing that
equalizing funding between schools does not necessarily equalize test scores, and posing
the question whether targeting resources, or non-equitable funding strategies, can address
the core of the problem "described" by achievement test score gaps); Emily Bazelon, The
Next Kind of Integration, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 20, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/07/20/magazine/2integration-t.htmlr=1 (describing the Louisville, Kentucky
School District's efforts to devise an alternative student assignment plan after the Supreme
Court's decision in Meredith and reflecting on actions being taken in other schools, includ-
ing Beaumont, Texas, to "switch to class-based integration").
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urban school districts that had operated under judicial supervision for
over twenty years and whose primary institutional goals had been compli-
ance with court ordered desegregation plans often found their unitary
status a challenge. Could such a district like DISD move forward effec-
tively, developing new policies to address their majority-minority status,
forging new political and institutional alliances, and fashioning a new
democratic dialogue to address the evolving question of equity and equal-
ity in educational opportunity? Judge Sanders and I discussed one of the
major challenges facing DISD: How would it define educational equity
and equality in a multiracial district with high levels of poverty? What
role if any should race, ethnicity, or class play as DISD faced a future in
which the racial and ethnic landscape of the district was drastically differ-
ent from that confronting Judge Sanders in 1981? Judge Sanders' answer
was a mix of common sense and judicial wisdom: He felt DISD, its Board
of Trustees, and its communities needed to approach these issues with a
fresh perspective, acknowledging the lessons learned during the desegre-
gation litigation, but open to the new issues and challenges that would
inevitably arise. As the federal district court judge who had provided the
public forum and overseen much of the debate about how to address past
wrongs in Dallas, Judge Sanders wisely believed that the appropriate pub-
lic forum for raising and addressing future challenges and concerns, for
now, was DISD's Board of Trustees. The larger political process needed
an opportunity to work and if the local communities disagreed with their
board member they could elect a different representative. It was time, as
Judge Sanders' opinion states, for the federal courts to step back.
Judge Sanders correctly predicted the community's desire and willing-
ness to move the debate about educational policy in DISD out of the
courtroom and into the public arena. Since the Tasby Litigation was dis-
missed, DISD has been subjected to its fair share of public scrutiny, re-
flecting the community's desire for transparency and accountability in its
public schools. A brief review of one year's worth of news articles about
DISD reveals a diverse array of topics and concerns discussed in the
available public forums including the press, both print and digital, in-
ternet forums such as blogs, the School Board's meetings, and the larger
political arena. 299 In his final two major opinions-the first declaring the
299. See, e.g., Karen Harper, Texas High School Students Forced to Fight in Cage
Matches, BIRMINGHAM PROGRESSIVE POL. EXAMINER, Mar. 21, 2009. While these articles
do not reflect the many positive achievements of the district, they do illustrate the extent to
which DISD is subjected to public scrutiny and highlight the increasingly open access for
members of the community to a public discourse about the district. Tawnell D. Hobbs et
al., Mayor Tom Leppert Exploring Takeover of Dallas School District, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Feb. 24, 2009, available at http://www.da.asnews.comsharedcontent/dws/dn/latest
news/stories/022209dnmetmayordisd.3ebacb.html; Press Release, U.S. Attorney Richard
B. Roper, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Dallas Independent School District Executive and
Houston Businessman Convicted in Federal Corruption Trial (July 10, 2008), available at
http:/dallas.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel08/corruption07l008.htm; Matt Pulle, Dallas Inde-
pendent School District's Check Register Dropped From Website. .. and other unsolicited




district unitary and the second entering a final judgment dismissing the
litigation-Judge Sanders anticipated many of the problems that would
challenge the district as it moved forward; the challenge of developing
bilingual/ESL programs in a majority Latino district with a large popula-
tion of LEP students; the challenge of attaining and maintaining equality
and equity in per pupil expenditures as the district moves out from under
the funding mandates of the desegregation plan; the challenge of devel-
oping a multicultural dialogue within the community regarding educa-
tional policy; the challenge of ensuring racial harmony and open debate
about educational policies by the Board of Trustees; the continuing chal-
lenge of closing testing gaps; and ensuring future Board of Trustees' com-
mitment to actively evaluating and monitoring district programs to ensure
educational equality and equity for all of the district's students.
1. A Majority-Minority District: The Mexican-American Experience in
Texas
From Judge Sanders' perspective, one of the major challenges facing
DISD was how it would handle its evolution into a majority Latino dis-
trict. Judge Sanders was extremely sensitive to the fact that, in Texas,
Fourteenth Amendment race jurisprudence and de jure discrimination
could not be narrowly viewed as it was in many other places in the coun-
try as a binary phenomenon involving African-Americans and Anglos.
And he was aware that the relationship between the African-American
and Latino communities in Dallas, Texas, paralleled that in other states:
there were aspects of cooperation and coalition building, but also dimen-
sions of conflict, which is understandable when the dominant political dis-
course is couched in terms of competition among diverse communities
over scarce resources, including judicially created "rights" and entitle-
ments.300 The Tasby Litigation itself provides a glimpse into the Mexican-
and-other-unsolicited-commentary-on-dallasisdorg/ (discussing DISD's actions following
the revelation that the district had overspent its operating budget by tens of millions of
dollars).
300. See, e.g., George A. Martinez, African-Americans, Latinos, and the Construction of
Race: Toward an Epistemic Coalition, 19 CHICANO L. REV. 213, 0215 (1998). Professor
Martinez discusses the seeming tension between Latinos and African-Americans as Lati-
nos assume the mantle of the "largest minority group in the United States." Id. at 213.
Professor Martinez argues that the "legal construction of Mexican-Americans as white"
early in the twentieth century has handicapped later efforts at coalition building. Id. at
214. Professor Martinez's analysis uses as one of its examples an incident in Dallas, Texas,
in which "some African-American leaders in Dallas ... argued that Mexican-Americans
should not share in the benefits or gains achieved by African-Americans" because they
were not similarly discriminated against. Id. at 215. Professor Martinez tracks the "racial-
ization" of Mexican-Americans, rebutting claims they were advantaged by this early racial
construction and pointing to their experiences of isolation, discrimination, and segregation.
Id. at 215-16. He argues that by understanding the Mexican-American experience and the
community's long history of waging a "battle for civil rights," the "free-rider" misunder-
standing can be avoided. Id. at 217. Professor Martinez's documentation of these early
civil rights battles begins with two school desegregation cases, Westminster School District
v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947), and Gonzalez v. Sheely, 96 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Ariz.
1951). Martinez, supra at 217. Both of these cases predate and anticipate Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), by holding that intentional racial discrimination and the
1612 [Vol. 62
Remembering Judge Sanders
American community's use of litigation to expose their experiences of
discrimination and marginalization, and to secure their constitutional
rights and remedies. 30 1 Some argue that acknowledging Latinos' experi-
ence of discrimination and segregation and exploring it through a lens
that moves away from a binary, racialized jurisprudence to one that is
truly multiracial and multicultural "may dilute the claims of African-
Americans or undermine the claim of African-American exceptionalism"
within constitutional jurisprudence. 302 The Tasby Litigation's inclusion of
Mexican-Americans within its remedial embrace proves this is not the
case. Judge Taylor and Judge Sanders both made it abundantly clear that
the insidious acts of discrimination and segregation within Dallas and
DISD giving rise to a constitutional violation and the court ordered reme-
dies were not limited to the statutorily authorized segregation of African-
American students.30 3 Applying the Fifth Circuit's Fourteenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence to Mexican-Americans, Judge Taylor, and more im-
portantly, Judge Sanders, affirmed the broader principles of educational
equality enshrined in the Constitution. Both Judges held that the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits discrimination in its many forms, including
the segregation and isolation of identifiable racial and ethnic groups such
as Mexican-Americans, or the unequal distribution of programmatic re-
sources and disparities in funding that have a racial profile. The court's
commitment to desegregating DISD meant that all of the students in
DISD were constitutionally entitled to an equal education, and since that
right had been denied Mexican-American students as well as African-
American students, they too were to be addressed in the court's desegre-
gation plan.
Examining the Tasby Litigation with an eye toward the role played
within the litigation by discrimination against Mexican-American stu-
dents casts much needed light on the school district's current mandate to
address every student's educational needs and what that means within
what is now a majority Latino school district. The original Tasby plain-
tiffs included Mexican-American students and their parents, but DISD
objected to their participation in the litigation claiming they were not a
protected class under the Fourteenth Amendment. 30 4 In resolving this
issue, Judge Taylor held that "Mexican-Americans constitute a clearly
resulting isolation of Mexican-Americans violated the Fourteenth Amendment and
"placed a stamp of inferiority on Mexican-Americans" not unlike that imposed by the seg-
regation challenged in Brown. Id. at 218. Pointing to the 1952 Texas case, Hernandez v.
Texas, 251 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952), Professor Martinez highlights the uphill
struggle Mexican-Americans faced in the civil rights arena as they battled to secure their
right to be treated as a protected class under the Fourteenth Amendment, the early Texas
courts' unwillingness to do so, and the importance of subsequent cases reversing that early
legal position. Id. at 219-20.
301. Tasby v. Estes, 517 F.2d 92, 95-96 (5th Cir. 1975) (deciding an appeal by the Mexi-
can-American plaintiffs in the desegregation suit against DISD).
302. Martinez, supra note 300, at 221.
303. See, e.g., Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 705-07 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (Sanders, J);
Tasby v. Estes, 342 F. Supp. 945, 947 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (Taylor, J.).
304. Tasby, 517 F.2d at 96.
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separate and clearly identifiable ethnic group," but he went on to hold
that "the plaintiff Mexican-Americans have failed in maintaining the bur-
den of proof" on the question whether they were subjected to unconstitu-
tional segregation. 305 Despite his evidentiary finding, Judge Taylor
ordered that "any plan or remedy must take the Mexican-American into
consideration. '30 6 In order to ensure that the Mexican-American com-
munity was integrally involved in the development of desegregation plans
for DISD, Judge Taylor created a "tri-ethnic committee as distinguished
from a bi-racial advisory committee" for the litigation, setting the stage
for what the court hoped would be a truly multiracial dialogue. 30 7 On
appeal, plaintiffs argued that the court erred in failing to find de jure
discrimination against Mexican-Americans, while DISD argued that the
error was more fundamental.308 DISD's position, that Mexican-Ameri-
cans should not be treated as a distinct ethnic group under the Fourteenth
Amendment for public school desegregation purposes raised an un-
resolved issue at the time.30 9
DISD's argument regarding Mexican-American students' standing in
school desegregation litigation was an issue ripe for resolution, but Tasby
ended up not being the first case to present the matter to the Fifth Circuit
for its resolution. In the appeal of this order, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's treatment of Mexican-Americans as a separate ethnic
group for purposes of desegregation, but disagreed with the lower court's
finding that the community had failed to prove de jure discrimination.310
According to the Fifth Circuit, "[s]ufficient statistical evidence is availa-
ble in the record to establish the isolation of Mexican-American students
in the DISD from white students and the DISD's practice of 'integrating'
its Mexican-American students with black students."'31' In reaching this
important result, the Fifth Circuit explicitly relied upon its very recent
decision in United States v. Texas Education Agency (Austin).312 Judge
Sanders has already shown that district court judges are pragmatic jurists
aware of fellow judges facing similar factual or legal issues, and Judge
Taylor was no different. The Austin case was obviously known to the
other federal judges in Texas and Judge Taylor, in reaching his 1971 rul-
ing, refers to the district court judge in the Austin case, Judge Jack Rob-
erts, and patterns his holding on Judge Roberts' refusal to find de jure
segregation of Mexican-Americans in the Austin public schools, the find-
ing ultimately reversed on appeal. 313 The question of the status of Mexi-
can-Americans in school desegregation litigation was not new to the
federal courts, but the Fifth Circuit's response in Austin, and repeated in
305. Tasby, 342 F. Supp. at 948.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Tasby, 517 F.2d at 102.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 106.
311. Id.
312. 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972)).
313. Tasby, 342 F. Supp. at 948-49.
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Tasby laid the ground rules for the racial equality debate in Texas. As
outlined by the Fifth Circuit, "at least in the State of Texas, segregation of
Mexican-Americans in the public schools constitutes a deprivation of the
equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. '314 This ruling had a profound impact on
the DISD litigation. The district court, following the Fifth Circuit's direc-
tion on this point, continued to closely examine single race schools, but
now it was directed to turn its critical lens on predominately minority
schools as well, schools that had significant combined Latino and African-
American student populations. The federal courts in Texas were not al-
lowed to "use" Mexican-American students to integrate their school dis-
tricts; for purposes of achieving all desegregation practicable and
remediating all "vestiges" of prior de jure segregation, the Fifth Circuit's
courts were directed to reject any plans or remedies that treated Mexi-
can-Americans as "white," whether explicitly or implicitly, for desegrega-
tion purposes.315
In 1982, Judge Sanders entered an order dissolving the Tri-Ethnic Com-
mittee established by Judge Taylor.316 Originally directed in 1971 to de-
314. Tasby, 517 F.2d at 107 (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Cisneros v.
Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 467 F. 2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972). The holdings in Austin,
Cisneros and ultimately Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), were
significant; they affirmed the constitutional principle that racial and ethnic groups other
than African-Americans were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, that de jure dis-
crimination could exist apart from statutorily mandated segregation, and that school dis-
tricts could not treat Mexican-Americans as "white" for purposes of defining segregated or
integrated schools. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 197; Austin, 467 F.2d at 852, 861, 863; Cisneros, 467
F.2d at 147, 149. The Supreme Court in Keyes made it abundantly clear that where Mexi-
can-Americans and African-Americans suffered discrimination in treatment, they would
be combined for purposes of determining whether a school could be considered a minority
school and therefore segregated. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 199. Professor Thomas Romero has
written extensively about the Keyes case and the emergence of a constitutional tri-ethnic
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Tom I. Romero II, La Raza Latina? Multiracial Ambivalence,
Color Denial, and the Emergence of a Tri-Ethnic Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth
Century, 37 N.M. L. REV. 245, 257, 282 (2007); Tom I. Romero II, Our Selma Is Here: The
Political and Legal Struggle for Educational Equality in Denver, Colorado, and Multiracial
Conundrums in American Jurisprudence, 3 SEATrLE J. Soc. JUST. 73, 74, 77, 84 (2004).
315. There exists a rich legal scholarship discussing the history of school desegregation
litigation in Texas and the Latino community's fight for equality. See, e.g., Ariela Gross,
Texas Mexicans and the Politics of Whiteness, 21 LAw & HIST. REV. 195, 195-96 (2003)
(offering insights into the problematic view of civil rights litigation and jurisprudence as
binary in the face of extensive data and literature historically documenting discrimination
against Mexican-Americans). The challenge at the national level to develop a truly multi-
racial constitutional jurisprudence is also discussed in the scholarly literature. See, e.g.,
Lupe S. Salinas & Robert H. Kimball, The Unequal Treatment of Unequals: Barriers Facing
Latinos and the Poor in Texas Public Schools, 14 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL'Y 215, 216-
18 (2007) (looking at the question of equity and equality in providing education to Latinos
and highlighting potentially new forms of discrimination); see also Jamie L. Crook, From
Hernandez v. Texas to the Present: Doctrinal Shifts in the Supreme Court's Latinalo Juris-
prudence, 11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 19 (2008); Neil Foley, Over the Rainbow: Hernandez
v. Texas, Brown v. Board of Education, and Black v. Brown, 25 CHICANO LATINO L. REV.
139 (2005); Steven Hamon Wilson, Mexican-Americans and the Politics of Racial Classifica-
tion in the Federal Judicial Bureaucracy, Twenty-Five Years After Hernandez v. Texas, 25
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 201 (2005).
316. Tasby v. Wright, 559 F. Supp. 9, 12, (N.D. Tex. 1982).
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velop and receive input from the community about desegregation, since
1976 the Committee's role had become less clear.317 In discussing the
Committee in his opinion, Judge Sanders points to similar committees
and their limited usefulness in other school desegregation cases, including
Boston, Denver, and Dayton, and cites to a number of law review articles
examining the changing role of community advisory groups similar to the
Tri-Ethnic Committee in the school cases. 318 At this stage in the Tasby
Litigation, the question of monitoring DISD's compliance with the deseg-
regation plan had been handed over to an "external auditor who [would]
provide an annual report to the Court. '319 True to his pragmatic and
democratic principles, Judge Sanders' opinion evokes the important role
played by the Tri-Ethnic Committee in the early stages of the litigation in
"facilitating community acceptance of desegregation and providing mi-
norities a meaningful participation in implementing desegregation," but
notes that its effectiveness in this arena had come to an end.32 0 Judge
Sanders finds that minorities are well represented in DISD administra-
tion and that this should "afford the minority community a substantial
role in school affairs."'321 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Judge
Sanders acknowledges that a single committee cannot be said to "re-
present or express all or even most points of view" from the community
and that at this point in the litigation the parties and their lawyers, "in
open court, are the most reliable sounding board available. '32 2 In reach-
ing this result, Judge Sanders obviously considered the fact that one of
those intervenors, the Black Coalition, was a broad-based coalition of Af-
rican-American and Mexican-American parents and organizations.
Judge Sanders' decision opened the court up to the broader community
dialogue about desegregation and reflected his belief that successful insti-
tutional change required more than a court order.
When Judge Sanders dismissed the Tasby Litigation, he did so with the
knowledge that a harmonious multicultural dialogue within DISD, within
the Board of Trustees, and within the community would be crucial to the
district's future success. Dallas had significantly changed since the Tasby
Litigation was filed, and DISD's obligation to provide an equal education
to all of its students could no longer be discharged by simply adhering to
the old desegregation plan. DISD needed to develop a new vision of
equality that would guide it as it moved out from under the court's super-
vision, and it needed to be sensitive to new forms of segregation and dis-
317. Id. at 10.
318. Id. at 10-11.
319. Id. at 11.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. In discussing the remaining parties ("Who's Still Here") in Tasby v.
Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 689-90 (N.D. Tex. 1981), Judge Sanders describes the Black Coa-
lition as a "broad-based minority community group composed of parents, patrons and tax-
payers with children in the DISD, as well as representatives from a number of civic,
political and ecumenical associations in the black community" that intervened on the be-
half of both African-American and Mexican-American community members.
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crimination at the individual school level and institutionally. The
desegregation plan ordered and implemented by Judge Sanders had
achieved its stated goals, but it was not designed to be a narrowly drawn
blueprint for the future of the district. The plan's constitutional princi-
ples were sound, but any future application of those principles had to
take into account the changing circumstances of the district. This is what
we discussed when Judge Sanders entered a final judgment dismissing the
Tasby Litigation. The federal district court judges who handled the
school cases, including Judge Sanders, drafted their desegregation plans
with an eye towards the immediate remedial concerns facing their school
districts. These plans were never intended to cast a long juridical shadow
permanently limiting the ability of school districts to develop new policies
and programs as needs demanded. Clearly, in all of these school cases
when the district courts finally dismissed the litigation everyone, includ-
ing the judges, expected the school boards and their districts to fulfill
their constitutional mandate to continue to pursue equality in providing
educational opportunities for all of their students. This is the core princi-
ple that must guide any school district's treatment of its students includ-
ing DISD. The question remains whether the lessons of Tasby require
more of DISD? Can DISD, its administrators and Board of Trustees de-
velop a more nuanced vision of educational equality and equity in its
schools and classrooms after thirty years of constitutional litigation? 323
2. Desegregation Litigation After Tasby: The Santamaria Case
A recent lawsuit involving DISD illustrates the changing dynamics of
racial segregation and the evolving jurisprudence of educational equality
in a post unitary world. In 2006, a lawsuit was filed alleging "unlawful
segregation of Latino school children at Preston Hollow Elementary
323. The contours and resolution of this debate are beyond the scope of this Article,
but when Judge Sanders dismissed the Tasby Litigation in 2003, many of the issues that are
now coming to define the public debate about equality in public education were already
known or at least anticipated. See, e.g., Khin Mai Aung & Christina Mei-Yue Wong, Ad-
vancing Diverse Learning for Asian Pacific Islanders, 15 ASIAN AM. L.J. 205 (2008); Josie
Foehrenbach Brown, Escaping the Circle by Confronting Classroom Stereotyping: A Step
Toward Equality in the Daily Educational Experience of Children of Color, 11 ASIAN L.J.
216 (2004); Henry Der, Resegregation and Achievement Gap: Challenges to San Francisco
School Desegregation, 11 ASIAN L.J. 308 (2004); Charles E. Dickinson, Accepting Justice
Kennedy's Challenge: Reviving Race-Conscious School Assignments in the Wake of Parents
Involved, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1410, 1411 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court's opinion in
Parents Involved prohibits racially explicit integrationist policies, including the use of race
and ethnicity in school assignment plans, while seeming to accept larger integrationist
goals); Mariana Kihuen, Leaving No Child Behind: A Civil Right, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL'Y & L. 113 (2009); Rosyln Arlin Mickelson, Twenty-First Century Social Science
on School Racial Diversity and Educational Outcomes, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1173 (2008); Mau-
rice E.R. Munroe, Unamerican Tail: Of Segregation and Multicultural Education, 64 ALB.
L. REV. 241 (2000); Wendy Parker, Desegregating Teachers, 86 WASH. U. L.R. 1 (2008);
Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary
Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467 (2007); Tom I. Romero II, No Brown Towns: Anti-
Immigrant Ordinances and Equality in Educational Opportunity for Latinaos, 12 J. GEN-
DER RACE & JUST. 13 (2008); William L. Taylor, Assessment as a Means to a Quality Edu-
cation, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 311 (2001).
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School . . . , an elementary school in a predominantly Anglo neighbor-
hood in Dallas. ' 32 4 At the core of the Santamaria case was the question-
able legality of in-school segregation of Latino students justified by
"language differences." In a district that is majority Latino and with a
significant student population, including non-Spanish speakers, identified
as Limited English Proficiency, the questions raised in Santamaria are
critical to the district's future. While DISD was not itself found responsi-
ble for the school's policy and practice of racial segregation, there is cer-
tainly an argument to be made that the district has had its one "free bite
at the apple" and as a result of the Santamaria case is now on notice of
the potential problems that can occur without careful policies to address
the implementation and monitoring of programs with segregative
potential.32 5
The plaintiffs in Santamaria alleged that Latino school children were
being segregated from Anglo students within the school through subject
class and classroom assignments; plaintiffs alleged that the predominately
Latino classes were physically isolated from the predominantly Anglo
classes, creating halls within the school which were identifiable by their
ethnic makeup. According to the plaintiffs, the principal consciously and
intentionally segregated the students in this fashion in order to encourage
more of the Anglo parents in the immediately surrounding area to send
their children to the school, thereby stopping "white flight."'326 The plain-
tiffs contended that this behavior denied both Anglo and Latino students
the opportunity to be in classes together, and caused "feelings of inferi-
ority and stigmatization" in the Latino students.327 DISD's response to
these allegations focused on the alleged equality in the educational exper-
iences provided in the different classrooms; according to DISD, so long as
the school complied with district policies and procedures in developing
the curriculum presented in the Latino and the Anglo classrooms, there
was no unlawful segregation or discrimination.328 The plaintiffs in put-
ting on their case at the trial focused on the fact that Latino students who
324. See Santamaria v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. Civ. A.3:06CV692-L, 2006 WL
3350194, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2006). The opinion is a lengthy review of the facts
presented at trial, witness by witness, and statistic by statistic, followed by the district
court's careful and clear "Findings of Fact" and "Conclusions of Law." Id. Once more, the
district court finds its expression in a highly fact-intensive legal rhetoric, which allows it to
exercise its unique skills in terms of finding facts and assessing the credibility of witnesses.
See Armour, supra note 5, at 226-28 (discussing the federal trial courts' unique role and
judicial rhetoric).
325. Michelle R. Wood, ESL and Bilingual Education as a Proxy for Racial and Ethnic
Segregation in U.S. Public Schools, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JusT. 599 (2008); Lupe S. Sali-
nas, Latino Educational Neglect: The Result Bespeaks Discrimination, 5 U. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 269, 298 (2005) (discussing the "first Latino school case
which sought to end segregation in Texas public schools," Independent School District v.
Salvatierra, 33 S.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1930, writ dism'd w.o.j.),
in which the district justified segregating Latinos because of language).
326. Santamaria, 2006 WL 3350194, at *2.
327. Id. at *3.
328. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Buscando Amdrica: Why Integration and Equal Protection
Fail to Protect Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (2004).
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were proficient in English were placed in the predominantly Latino ESL
classes, while Anglo students with the same "language needs" as these
Latino students were channeled into the "General Education Classes,"
also known as "the neighborhood classes. ' 329 The plaintiffs prevailed in
their argument that the difference in this treatment of students with simi-
lar language needs was based solely on race and ethnicity.330
The Dallas federal district court judge assigned the case, Judge Sam
Lindsay, found that the segregation was "unexplainable on grounds other
than race or national origin. ' '331 The court went on to find that the segre-
gation in Preston Hollow Elementary School undertaken by Principal
Parker constituted a significant deviation from the district's normal and
accepted procedures, a finding that was crucial to the court's ultimate
decision that the segregation was due solely to the principal's actions and
did not reflect DISD's policy, practice, custom, or procedure. 332 Judge
Lindsay, an African-American appointed to the federal bench by Presi-
dent Clinton in 1997, is not dispassionate in his consideration of defen-
dant DISD's position that the Latino students were receiving an
education equal to the Anglo students when measured by reference to
the curricular content of the classes. In response to this argument, Judge
Lindsay states: "The court is baffled that in this day and age, Defendants
are relying on what is, essentially, a 'separate but equal' argument. '333
Judge Lindsay cites to Sweatt v. Painter to make it clear that whether
education is unconstitutionally segregated or unequal cannot be mea-
sured merely by objective factors that look at the room, the desks, the
books, and the curriculum. 334 In Sweatt v. Painter, the University of
Texas attempted to create a separate "law school" for the African-Ameri-
can law students but the school was ordered by a federal trial judge to
admit the students. Echoing the theme in Sweatt, which was relied upon
in framing Brown's arguments, Judge Lindsay embraces the principle that
determining whether or not an equal education is being provided to stu-
dents requires consideration of a range of experiential and personal fac-
tors, including the question of individual choice. In doing so he casts
serious doubt on the DISD's claim that the Latino school children who
were English proficient would have chosen the Latino ESL classes over
the Anglo General Education classes if given the choice.335 Judge Lind-
say's opinion revisits Brown and its more nuanced approach to the core
stigmatic injury of segregation by focusing on the minority students' and
329. Santamaria, 2006 WL 3350194, at *2-4.
330. Id. at *47-48.
331. Id. at *33 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 266-67 (1977)); see Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds
Other Than Race": The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Juris-
prudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615 (2003).
332. Santamaria, 2006 WL 3350194, at *49.
333. Id. at *38.
334. Id. (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633 (1950)).
335. Santarnaria, 2006 WL 3350194, at *38.
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community's perceptions of difference and isolation fostered by their
treatment at the school.
Ultimately, Judge Lindsay refused to hold DISD responsible for the
policies and practices of racial and ethnic segregation that he found per-
meated Preston Hollow Elementary School, 336 despite the fact that this
was not a case where the acts of racial discrimination or ethnic segrega-
tion were isolated or episodic. Quite the contrary, the trial record re-
counts the testimony of Preston Hollow teachers and administrators who
acknowledged the segregation was a fact of life at the school.337 Signifi-
cantly, the record also reflects contacts between the Latino parents at
Preston Hollow and DISD Superintendent Hinojosa, including a phone
call and a letter, in which the parents attempt to put the superintendent
on notice of the problem and ask for his help.338 In reaching his conclu-
sion that DISD could not be held liable despite the open (and rather
notorious) policy and practice of racial and ethnic segregation throughout
the Preston Hollow Elementary School, Judge Lindsay appears satisfied
the superintendent handled the problem appropriately. 339 Noting that
DISD has a clear policy of nondiscrimination, Judge Lindsay is sympa-
thetic to the superintendent's need to rely on others in situations like this
and to the problems inherent in supervising a district as large and cum-
bersome as DISD, reasoning that neither Dr. Hinojosa nor the school
board could be expected to know what is going on in the individual
schools in the district on a daily basis.340
While refusing to hold DISD responsible for what appeared to the
court to be Principal Parker's isolated conduct, the court found that cer-
tain of the districts administrators, apparently some area superintendents,
knew of parental and community concerns about racial discrimination at
Preston Hollow and the court expressed puzzlement as to why this infor-
mation was not passed on to Superintendent Hinojosa. 341 Although
Judge Lindsay expresses some concern regarding how the matter was
handled, ultimately he concludes that the plaintiffs failed to meet the
Fifth Circuit's "stringent test for imposing governmental liability" in civil
rights cases. 342 According to Judge Lindsay, Santamaria was a case where
DISD failed to take "affirmative steps" to educate itself and redress legit-
imate parental concerns, but such conduct did not rise to the level of in-
tentionality needed to turn negligent oversight into unconstitutional
conduct.343 Online discussions of the Santamaria case revealed a range of
comments, some claiming that this type of discrimination had been going
on since the late 1970s and early 1980s, others arguing that Preston
336. Id. at *44.
337. Id. at *47.
338. Id. at *42-43.
339. Id.
340. Id. at *44.
341. Id. at *42.
342. Id.
343. Id. at *44.
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Hollow would be a perfect place to implement a program of economic
integration, and still others expressing anger and frustration over the fact
that one of the school teachers involved in the litigation was fired. 344 A
more detailed analysis of the Santamaria decision is beyond the scope of
this Article, but the case points to the efficacy of parents, students, staff,
and community members having access to an independent forum or ad-
vocate when issues such as discrimination need to be raised within a large
school district such as DISD.345
It is well-documented that large, complex organizations, such as DISD,
do not actively seek to expose problems that might impose additional
administrative burdens or lead to greater legal exposure and liability.346
DISD is large and hierarchical, and it uses its chain of command to dis-
tribute policy directives and oversee their implementation, passing
needed information from the schools up to the Superintendent, from the
Superintendent to the Board of Trustees and from the Board back to the
Superintendent and then down to the schools through the district's ad-
ministrative infrastructure. There is no dispute about the limited legal
role of the School Board; it makes the general policy decisions for the
district and it adopts, as needed, a range of more specific policy directives
that shape DISD's operation.347 In this institutional context the Fifth Cir-
cuit's highly deferential jurisprudence narrowly defining those instances
in which a large urban district like DISD that must depend upon its prin-
cipals to run their schools and implement the programmatic mandates
issued by the Board might be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct
of its employees raises serious policy questions. Obviously it is troubling
that Santamaria occurred only three years after DISD was released from
the supervision of the district court, especially in light of DISD's promises
and covenants in the Tasby Litigation, which were recited in open court
by then-Superintendent Moses, referenced in Judge Sanders' opinion dis-
missing the Tasby Litigation, and published by DISD in its policies-that
344. See, e.g., Posting of Robert Wilonsky to Dallas Observer Blog, Don't Forget, the
DISD Still Has a Preston Hollow Lawsuit to Deal With, http:/Iblogs.dallasobserver.com/un
fairpark/2008/10/ (Oct. 16, 2008, 3:49 p.m.).
345. The district court's reference to the chain of command and the implication that the
parents, and the teachers who became involved with the parents, should have followed the
district's normal complaint procedures is interesting because this process directs the par-
ents to go first to the classroom teacher, then to the principal, and then work their way up
the chain. It is difficult to believe that an allegation of school-wide racial segregation is the
type of problem intended to be handled in this fashion. See Dallas Independent School
District's Policies and Procedures (local), Apr. 24, 2008, http://www.tasb.org/policy/pol/pri-
vate/057905/pol.cfm?DisplayPage=FNG(LOCAL).pdf&QueryText=COMPLAINT; Dallas
Independent School District's Policies and Procedures (Exhibit), Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.
tasb.org/policy/pol/private/057905/pol.cfm?DisplayPage=FNG(XHIBIT).pdf&QueryText=
COMPLAINT.
346. See Armour, supra note 5, at 178-225 (discussing prison leaders' reluctance to un-
dertake proactive monitoring and investigation of conditions that might uncover constitu-
tional problems).
347. DISD recently published its organizational structure in a 250 page document enti-





DISD would be especially vigilant in ensuring that there would be no
resegregation or racial discrimination in its schools. 348 These promises
and reassurances following as they did thirty years of desegregation litiga-
tion evoke a heightened sense of concern and responsibility on the part of
DISD to be extra vigilant in avoiding any racial discrimination, segrega-
tion, isolation or stigmatization in its schools.
The Santamaria case raises a number of questions concerning federal
trial courts' treatment of school districts recently released from judicial
supervision under a district-wide desegregation plan.349 As a matter of
constitutional policy, when a school principal, such as Principal Parker,
implements a school-wide policy and practice of racial segregation, it is
difficult to see how a reasonably prudent policy maker, even under the
Fifth Circuit's highly deferential standards for school districts, can claim
that it neither knew nor should have known what was going on, especially
in light of the continuous monitoring previously mandated under the
court's desegregation order.350 It is equally difficult to comprehend as a
matter of constitutional policy that in order for an overt, continuous
school-wide policy and practice of racial segregation to meet the Fifth
Circuit's institutional liability standards, such segregation must permeate
all of the schools in the district or have been explicitly authorized or rati-
fied by the Board of Trustees. 35 1 The district court in Santamaria seems
to treat the case as one free bite at the apple for DISD.352 The size of the
district, the difficulty inherent in managing so many schools, and the dis-
trict's hierarchical institutional structure are viewed by the district court
as limiting DISD's constitutional responsibilities, 353 even though the
Tasby Litigation dealt with similar issues and challenges for over thirty
years without reaching this conclusion. Effectively, the holding insulates
DISD from any legal responsibility for acts of institutional racial discrimi-
nation and resegregation undertaken openly in one of its schools.354
348. See Tasby v. Moses, 265 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766-67 (N.D. Tex. 2003); BD. OF TRS.,
DALLAS INDEP. SCH. DIST., DECLARATION OF COMMITMENTS AND COVENANTS UPON RE-
LEASE FROM COURT SUPERVISION, available at http://www.dallasisd.org/about/boardcandc.
htm.
349. See generally Santamaria v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. Civ. A. 3:06CV692-L,
2006 WL 3350194 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2006).
350. See Armour, supra note 5, at 178-81, 213-25 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's evolving
standard in "municipal" liability cases under 48 U.S.C.§ 1983).
351. The Santamaria opinion warrants further study on this point since it appears to
misapply the policy and practice element of a civil rights municipal liability claim to the
facts of the case. Id.
352. See Santamaria, 2006 WL 3350194, at *42-44.
353. See id.
354. The court's application of the municipal liability standard in Santamaria creates a
conundrum. Parents with concerns about the unconstitutional conduct of DISD employees
are told to work their way up through the system, but it would appear that taking their
issues directly to the Board of Trustees, bypassing even the Superintendent, is the only way
to ensure that DISD is put on legal notice. See id. at *34-37 (outlining relevant Supreme
Court and circuit court precedent discussing those situations in which conduct within the
institution which is not intermittent or episodic, but rises to the level of a custom or prac-
tice, will suffice to establish institutional liability without the actual knowledge or authori-
zation of the designated "policymaker," in school cases the Board of Trustees).
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The Santamaria case offers important insights into the concerns ex-
pressed by some when Judge Sanders dismissed Tasby, concerns that the
district would not be vigilant in monitoring its schools for acts of discrimi-
nation and that parents and students would not have access to an open
forum in which to air their concerns. Santamaria could be considered
evidence that the federal courts are available, but it does not fully address
the issue of how districts who have emerged from desegregation litigation
should be treated when new acts of segregation and discrimination are
raised. Is a unitary district to be treated as a "new" district, or should
past acts and conduct be considered in evaluating the district's liability?
On balance, Judge Lindsay's opinion moves the discussion about equality
and segregation in DISD's schools forward by focusing on the experience
of isolation, difference, and second class status imposed on the Latino
students at Preston Hollow as the experiential core of stigmatic racial
segregation. 355 Echoing Austin, Cisneros, Tasby, and Keyes,356 Judge
Lindsay's opinion ensures that future debates over educational equality
in DISD will need to address these issues.
3. Defining Equality and Equity in a Post Unitary District: The
Question of Intra-District Per-Pupil Funding Comparability
One issue all desegregation cases addressed was resource allocation-
whether there were racialized disparities within the district that needed to
be remediated. 357 Tasby was no different, 358 and when Judge Sanders dis-
missed the case, the question of equity and equality in per-pupil funding
had been an issue in the school desegregation cases for years. 359 Because
of the racial and ethnic makeup of DISD, integration as a remedial goal
quickly gave way to resource reallocation, building new schools and fund-
ing programs to ensure educational equality, as the court's major reme-
dial strategy. 360 For example, one of the major programmatic ventures of
DISD under the desegregation plan was to open new schools called
Learning Centers in minority neighborhoods that had previously been ig-
nored or underserved by the district, and to ensure students previously
denied access to an adequate education would have the quality of pro-
grams needed to put them on par with students in the Anglo schools.3 61
355. See, e.g., id. at *9-12.
356. See supra notes 300-23 and accompanying text.
357. See, e.g., Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 741-42 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
358. Id.
359. See, e.g., Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d
404, 437 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1985); Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ., 18 F. Supp. 2d 569, 588 (D. Md.
1998).
360. See Tasby, 520 F. Supp. at 737 (indicating DISD's statistical enrollment by race for
grades four through eight); id. at 741-42, 749-50 (instructing DISD to create desegregation
plans throughout the district similar to those in East Oak Cliff, which had received an
increased budget allocation and improved teacher-to-pupil ratios).
361. See Tasby v. Moses, 265 F. Supp. 2d 757, 759, 767 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (discussing the
court ordered DISD Learning Centers, which were "designed to close the achievement
gap" between minority and Anglo students); Tasby, 520 F. Supp. at 749-50 (requiring de-
segregation plans from DISD, which included "[p]rogrammatic remedies").
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In targeting and reallocating resources in this fashion, the court exercised
its extensive remedial powers to equalize educational experiences across
the district, anticipating Judge Lindsay's opinion in Santamaria, in which
the court examined educational equality from the perspective of the indi-
vidual student's daily experiences. 362 Yet how does a unitary school dis-
trict like DISD approach the question of resource allocation and per-
pupil expenditure after the court's desegregation mandate has been met?
Should the district revisit its overall resource allocation policies by school,
by student, or by program? What does it mean to allocate resources in a
manner that is equitable and equal from school to school, student to stu-
dent?363 The Supreme Court of Texas addressed the question of funding
comparability in terms of the state's constitutional prohibitions and man-
dates when it decided Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby;364
while the case raised very different issues from those raised by the federal
constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, at least in the Texas context, the
question of funding comparability is an issue with which school districts
are familiar.365
This question of per-pupil and per-school funding comparability within
the district came to a head in April 2009, but not because of state or
federal constitutional concerns. 366 In an unprecedented move in the
Spring of 2009, DISD announced it would have to cut funding at thirty-
four campuses, some of which were initially created by Judge Sanders'
desegregation plan. 367 The Texas Education Agency (TEA), the state's
educational oversight agency, 368 appeared to take the position that DISD
had been "inaccurately filling out a report used by the state and federal
government to determine" DISD's eligibility for Title I funds, federal
funds targeting low-income students. 369 Title I requires school districts to
meet certain school funding parameters; under this program the per-pupil
funding per school district-wide must fall "within 10 percent of a district's
average per-campus allocation. '370 DISD was informed that failure to
362. See Santamaria v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. Civ. A. 3:06CV692-L, 2006 WL
3350194, at *39 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2006). (analyzing the question of educational equality
in terms of experiential as well as objective factors).
363. The question of equity and equality in education has generated a healthy dis-
course. See, e.g., William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn't: The Retreat From
Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545 (2006).
364. 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989), vacated in part, 804 S.W.2d 491, 492-93 (Tex.
1991); see also Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consolidated Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d
746, 751 (Tex. 2005); W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558,
563 (Tex. 2003); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 725 (Tex. 1995);
Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d
489, 492 (Tex. 1992).
365. See Alanis, 107 S.W.3d at 563.
366. Id.
367. Tawnell D. Hobbs & Kent Fisher, Dallas Schools Must Cut Funding at 34 Cam-
puses to Qualify for Aid, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 9, 2009, available at http:www.
dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories.
368. About TEA, http://ritter.tea.state.tx.us/about.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).




meet this funding comparability standard could result in the district
forfeiting all of its Title I funding. TEA expressed concern that DISD had
not been including in its funding comparability calculations and reports
all of the figures from its specialized schools, its most expensive cam-
puses, which included, in addition to the Learning Centers, three of the
district's magnet high schools. 371 The magnet high schools were also
among the special programs developed and provided enhanced funding
under the desegregation plan. 372 At the final court hearing in 2003, when
Judge Sanders was asked to dismiss the Tasby Litigation, DISD made a
special promise to the Court and the community that it would continue to
pursue the goals and mandates of the desegregation plan including sup-
porting the programs created under the plan.3 73 True to its word, many
of these same programs were shielded from the budget cuts and staff riffs
that shook DISD following the revelation of a massive budget shortfall at
the end of the 2007-2008 school year. 374 The question was raised in the
face of this new financial crisis whether the district would once more ex-
empt these schools and programs from any resource or funding compara-
bility requirements, whether federal, state, or district.375
The Title I revelations sent a seismic tremor through the district and
quickly mobilized the community, many coming forward to ask for spe-
cial funding treatment for the Learning Centers and magnet high schools,
focusing on their roles in the desegregation plan, their successes, and
their national reputations. 376 Not everyone took this position; some ad-
vocated for the reallocation of resources or at least the equal allocation of
resources across the district.377 It is not surprising that many of these
community advocates spoke on behalf of schools whose per-pupil ex-
penditures fell on the extremely low end of the district's allocations. By
May 30, 2009, the debate had clarified: there were those who thought the
special programs deserved more money and should be exempt from cuts
under the Title I guidelines; there were those who thought the per-school
and per-pupil allocations across the district should be more equitable; and
there were those who argued the district should put new money into the
underfunded schools in order to increase comparability across the district
371. The three schools, often referred to as the district's flagship schools, are Booker T.
Washington High School for the Performing and Visual Arts, Talented and Gifted, and
Science and Engineering. Id.
372. See supra notes 156-246 and accompanying text (discussing the Court Ordered
Plan for Desegregating DISD).
373. See supra notes 248-55 and accompanying text (discussing the final dismissal of the
Tasby Case).
374. See Tawnell D. Hobbs, Dallas ISD Magnet Schools May be Spared from Funding
cuts, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 12, 2009.
375. Id.
376. See, e.g., Letter from Peter O'Donnell, Jr. to Dr. Michael Hinojosa, Superinten-
dent, Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. (May 12, 2009), available at http://www.schbd.com/doc/15387
758/ODonnel-Letter; Postong of Tawnell d. Hobbs to Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. Blog, http://
dallasblog.dallasnews.com/archives/2009/04/busy-night-for-disd-trustees.html (Apr. 23,
2009, 15:59 CST).
377. Steve Blow, Learning Centers Lose Purpose, Not Defenders, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Apr. 23, 2009, at B1.
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without cuts. 378 Over the summer, DISD "redid" the numbers under Ti-
tle I's comparability formulas and worked to exempt certain schools from
the original proposed cuts. By summer's end, the Board had a plan; not
everyone was happy with it, but at least the threatened cuts in Title I
funds to the district were avoided.379
These questions of intra-district resource allocation patterns will be-
come increasingly important as school districts move beyond their court
ordered desegregation plans. The question has been studied to a limited
extent, and the data to date indicates that "variation in funding within
districts remains high" and may pose a more troubling public policy and
legal question then originally envisioned. 380 DISD's experience confirms
this reality; the final comparability per-pupil per school budgets adopted
by the district and approved by the TEA under Title I allowed for a
greater variation in per school expenditures than the "10% figure" origi-
nally discussed, did not require DISD to make as extensive cuts as origi-
nally proposed, but still required some cuts across the district. 381 As other
school districts have discovered, the district courts were in a unique posi-
tion to target funding and programs within the context of a desegregation
case.382 Once released from the courts' protective umbrella, however,
school districts are finding it harder to explain funding strategies that are
not facially equal or demonstrably equitable or that use race in targeting
programmatic resources.383
Title I "funds are supposed to boost spending for high-poverty stu-
dents, not fill in the holes created by district allocation practices. '384 This
is the stated goal of the federal comparability requirement; Title I monies
378. Tawnelle D. Hobbs & Holly K. Hacker, Depth of DISD Cuts Up in Air, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, May 30, 2009, at Al.
379. While the final plan was not reported in the Dallas Morning News, the Board of
Trustees decided that only those schools receiving Title I funds would need to be brought
within the funding comparability requirement in order to satisfy Title I requirements.
Under this plan schools of comparable size would have the same staff allocation formulas
which led to staffing reallocations with some campuses experiencing substantial reductions.
The other result of this plan is that the non-Title I schools are now at 110%, 125%, and
143% funding versus their comparable Title I schools. The non-Title I schools are the two
Montessori schools (Stone and Dealey), Travis (TAG) Middle School, Booker T. Washing-
ton High School for the Performing and Visual Arts, and all six magnet high schools in the
Townview Complex. (Communications with the Board of Trustees are on file with the au-
thor). See, e.g., Jim Schutze, Wherein the DO and the DISD Have a Math-Off Concerning
Per-Pupil Expenditures, DALLAS OBSERVER, May 20, 2009, available at http:/Iblogs.dallas
observer.com/unfairpark/2009/05/ (discussing available per-pupil funding data).
380. Marguerite Roza et al., Do Districts Fund Schools Fairly?, EDUc. NExT, Fall 2007,
at 69, 70-71 (finding that "noncategorical funding between schools within Texas districts
was considerably less equal than between districts"), available at http://educationnext.org/
files/ednext_20074_68.pdf.
381. See supra note 279.
382. See supra text accompanying note 203.
383. See, e.g., Julie Zwibelman, Broadening the Scope of School Finance and Resource
Comparability Litigation, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 527, 531 (2001) (examining resource
comparability litigation to expand the debate about educational equality and equity).
384. Marguerite Roza et al., Strengthening Title I to Help High-Poverty Schools: How




are designed to layer in on top of the local monies "such that the federal
dollars serve to augment services for poor students. '385 The operative
assumption is that the district is treating its students equally and equitably
on an individual basis, at least as measured by the per-pupil budgets de-
veloped school by school. This assumption is worth examining in a public
debate such as the one held within DISD this past summer. The result of
that debate left many unsatisfied and did not directly answer some of the
important questions raised, such as whether DISD is in fact allocating its
basic resources equally on a school by school basis and, if not, what justi-
fies any differences in the district's per-pupil per school allocation. An
equally important question, but one for a national rather than a local de-
bate, is whether Title I's funding comparability formulas in fact enhance
the equitable allocation of school resources within districts.386 These de-
bates about educational equality and funding comparability may never be
finally resolved, but an open and engaged discussion about fundamental
issues of educational equity, equality, and opportunity reflect a natural
evolution in the political discourse of a post-unitary school district like
DISD. When Judge Sanders dismissed the Tasby Litigation, he knew the
district faced challenges and would need to develop an engaged demo-
cratic process to address these fundamental issues.
IV. CONCLUSION: PRAGMATISM, JUDICIAL CHARACTER,
AND THE ROLE OF THE REFLECTIVE JUDGE 387
How then do federal trial court judges as pragmatic jurists resolve the
conundrum of discretion and accountability-the fact that uncertainty in
385. Id. at 3.
386. See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Improving Title I Funding Equity Across States, Districts,
and Schools, 93 IOWA L. REV. 973, 994-1009 (2008).
387. The idea that reflection is a skill that can be learned and that enhances the practice
of law is not new. See William J. Witteveen, Reading Vico for the School of Law, 83 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1197, 1217 (2008) (claiming that "it is worthwhile to recover a role model of
the jurist as a reflective practitioner of the art of lawmaking"). Judges are trained in law
schools, and it is there that we should look to see if the skill of self-critique and self-
awareness as an antidote to bias, be it racial, gender, age, social class, cultural, or political,
is being developed. Critiques of core law school curricula question why the dominant
paradigm for training attorneys still emphasizes lawyering as a set of neutral legal skills
when, in fact, legal skills and, by implication, judicial skills are imbedded in a series of
potentially distorting decisional paradigms. This is less true in clinical programs where
faculty use guided and structured reflection in clinical supervision as an effective method
for exploring the question of bias as a potential source of misperception and
misunderstanding in the practice of law. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Against Practice, 107
MICH. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2009) (discussing the lack of cultural perspectives in core legal
training and the legal academy's undue emphasis on the "myth" of legal neutrality, or the
positivist assumption that the legal process is inherently neutral); Richard K. Neumann, Jr.,
Donald Schon, The Reflective Practitioner, and the Comparative Failures of Legal
Education, 6 CLINICAL L. REv. 401, 404-05 (2000) (critiquing law schools' emphasis on
technical rationality on the grounds it fails to address how in fact legal problems are solved
and legal decisions rendered). There is a growing consensus in the literature on legal
education that law schools committed to training their students to "think like a lawyer"
need to recognize and incorporate multiple lawyering intelligences and competencies into
the curriculum as an antidote to this historically narrow pedagogical perspective. See, e.g.,
David T. ButleRitchie, Situating "Thinking Like Lawyer" Within Legal Pedagogy, 50 CLEV.
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many, if not most, judicial decisions gives them immense "decisional
power"? Do they approach different types of discretionary decisions dif-
ferently? How do they bridge the apparent gap between judicial pragma-
tism, with its context-enriched approach to real-world solutions, and
legalism, the normative ideal of the rule of law? How do these jurists
think about their ubiquitous decisional thumb on the scales of justice?388
What can they do to ensure that their decisions and the adjudicative sys-
tem's handling of disputes is perceived as fair and neutral? Given the
degree of decisional freedom and appellate deference accorded federal
district court judges, they may be the "most powerful judges in the land"
in large part because "they are the only check on their own behavior. '389
Thus, the question remains, what is the nature of this restraint? There
are the obvious institutional and legal restraints that guide federal trial
judges, but it is also fair to raise questions about judicial temperament, or
character, and how they guide a judge through difficult decisions. Judges
operate both institutionally and individually, and questions of fairness
and neutrality, the touchstones of adjudicative accountability, are ques-
tions ultimately asked of the individual judge.
In examining Judge Sanders' career on the bench, especially his han-
dling of the Tasby Litigation, three aspects of his character, or judicial
temperament, have been consistently on display: humility, courage, and
self-awareness. 390 Why is self-awareness, the capacity for self-reflection,
an important judicial trait? How can it be cultivated? Does it offer an
answer to the questions posed above? Self-awareness, as a conscious ju-
dicial strategy, can help redress the problematic role personal and institu-
tional preconceptions can play in shaping judges' responses to the
uncertainty inherent in discretionary decisions, especially decisions that
touch upon areas of potential bias such as race, age, gender, disability,
social class, or any other quality that might insert the distorting lens of
ST. L. REV. 29, 31 (2003) ("The trend in recent years, however, has been to view the
traditional notion of 'thinking like a lawyer' as unduly narrow and restrictive."); Philip C.
Kissam, The Ideology of the Case Method/Final Examination Law School, 70 U. CIN. L.
REV. 137 (2001).
388. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 3, at 35 (providing a thorough overview of the range
of scholarship exploring judicial decision making and how it is shaped by explicit decisional
methodologies as well as implicit biases, be they psychological, attitudinal, strategic, orga-
nizational, sociological, economic, pragmatic, phenomenological, or legalist (citing, among
others, C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL Dis-
TRICT COURTS (1996) and Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial
Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998))); see also
Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (2007) (exploring trial judges' decisional biases and cognitive heuristics).
389. McMahon, supra note 42, at 992.
390. Judge Sanders' other clerks and I have discussed these traits at length and in our
written recollections. See File of Clerk Questionnaires (on file with the author) and the
written reminiscences published in this issue. I did not begin this article thinking about the
potential convergence between Judge Sanders' openness to debate and his willingness to
examine legal decisions from a variety of perspectives and the literature on the ideal of the
"reflective practitioner." See supra note 387. The connection only occurred to me after I




"difference" between the judge and the litigants.391 Being open to
"knowledge about who one is as a person, what one values and does not
value and what motivates one's decisional processes" as a judge is criti-
cal. 392 If the extremely human process of adjudication is to be seen as
fair, judges must "proactively nurture their own ability" to scrutinize their
decisions for preconceptions, assumptions, or any other form of bias
393
391. POSNER, supra note 3, at 35 (making the telling observation that pragmatic jurists
are often the most self-reflective); Armour, supra note 5 (arguing that courts need an ex-
plicit strategy and rhetoric to address the phenomenology of judicial discretion); Armour,
Practice, supra note 2 (exploring the problem of judicial discretion in Rule 11 sanctions
decisions and arguing that the courts need to develop an explicit legal vocabulary that
renders highly discretionary decisions more transparent); see, e.g., Armour, Rethinking,
supra note 2. Journalistic reports and legal scholarship offer insights into the inevitable
biased perceptions of humans when viewing new situations and our tendency to use our
own personal experiences as a template for evaluating others' actions. See, e.g., Judith
A.M. Scully, Seeing Color, Seeing Whiteness, Making Change: One Woman's Journey in
Teaching Race and American Law, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 59 (2007). Recent pieces reflect the
professional and lay communities' interest in the individuals behind the robes and those
same individuals' unique judicial perspectives. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Court Debates Strip
Search of Student, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at A13 (describing a case involving the strip
search of a young female, where Justice Breyer observed from the bench, "We changed for
gym, O.K.? And in my experience, too, people did sometimes stick things in my under-
wear"); Adam Liptak, Reticent Justice Opens Up to a Group of Students, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
14, 2009, at All (describing Justice Thomas's visit with a group of school children as a
"revealing look at Justice Thomas's worldview these days" in which "[h]e talked about his
own school days, reminiscing fondly about seeing 'a flag and a crucifix in each
classroom'").
392. McMahon, supra note 42, at 990-95 (citing Suzanna Sherry, Judges of Character, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793 (2003)). Judge McMahon focuses on what she sees as the
essential judicial virtue of self-awareness, a virtue rendered doubly important given the
isolated environment in which of district court judges work. Id. Judge McMahon's obser-
vations resonate with the ideal of the "reflective practitioner" as a lawyer and a judge, see
sources cited supra note 387, and a range of empirical scholarship examining different
types of conscious, if not explicit, decision making biases. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass
R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006); Jody Armour, Stereo-
types and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 733 (2005); William Bradford, In The Minds of Men: A Theory of Compliance with
the Laws of War, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1243 (2004) (examining how decision makers process
information in an attempt to open up those decision makers to the prospect of bias and
error); Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 163 (2000) (examining the well-documented "hindsight bias" of decisionmakers).
393. The problem of racial and ethnic bias in the legal system was the topic of a confer-
ence at Southern Methodist University. The conference, Justice for All? Perceptions of
Racial and Ethnic Bias in Our Courts?, was jointly hosted by the Judicial Division of the
American Bar Association and SMU Dedman School of Law on April 7, 2009. The confer-
ence provided an opportunity for practitioners and scholars to explore various dimensions
of racial bias in the courts. Most importantly, participating scholars were able to turn the
perceptions of the practice arena-that racial bias potentially permeates the courts and
impacts seemingly neutral judicial decisions-into quantifiable data. Empirical research
focusing on institutional, adjudicative, and legal bias provides insight into what might oth-
erwise be dismissed as mere anecdote. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of
the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1117 (2009) (Professor Chew presented her preliminary results from this study at the
conference); Lee Epstein et al., On the Effective Communication of the Results of Empiri-
cal Studies, Part 11, 60 VAND. L. REV. 801 (2007); Todd Brower, Pride and Prejudice: Re-
sults of an Empirical Study of Sexual Orientation Fairness in the Courts of England and
Wales, 13 BuTT. WOMEN'S L.J. 17 (2005); Sean M. McEldowney, New Insights on the
"Death" of Obviousness: An Empirical Study of District Court Obviousness Opinions, 2006
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4; Monique C. Lillard, Professor, Univ. of Idaho & Ruth Colker,
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that might unconsciously or subconsciously affect a judicial decision. 394
Courts are contextual institutions and neither they nor their judges exist
outside of time and space, history, and culture. It is perhaps not surpris-
ing that judges able to engage in this type of self-reflection-judges who
view their discretion and decision making as conscious acts-tend to
think of themselves as pragmatic judges, sensitive to the human dimen-
sion of adjudicative and legal processes.395 In this approach to adjudica-
tion, these thoughtful jurists identify the essential bridge between
pragmatism and legalism-the intuitive, and perhaps not fully formed,
phenomenological strategy of self-awareness and reflection. What they
know and practice, as an essential juridical skill,396 is that by being aware
of decision-making as something more than the rote application of law to
facts, jurists can begin to root out distorting biases in their decision mak-
Professor, Ohio St. Univ., Empirical Studies: How Do Discrimination Cases Fare in
Court?, Address Before the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools, Section on Employment Discrimination (Jan. 2003), in 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'
J. 533 (2003).
394. See Sophia H. Hall, In the Pursuit of Justice: Reflections on Changes in the Judicial
Role After Three Decades as a State Court Judge, JUDGES' J., Winter 2009, at 5-7 ("Taking
an oath of office does not immunize judges from prejudice. Judges are all too human.").
395. POSNER, supra note 3, at 40. These pragmatic jurists reject the myth of judicial
neutrality, the positivist ideology, embraced by much of the legal academy, that legal skills
and legal methods render decisions culturally, socially, or politically contextless and, there-
fore, value-neutral. Again drawing from my areas of teaching and research, law schools'
clinical faculty have been addressing this issue for years: How do we help student attorneys
become aware of unconscious and subconscious biases that come into play in the represen-
tational and adjudicative contexts? A major component in the orientation provided stu-
dents in the Civil Clinic at SMU Dedman School of Law involves exploring and examining
the idea of bias and how our own personal biases (including the assumption that "thinking
like a lawyer" avoids bias problems) and those of our clients influence our perceptions of
the clients' cases. See, e.g., Beryl Blaustone, Teaching Law Students to Self-Critique and to
Develop Critical Self-Awareness in Performance, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 143 (2006) (offering
a method that can be used to teach law students (future lawyers and judges) how to engage
in a regular, rigorous analysis of their lawyering and emphasizing the difference between
criticism, which evokes defensiveness and rarely leads to insightful learning, and critique,
which engages the student at a collaborative level in the goal of identifying how their lawy-
ering can be improved); Carolyn Grose, A Persistent Critique: Constructing Clients' Stories,
12 CLINICAL L. REV. 329 (2006) (admonishing lawyers, and by implication judges, to learn,
see, and hear clients' and parties' stories without forcing them into an "official story" or a
set of perceptions based on the lawyer's, or judge's, personal experiences); Paul R. Trem-
blay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL L.
REV. 373 (2002); Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering: Teaching Psychology to Develop
Cultural Self-Awareness, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2005) (challenging the utility of learn-
ing information about clients' cultures and, given that human nature tells us that everyone
reacts to people who are different from themselves in unconscious and subconscious ways,
arguing that multicultural or difference training should focus on self-analysis of the law-
yer's (or judge's) own culture and how the two might interact).
396. See Armour, Practice, supra note 2, at 730-61. In this piece, discussions of judicial
skill and judgment in the case law are shown to relate directly to the trial courts' pragmatic
and phenomenological approach to Rule 11 sanctions. Id. This skill, the ability to be con-
sciously impartial and reflective about the very uncertain or discretionary nature of the
decision before the court, is an essential aspect of an independent judiciary whose discre-
tion must be perceived to be exercised fairly and impartially. See, e.g., H. Thomas Wells,
Jr., Introduction, Judicial Independence: Preserving a Fair and Impartial Judiciary, A.B.A.




ing and in the legal system as a whole, which is after all simply the ac-
cumulation of these individual juridical acts.397 The call to root out bias
in judicial decision making is really little more than asking our judiciary
to reflect on whether they are acting as close to the ideal of a neutral
decision maker as possible without losing their humanity or their ability
to hear and respond to different personal narratives and examine legal
problems from different perspectives.
This is where the other two judicial virtues discussed above, humility
and courage, come into play.398 Humility paired with courage is essential
to ensure "self-awareness" because critical reflection cannot occur with-
out the willingness not only to entertain the idea you might be wrong, but
to actively seek critique from others in order to guard against bias, per-
sonal motive, or hubris. These virtues are important because they combat
the threat posed to the judicial process by arrogance, intellectual timidity,
or laziness.399 "Arrogance, of course, comes in many forms. The most
common judicial variant is ... a misleading certitude in the correctness of
one's own decisions. '400 But there is a more dangerous form of arro-
gance-the arrogance that leads a judge to disregard the common law
397. See, e.g., Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers
Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733 (1995) (examining the feasibility of reduc-
ing racial bias among "white legal decisionmakers"); Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implica-
tions of Psychological Research Related to Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in
Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 Mo. L. REV. 83 (2008) (exploring the extent to
which cognitive bias operates beyond the reach of decisionmaker's self-awareness); Robert
G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
1861 (2007) (arguing that the effects of cognitive bias can be reduced when a deci-
sionmaker adopts an "outsider" perspective); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law
of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006) (examining in part the reluctance of the gov-
ernment and the courts to target implicit racial bias because it lacks the intentionality nec-
essary to render it legally problematic according to current constitutional and statutory
norms); George A. Martinez, Race Discrimination and Human Rights Class Actions: The
Virtual Exclusion of Racial Minorities from the Class Action Device, 33 J. LEGIS. 181 (2007)
(exploring the differing treatments received by human rights class actions and race discrim-
ination class actions in the courts); George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy, Judicial Dis-
cretion and the Mexican-American Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAvis L.
REV. 555 (1994) (stating that, given indeterminacy in legal standards, decisions in cases
involving race would be expected to be randomly distributed within that zone of discretion
but pointing to patterns of decisions that correlate with race and illustrate the potential
biasing impact race has on cases); Justice for All Conference Handout from Mark W. Ben-
nett, The Deeply Troubling Prevalence of "Implicit Bias" and What the Legal Profession
Should do About It (discussing the problem of implicit racial bias in decision making and
the legal profession's obligation to address this bias within the legal system) (on file with
author).
398. See Sherry, supra note 392 and accompanying text (extolling the judicial virtues of
humility and courage).
399. It is comforting to find that my experiential insights into what makes a good judge
and those of Judge Sanders' other law clerks' echo the ideas of other judicial observers and
judges. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 3; McMahon, supra note 42; Sherry, supra note 392.
It is even more comforting, however, to know that reflection is a skill than can be taught.
See, e.g., Blaustone, supra note 395; Kandis Scott, Non Analytical Thinking in Law Prac-
tice: Blinking in the Forest, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 687 (2006); Ian Weinstein, Teaching Re-
flective Lawyering in a Small Case Clinic: A Love Letter to My Clinic, 13 CLINICAL LAW
REV. 573 (2006).
400. See Sherry, supra note 392, at 799.
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method, that unique mix of judicial pragmatism "in the service" of legal-
ism,4 0 and decide cases based on a personally perceived "greater
good. '40 2 The district court judges who found themselves, like Judge
Sanders, enmeshed in the legal, political, social, cultural, and educational
process of desegregating public schools throughout the our country
quickly learned that they could not claim to sit as the paradigmatic neu-
tral jurist, unmoved or untouched by the case before them. These judges
were forced to confront their own personal biases and moral views re-
garding segregation and the role of the federal courts in integrating the
public schools. Some fell sway to their own personal opinions about the
Supreme Court's desegregation rulings or local concerns about the speed
with which the process of desegregation should proceed.40 3 Judge Sand-
ers did not display this quality of judicial arrogance and he did not bring
his personal agenda to the table. He was willing to look the lawyers and
their clients in the eye when he ruled, and when he ruled, especially as we
have seen in Tasby, he knew he was accountable to the parties, their law-
yers, circuit judges, and ultimately the Supreme Court. More importantly
he was a democrat with a small "d," who understood the important role
independent federal trial judges play within our democracy. He knew
that judges must not only be seen to be fair, but they must be fair in fact,
and that fairness required the district court to be accessible to all citizens.
Ultimately, Judge Sanders knew he was accountable to the people who
never visited his court because he had been given the privilege and re-
sponsibility of enforcing the law-state, federal, and especially that of the
United States Constitution-as one of the federal trial courts of first and
last resort.
The Honorable Judge Harold Barefoot Sanders grew up in the South
and attended segregated schools; he was a product of his world, but he
was much more. He was a willing listener, ready to hear a party's
story.404 He was a legal craftsman whose opinions were clear and to the
point. He was a skilled trial judge who could express impatience if a law-
yer seemed to be wasting time, but whose humor and arched brow could
keep a trial on track. He was a gregarious man who enjoyed meeting his
jurors and listening to their stories. He was an able court administrator
who (perhaps slightly) terrorized his law clerks in order to ensure the
docket moved and parties had their day in court. He was a valued col-
league on the bench, willing to mentor younger judges and willing to take
on extra responsibility in order to make sure the federal courts func-
401. POSNER, supra note 3, at 40.
402. Sherry, supra note 392 (discussing two decisions, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
393 (1857), and Bush v. Gore, 51 U.S. 98 (2000), and arguing that the Supreme Court's
extra-legal motive, avoiding what it perceived to be potential national crises, resulted in
questionable results).
403. See supra notes 117-18. In the 1950s and 1960s there were federal judges who
refused to act in the face of racial apartheid or whose acts were so restrained as to accom-
plish little more than rubberstamping the school districts' foot dragging when it was obvi-
ous they were in violation of the Supreme Court's mandate.
404. See, e.g., supra note 268.
1632 [Vol. 62
Remembering Judge Sanders
tioned properly. He was sensitive to the special role he played as a trial
judge within the triumvirate of the federal courts, but he was not intimi-
dated by either the Fifth Circuit or the Supreme Court. He was a beloved
friend to many, a husband, a father, and a grandfather. He was willing,
when needed, to challenge or be challenged by his colleagues, his clerks,
the lawyers and litigants appearing before him, and his own innate sense
of fairness and justice. In the Tasby Litigation, he was a critic of the bi-
ases and assumptions that had shaped the South and its policies of racial
oppression and he was willing to make difficult decisions with full aware-
ness of their effect in people's lives, without hiding behind an obfuscating
cloud of legal formalism. Ultimately, he had great faith in the federal
courts' ability to move Dallas, Texas, one step closer to a fuller realization
of the Constitution's promise of justice and equality for all.
We have come full circle. What is left to be said? The Honorable Har-
old Barefoot Sanders of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas got it right. Democracies cannot survive without an in-
dependent judiciary, and Judge Sanders believed in democracy as a prin-
ciple and as a practice. When the drafters of the Constitution sat down to
work out its details, they crafted nuanced and complex compromises be-
cause they were willing to find common ground with their fellow citi-
zens.40 5 Judge Sanders understood the delicate balance between
principle and pragmatism that defines the world of a federal trial judge,
and he understood that the federal courts must continue to provide a
common ground, a public forum for dialogue concerning democracy,
equality, and justice.
405. Walter Isaacson, A Delicate Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009 (reviewing RICH-
ARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
(2009)) (focusing on the drafters' need to balance principle and pragmatism in negotiating
key compromises in drafting the Constitution establishing the United States of America).
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